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How do governance systems survive the shock of large-scale natural disasters and adapt to changed 
post-disaster environment in low-income, fragile states? Through what mechanisms do such 
extreme events contribute to changes in the governance system? Scholars of political economy and 
public policy and management seldom explore these questions; more often than not, they focus on 
how conflict and post-conflict rebuilding processes contribute to state building or governance 
reforms. Scholars of disaster policy and management often examine specific changes in disaster 
policy arenas and post-disaster administrative reorganization within the sphere of disaster 
governance. Drawing on both avenues of scholarship, this dissertation focuses on how catastrophic 
natural disasters produce a window of opportunity for enacting drastic changes in governance 
institutions. In so doing, the dissertation argues that increased levels of social trust that emerges to 
overcome the hardships produced by the destructive forces of nature and to fight against the 
challenges of post-disaster crises can create pressure and responsibility for leaders to swiftly enact 
governance reforms. As massive amounts of resources are mobilized for post-disaster relief and 
reconstruction, leading actors of the governance system are motivated to make the best use of such 
resources in improving their autonomy and influence. Because natural disasters, just like market 
shocks and policy changes, have distributional consequences, those actors that have the greatest 
organizational capacity or preparation prior to the disaster in managing information benefit the 
 v 
most from the window of opportunity. Taken together, elevated levels of social trust against real 
and perceived threats, improved levels of resource capacity, and increased levels of organizational 
capacity to collect, use and exchange information interact together to facilitate reforms in the 
governance system. The dissertation utilizes the case of the 2015 earthquakes and post-earthquake 
governance reforms in Nepal as a crucial case study to assess this theory. Using multimethod 
research design and multiple sources of evidence including filed observations and expert 
interviews, the dissertation shows how the earthquakes created a window of opportunity for 
governance reform, and, through the theorized mechanisms of change, contributed to enhanced 
level of governance capacity in Nepal. 
  
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE ............................................................................................................................... xi 
1.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1. Research Question ..................................................................................................................1 
1.2. Rationale ................................................................................................................................2 
1.3. Policy Significance ..................................................................................................................5 
1.4. Overview of Chapters .............................................................................................................6 
2.0. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL ................................................... 9 
2.1. Review of Relevant Theoretical Frameworks ............................................................................9 
2.1.1. Social Construction of Institutions ............................................................................................................. 9 
2.1.2. Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) ......................................................................................... 10 
2.1.3. Strategic Action Fields (SAF) ..................................................................................................................... 12 
2.1.4. Network Paradigm .................................................................................................................................... 14 
2.1.5. Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) ............................................................................................................. 15 
a) External Environment ..................................................................................................................................... 16 
b) Initial Conditions ............................................................................................................................................ 17 
c) Exogenous Shocks .......................................................................................................................................... 19 
d) Interdependent Factors ................................................................................................................................... 20 
e) Feedback Effects ............................................................................................................................................ 21 
2.2. A Conceptual Model of Post-Disaster Governance Reform ...................................................... 22 
2.2.1. Definitions ................................................................................................................................................ 22 
2.2.2. Natural Disasters, Post-Disaster Crises, and Windows of Opportunity ................................................... 24 
2.2.3. Mechanisms of Change ............................................................................................................................ 25 
2.2.4. Summary of the Conceptual Model ......................................................................................................... 38 
3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODS AND DATA ....................................................................... 39 
3.1. Research Design ................................................................................................................... 39 
3.2. Data Sources and Analytic Techniques ................................................................................. 40 
3.2.1. GDELT Global Knowledge Graph (GKG) Database .................................................................................... 42 
3.2.2. Donations Data ......................................................................................................................................... 53 
3.2.3. Citizen Feedback Surveys ........................................................................................................................ 54 
3.2.4. Expert Interviews and Field Observations ............................................................................................... 55 
3.2.5. Other Data Sources ................................................................................................................................... 57 
4.0 THE CONTEXT OF NEPAL ................................................................................................. 58 
4.1. Situating Nepal ..................................................................................................................... 58 
4.2. The Governance System of Nepal ......................................................................................... 62 
4.3. The 2015 Earthquakes in Nepal ............................................................................................ 64 
4.4. Disaster Policy and Management in Nepal ........................................................................... 66 
4.5. Nepal’s Governance System After the Earthquakes ............................................................. 69 
5.0 THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NETWORKED RESPONSE .............. 79 
 vii 
5.1. Effectiveness of the Disaster Response Network ................................................................... 81 
5.2. Network Statistics ................................................................................................................. 83 
5.3. Frequency Distribution by Organization Type ......................................................................... 85 
5.4. Network Centrality by Organization Type ............................................................................... 86 
5.5. Most and Least Central Organizations .................................................................................... 90 
5.6. Subnetworks in the Network ................................................................................................. 94 
5.7. Summary .............................................................................................................................. 96 
6.0 NEPAL’S RESOURCE CAPACITY BEFORE AND AFTER THE EARTHQUAKES ........................... 98 
6.1. Resource Capacity Before the Earthquakes.......................................................................... 99 
6.1.1. Fiscal Resources ....................................................................................................................................... 99 
6.1.2. Non-Fiscal Resources ............................................................................................................................. 102 
6.2. Resource Capacity After the Earthquakes.......................................................................... 110 
6.2.1. Donations ................................................................................................................................................ 110 
6.2.2. Fiscal Resources ..................................................................................................................................... 119 
6.2.3. Non-Fiscal Resources ............................................................................................................................. 121 
6.3. Summary ............................................................................................................................ 125 
7.0 SOCIAL TRUST IN NEPAL BEFORE AND AFTER THE EARTHQUAKES.................................. 127 
7.1. Social Trust Before the Earthquakes .................................................................................. 127 
7.1.1. Citizen-Citizen Relations ........................................................................................................................ 128 
7.1.2. Leader-Leader Relations......................................................................................................................... 130 
7.1.3. Citizen-State Relations ........................................................................................................................... 131 
7.2. Social Trust After the Earthquakes .................................................................................... 133 
7.2.1. Citizen-Citizen Relations ........................................................................................................................ 134 
7.2.2. Leader-Leader Relations......................................................................................................................... 136 
7.2.3. Citizen-State Relations ........................................................................................................................... 139 
7.3. Summary ............................................................................................................................ 146 
8.0 NEPAL’S ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY BEFORE AND AFTER THE EARTHQUAKES ............. 148 
8.1. Organizational Capacity Before the Earthquakes .............................................................. 148 
8.1.1. Post-2006 Governance in Nepal ............................................................................................................. 149 
8.1.2. Governance System Two Years Prior to the Earthquakes ...................................................................... 155 
8.1.3. Governance System Three Months Prior to the Earthquakes ................................................................. 183 
8.2. Organizational Capacity After the Earthquakes ................................................................ 190 
8.2.1. Governance System Within Three Months After the Earthquakes ........................................................ 190 
8.2.2. Governance System Within Two Years After the Earthquakes .............................................................. 209 
8.3. Summary .................................................................................................................................................... 216 
9.0 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 218 
9.1. Summary of Findings ......................................................................................................... 218 
9.2. Implications for Theory ...................................................................................................... 220 
9.3. Implications for Policy and Management ........................................................................... 221 
 viii 
9.4. Limitations and Future Research ....................................................................................... 223 
APPENDIX A.  LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED IN EXPERT INTERVIEWS ................... 225 
APPENDIX B.  LIST OF QUESTIONS USED IN SEMI-STRUCTURED EXPERT INTERVIEWS ........... 226 
APPENDIX C. LIST OF VARIABLES OF THE CITIZEN FEEDBACK SURVEYS ................................. 227 
APPENDIX D. DISTRIBUTION OF STATISTICS FOR DISASTER RESPONSE NETWORK ................ 229 
APPENDIX E. LIST OF LABELS AND DESCRIPTIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DISASTER 
REPONSE NETWORK .......................................................................................................... 230 
APPENDIX F.  GDELT NETWORK STATISTICS AND VISUALIZATIONS FOR NEPAL’S GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM TWO YEARS PRIOR TO THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES .................................................... 238 
APPENDIX G.  GDELT NETWORK STATISTICS AND VISUALIZATIONS FOR NEPAL’S GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES ............................................. 241 
APPENDIX H.  GDELT NETWORK STATISTICS AND VISUALIZATIONS FOR NEPAL’S GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM THREE MONTHS AFTER THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES .................................................. 243 
APPENDIX I.  GDELT NETWORK STATISTICS AND VISUALIZATIONS FOR NEPAL’S GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM TWO YEARS AFTER THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES ......................................................... 246 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................. 248 
 
 
 
  
 ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Data Sources Used in the Dissertation Project ............................................................... 41 
Table 2. List of Governance Themes in GDELT GKG Database ................................................ 45 
Table 3. A Co-Lead Cluster Approach to Disaster Governance in Nepal .................................... 68 
Table 4. Network Statistics ........................................................................................................... 85 
Table 5. Public Revenue Composition of Nepal, 2011-2013 ..................................................... 100 
Table 6. Efficiency of Tax Payments in Nepal ........................................................................... 101 
Table 7. Civil Servants Across Nepal’s Regions ........................................................................ 108 
Table 8. Donations, Commitments and Pledges for Relief and Recovery .................................. 111 
Table 9. Main Recipient Actors with Highest In-Degree Centrality Score ................................ 113 
Table 10. Top Donor Organizations by Disbursement ............................................................... 115 
Table 11. Top Donor Organizations by Commitment ................................................................ 115 
Table 12. Top Donor Organizations by Pledge .......................................................................... 116 
Table 13. Top Recipient Organizations by Disbursement .......................................................... 116 
Table 14. Top Recipient Organizations by Commitment ........................................................... 118 
Table 15. Top Recipient Organizations by Pledge ..................................................................... 118 
Table 16. Annual Changes in Revenue and Aid in Nepal (in Billion NRs.) .............................. 120 
Table 17. Co-Occurrence of Resource Capacity in Expert Interviews ....................................... 124 
Table 18. Co-Occurrence of Social Trust in Expert Interviews.................................................. 136 
Table 19. Development Regions, Zones, and Districts of Nepal ................................................ 150 
Table 20. The Structure of Nepal’s Government, July 2013 ...................................................... 151 
Table 21. Civil Service Jobs in Nepal ......................................................................................... 153 
Table 22. Distribution of Civil Servants Across Government Levels in Nepal.......................... 154 
Table 23. List of UN Coordination Mechanisms in Nepal ......................................................... 158 
Table 24. Co-Occurrence of Organizational Capacity in Expert Interviews .............................. 215 
  
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework ......................................... 12 
Figure 2. A Conceptual Model of Post-Disaster Governance Reform ......................................... 29 
Figure 3. Sectors of Organizations Represented in Expert Interviews ......................................... 56 
Figure 4. Select Development Indicators of Nepal with other Least Developed Countries ......... 60 
Figure 5. Governance Indicators of Nepal and LDCs in 2015 ..................................................... 62 
Figure 6. Governance Indicators of Nepal, 1996-2013................................................................. 64 
Figure 7. The 2015 Earthquakes and Aftershocks in Nepal ......................................................... 65 
Figure 8. Nepali National Disaster Management Framework ...................................................... 67 
Figure 9. Nepali National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF) ............................................. 68 
Figure 10. Frequency of Organizations by Type (N=273, E=853) ............................................... 86 
Figure 11. Mean Degree Centrality of Organizations by Type (N=273, E=853) ......................... 87 
Figure 12. Mean Eigenvector Centrality of Organizations by Type (N=273, E=853) ................. 87 
Figure 13. Mean Betweenness Centrality of Organizations by Type (N=248, E=828) ................ 88 
Figure 14. Mean Closeness Centrality of Organizations by Type (N=248, E=828)..................... 89 
Figure 15. Interorganizational Disaster Response Network in Nepal, Apr 25 - Jul 25, 2015 ...... 92 
Figure 16. Frequency of Organizations by Modularity (N=273, E=853) ..................................... 94 
Figure 17. The Disaster Response Network by Modularity, Apr 25 – Jul 25, 2015..................... 95 
Figure 18. Human Development Index in Nepal’s Districts, 2011............................................. 103 
Figure 19. Human Development Index by Caste/Ethnicity, 2011 .............................................. 104 
Figure 20. Distribution of Donations by Donor Type................................................................. 112 
Figure 21. Distribution of Donations by Recipient Type ........................................................... 112 
Figure 22. The 2015 Earthquakes Donation Network in Nepal (N=890, E=1099) .................... 113 
Figure 23. Semantic Network of Resource Capacity in Expert Interviews ................................ 123 
Figure 24. Semantic Network of Social Trust in Expert Interviews ........................................... 134 
Figure 25. Perception of Fairness in Relief Distribution ............................................................ 140 
Figure 26. Perception of Unfairness Factors in Relief Distribution ........................................... 141 
Figure 27. Satisfaction with Government Relief Services .......................................................... 142 
Figure 28. Reasons for Dissatisfaction with Government Services in the 4th Round ................ 143 
Figure 29. Satisfaction with I/NGO Relief Efforts ..................................................................... 143 
Figure 30. Reasons for Dissatisfaction with I/NGO Services in the 4th Round ......................... 144 
Figure 31. Perception of Risk of Violence and Harassment ....................................................... 145 
Figure 32. Semantic Network of Organizational Capacity in Expert Interviews ....................... 215 
  
 xi 
PREFACE 
I am very fortunate to have had the advice and guidance of my dissertation committee members 
Louise Comfort, Kevin Kearns, James Joshi and David Miller who provided thoughtful and 
constructive feedback on my project. I am highly indebted to Dr. Comfort, who was a constant 
source of extraordinary professional guidance and support and intellectual mentorship. At every 
stage of graduate school and dissertation research, Dr. Comfort has provided critical pieces of 
advice and constructive feedback that significantly improved my scholarly work and professional 
career. Above all, Dr. Comfort has been a true source of inspiration as a role model to me and to 
countless other doctoral students both in our professional and social lives. 
I am very grateful to have had Dr. Joshi’s advice on recruiting high-and medium-level 
leaders for my expert interviews and fieldwork in Nepal. I appreciate the time of many Nepali 
experts who agreed to be interviewed for my research. In arranging my interviews, many Nepali 
leaders were extremely helpful. Above all, I am really grateful to the people of Nepal for their 
utmost hospitality and friendship. I hope my dissertation will prove useful for the country as it 
continues to rebuild its infrastructure and institutions after the 2015 earthquakes. 
I gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the U.S. National Science 
Foundation (NSF) Decision, Risk and Management Sciences (DRMS) program for undertaking 
field research and expert interviews in Nepal. In the process of obtaining the NSF doctoral 
dissertation research grant (#1757111), I found the intellectual feedback provided by the DRMS 
program director Bob O’Connor and a panel of anonymous reviewers very helpful. The grant 
also provided support for participation at conferences to disseminate my findings, and I 
appreciate the feedback I received from panelists and audiences at conferences organized by the 
 xii 
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, the American Political Science 
Association, and the International Public Policy Association. 
 Throughout my time in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the 
University of Pittsburgh, I benefited from moral and intellectual support of many friends and 
colleagues: Nauman Afridi, Fuli Ai, Jennifer Bert, Dan Bisbee, Erin Carbone, Caitlin Corrigan, 
Stephen Coulthart, Jian Cui, Jonas Gamso, Jessica Hanson, Min Han Kim, Jonathan Livingston, 
Danielle Loustau-Williams, Jikuo Lu, Dijana Mujkanovic, Hovhannes Nahapetyan, and 
Katherine Yoon.  
 I am also indebted to my colleagues and mentors outside of the University of Pittsburgh, 
namely, Brian Bell, Erin Dalton, Eric Hulsey, Catherine Jensen, Naim Kapucu, Barbara Murock, 
Devendra Raj Panday, and Katie Stoehr for their extraordinary moral support in the process of 
writing my dissertation. 
I also thank Jessi Kelly, Kamron Khodjaev, Nasiba Mekhmankulova, Anna Barova, 
Shannon Dickerson, Maggie McGannon, Katya Orlova, Sera Passerini, Bahodir Sadikov, Ali 
Soroka, Elsa Talat Khwaja, Abduvohid Turonov, Doniyor Tursunov, Artur Valiev, Patricia 
Woods, and Chengyuan Zhou for their invaluable friendship during my time in graduate school 
and dissertation writing. 
 Above all, I am indebted to my parents Tursun and Mamlakat for their unlimited and 
unconditional love and support, without which my extensive academic training would not have 
been possible. 
 1 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Research Question 
How do catastrophic natural disasters affect the dynamics of continuity and change in 
governance systems in low-income, fragile states? This dissertation research examines this 
question and proposes that natural disasters trigger new forms of cooperation and conflict in a 
disaster-stricken society, leading to changes in rules, structures, and behaviors of the governance 
system. I derive several hypotheses from this proposition with specific assumptions and 
mechanisms of change. In my theoretical model, catastrophic natural disasters affect the 
dynamics of governance reform directly and indirectly via changes in resource capacity, social 
trust, and organizational capacity. The conceptual model utilized in this dissertation also 
incorporates the role of initial conditions on the magnitude of disaster impact, interaction effects 
of resource capacity, social trust, and organizational capacity on governance reforms, and 
feedback effects. This conceptual model was developed based on various strands of scholarship 
in disaster governance, political systems, and public policy and administration. 
 The reason I focus on resource capacity, social trust, and organizational capacity of 
governance systems as critical mechanisms of change is because a thorough review of social and 
policy sciences literatures shows that large-scale, unexpected events create a juncture or a 
window of opportunity for drastic change (Kingdon 1995; Mahoney 2000). Following such 
events, new forms of cooperation and conflict can shift the system to a new state as the 
sociotechnical foundations - resources, trust, and organizational capacity - are realigned and 
reconfigured to support alternative paradigms (Birkland 1998; Pelling and Dill 2010). 
I assess my theoretical propositions with mixed methods research design and multiple 
sources of evidence from Nepal, which was struck by catastrophic earthquakes in April and May 
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of 2015. The 2015 earthquakes in Nepal provide a unique opportunity to test my theory of post-
disaster governance reform for three main reasons. First, I justify selection on the outcome 
variable to appreciate the full complexity of the problem of governance reform in Nepal as a 
low-income, fragile state that has been grappling with fundamental problems of social order. 
Second, considering selection on the explanatory variable, the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal 
illustrate the importance of understanding multiple, recurring hazards as opposed to simplistic 
notions of one-off shocks. The third justification for my case selection is the fact that no prior 
research has provided a systematic empirical analysis of how catastrophic disasters affect 
governance in Nepal from a systems perspective. Taken together, this dissertation will contribute 
to our theoretical and practical understanding of how natural disasters impact governance reform 
in complex, yet fragile governance systems as opposed to many other studies focusing on 
electoral outcomes after disasters in established democratic systems. 
 
1.2. Rationale 
Large-scale, rapid-onset natural disasters are of fundamental importance for governance systems. 
While the impact of natural disasters on human life and property is mediated by the capacity of 
governance systems, disasters also have considerably affected the origins and evolution of 
governance systems. Despite the importance of the topic, not much work has been done on it, 
especially in the context of low-income, fragile states. This gap provides an opportunity for this 
dissertation research to contribute to understanding the relationship between natural disasters and 
governance systems in such settings. 
What is the current state of our collective knowledge about the ways in which governance 
systems lessen or amplify the effects of physical forces of nature? What kind of governance 
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institutions, public policies and administrative processes ensure the design and implementation 
of more robust public infrastructure and private buildings and less complacent political culture 
within which all actors in society engage in investments in reducing disaster risk and 
vulnerability? While some studies found that wealthier countries, democratic regimes, 
decentralized governance systems, and societies with lower inequality suffer less damage and 
loss from disasters compared to poorer countries, authoritarian regimes, centralized governance 
systems, and societies with higher inequality (Albala-Bertrand 1993; Horwich 2000; Kahn 2005; 
Toya and Skidmore 2007; Smith and Flores 2010; Skidmore and Toya 2013), there is a need to 
go beyond such dichotomies because of nonlinear relationships, system interdependencies and 
heterogeneous effects (Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008; Raschky 2008).1 For instance, while some 
scholars blame federalism for the losses of Hurricane Katrina (Congleton 2006), others point out 
the benefits of federalism (Skidmore and Toya 2013) and that we should consider both in 
assessing the factors mediating the impact of natural disasters (Derthick 2007; Landy 2008). 
Therefore, there is a need for improving collective understanding of how governance systems 
and interdependent actors within such systems exchange information and resources in making 
their public and private lives more robust and resilient and less vulnerable to the exogenous 
shocks of nature (Comfort 2007). It is especially critical to do this work in the context of low-
income, fragile states where international actors also play significant roles in ameliorating the 
potential impacts of disasters filling the gap in existing domestic capacity. 
It is also important to understand the ways in which catastrophic natural disasters 
contribute to origins and evolution of governance systems. In the process of disaster relief and 
                                                 
1 In addition, there is a comparative political economy literature that focuses on political institutions to explain the 
divergent state capacities in responding to large-scale crises, including earthquakes and pandemics (Acemoglu and 
Johnson 2007; Kurtz 2013). 
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recovery as well as risk reduction and resilience building, governments expand their authority 
over society with respect to regulation, taxation, and service provision. Despite the importance of 
the subject, not much work has been done. Much of the work in state building literature focuses 
on the impact of crises such as external wars and internal conflicts and political response to such 
crises in the form of expanded power to regulate, tax and provide public goods and services in 
explaining the origins and expansion of the state authority (Skowronek 1982; Knight 1992; 
Skocpol 1995; Doner 2009; Pollack 2009; Slater 2010). 
There are two recent exceptions to this; first, the work of Dauber (2013) has traced the 
origins and evolution of the American welfare state back to disaster relief in 18th and 19th century 
United States. Dauber (2013) has shown that the constitutional and moral logics of bailing out 
innocent victims of disasters has provided the basis for social security programs such as 
unemployment compensation and retirement pensions. Second, Roberts (2013) systematically 
examines how disasters have affected the American state through political, bureaucratic, and 
popular expectations mechanisms. This dissertation research will contribute to this discussion of 
social responsibility by studying the ways in which disaster governance activities contribute to 
the origins and evolution of governance systems in a setting that involves collaboration with 
international actors. 
As a hard-to-predict, exogenous shock, natural disasters test governance systems and 
allow scholars to better understand the dynamics of cooperation and conflict. Because large-
scale, rapid-onset natural disasters open a temporary window for renegotiation of the accepted 
social contract among participating groups, it is critical to study the conditions under which the 
disaster-initiated process of contentious politics leads to a path-dependent trajectory of 
consolidation of the existing governance system versus creating a critical juncture and shifting 
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the system to a new state (Pelling and Dill 2010; Wood and Wright 2016). In addition, it is also 
important to study the effects of natural disasters on governance because such natural disasters 
affect overall socioeconomic development of the country both in short term and the long term 
(Skidmore and Toya 2002; Stromberg 2007; Cuaresma et al. 2008). 
 
1.3. Policy Significance 
Governments, international agencies, and private organizations spend large amounts of resources 
in designing and implementing institutions and policies aimed at responding and recovering from 
disasters. Substantial resources are lost to natural disasters and more resources are spent to 
recover from the losses. It is critical to advance our knowledge and understanding of the ways in 
which policies and practices reduce the negative impact of natural disasters and how such 
policies and practices strengthen governance capacity and mold the evolution of the governance 
systems. These issues are gaining more importance as natural hazards are increasing because of 
global warming and climate change (Ahrens and Rudolph 2006; Helmer and Hilhorst 2006). 
Moreover, it is important for policymakers and practitioners to better understand the 
dynamics of cooperation and conflict that are induced by natural disasters. Gaps in governance 
capacity with respect to 1) regulations governing building codes and engineering standards; 2) 
intergovernmental relations between national and local agencies, which compromised the co-lead 
cluster system as lack of information and resource exchange got hampered; 3) efforts to address  
social, economic and political inequality across communities affecting social trust; and 4) 
autonomy from external influences and constraints produced collective action problems such as 
riots, gasoline crisis and delays in the reconstruction process. Insights from this inquiry will 
contribute to a better understanding of how such post-disaster crises can be avoided or mitigated. 
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As disaster relief and reconstruction can have fundamental consequences for the capacity 
of the governance system in Nepal, it is vital for international and Nepalese policymakers and 
technocrats to have an enhanced understanding of how disaster aid should be designed and 
implemented, given multiple constraints. As Nepalese leaders harnessed the disaster-induced 
social trust and cooperation to build a more inclusive and adaptive governance system in the 
aftermath of the earthquakes, they encountered challenges related to resource capacity, social 
trust, and information collection and use. The study of these challenges will yield insights that 
Nepalese policymakers can use as they attempt to improve their governance system. 
 
1.4. Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 reviews major theoretical frameworks often utilized in social and policy sciences to 
understand continuity and change in governance systems. In so doing, it forms a framework to 
guide this dissertation inquiry. Drawing on existing theories in social and policy sciences, the 
chapter develops a conceptual model of post-disaster governance reform and derives theoretical 
propositions to assess using the case of 2015 earthquakes and post-earthquake governance 
reforms in Nepal. 
Chapter 3 provides a description of research design, data sources, research methods, and 
analytic techniques used in this dissertation to trace the logics of action in post-disaster 
governance reforms in Nepal. 
Chapter 4 introduces the case of Nepal comparing it to other low-income, fragile states. 
To contextualize the research question within the case of Nepal, the chapter provides description 
of how the governance system of Nepal has evolved over time, the context of disasters and 
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disaster policy and management in Nepal, and the challenges that the governance system of 
Nepal experienced following the 2015 earthquakes. 
Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the disaster governance system of Nepal by identifying 
the main actors, salient issues, and gaps in governance of the disaster response system. Using 
GDELT knowledge graph data and expert interviews, the chapter shows that the scale of the 
2015 earthquakes overwhelmed Nepal’s disaster response network, and the large number of 
external actors that responded to Nepal’s appeals to assistance contributed to the perception and 
fear of loss of control as many foreign military and civilian actors dominated the scene. Massive 
mobilization of resources in the disaster relief phase, as well as perception of loss of control in 
managing one’s own internal affairs such as Search and Rescue (SAR) and management of 
displaced populations provide an important background for subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 6 presents an analysis of how the 2015 earthquakes the resource capacity of 
Nepal’s governance system. In so doing, it uses donations data that document mobilization of 
resources by Nepal as well as its development partners in the UN system and multilateral 
development organizations. The chapter also uses financial statistics provided in government and 
nongovernmental organization reports as well as expert interview data to show how the fiscal, 
economic, and human resource capacity of Nepal compares before and after the earthquakes. 
Incentives to command these resources and show that the increased resource capacity has 
increased the capacity of Nepal’s governance system are especially evident in the ways in which 
Nepal has been able to conduct its foreign economic and diplomatic relations. 
Chapter 7 analyzes how the 2015 earthquakes affected the governance reforms and 
adaptation of Nepal’s governance system to the post-disaster situation. Coupled with increased 
levels of fear of loss of control on the part of governance actors, the increased level of social 
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trust allowed the nation’s leaders to quickly adopt a new constitution. As the post-constitutional 
border crisis disrupted reconstruction activities, this further contributed to the salience of social 
trust, national unity, and calls for increased governance capacity and autonomy in managing 
Nepal’s relations with foreign nations. In so doing, the chapter uses Citizen Feedback Surveys 
from earthquake affected districts of Nepal and qualitative data from expert interviews in Nepal. 
Chapter 8 uses the knowledge graph data from GDELT and expert interviews to show 
that increased levels of interorganizational connectivity among actors of Nepal’s governance 
system and their increased capacity for information collection, exchange, and use following the 
2015 earthquakes have contributed to enhanced governance capacity in Nepal. The chapter also 
shows that actors with greater pre-disaster organizational capacity had greater opportunity to 
increase their capacity in the post-disaster governance system of Nepal due to higher levels of 
resources and changes in the governance system that solidified their rights and privileges. 
Chapter 9 provides a summary of findings and discusses their contributions to knowledge 
creation and implications for policy and practice. Pointing out its limitations, the chapter 
provides recommendations for future research in advancing our understanding of how large-scale 
natural disaster affect governance systems in low-income, fragile states in Nepal and other parts 
of the world. 
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2.0. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
This chapter reviews major theoretical approaches utilized in studying governance 
challenges in social and policy sciences. In so doing the chapter weaves together a meta-
theoretical framework that will then guide the researcher in establishing boundaries around the 
research problem and refining the scope of the policy issues. This framework will then lay out 
the ontological and epistemological foundations upon which a conceptual model of post-disaster 
governance reform can be systematically built and empirically assessed. 
 
2.1. Review of Relevant Theoretical Frameworks 
2.1.1. Social Construction of Institutions 
Because policies and institutions are socially constructed (Searle 2005), any study of post-
disaster governance reforms should consider perceptions, ideas, mental models, and informal 
norms and practices in addition to formal rules governing the behavior of actors that are 
motivated to optimize their economic resources and political influence (Denzau and North 1994; 
Ostrom 2005). Contentious political economy of post-disaster relief and reconstruction policy 
design and implementation are shaped by social norms and expectations about who deserves 
such support, who is entitled to such rights, and what governments should provide (Ingram, 
Schneider, and DeLeon 2007; Roberts 2013).  
Social norms and expectations are overlaid with external influence of norms of inclusive 
minority rights and sociotechnical modernization of the system. As external multilateral 
development institutions in developing countries push for codifying informal rules guiding 
property relations (De Soto 2003) and for enhancing informational capabilities of the governance 
system to read, record, and manage its populace (Scott 1998), the researcher needs to take into 
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account how such projects are shaping the post-earthquake reconstruction and the process of 
policy and management capacity building as a result. While such sociotechnical modernization 
would benefit low-income, fragile state to a great extent, inattention to cultural sensitivities 
might amplify vulnerabilities and produce pushback against external influence. Perceptions of 
national security vulnerabilities and fear of national disintegration due to natural and external 
forces can then contribute to increased awareness, push for autonomy, and capacity building 
leading to governance reforms (Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005). 
 Post-disaster changes in the governance system, when studied through the lens of socially 
constructed institutions and policies, require the researcher to trace the logics of action before 
and after the disaster to identify the extent to which long-operant institutions persist and which 
ones continue on shifted paths due to the critical juncture (Mahoney 2000). It is important to 
account for initial conditions of the system so that the magnitude of the impact of the 
earthquakes and relief and recovery processes on governance changes are not over-identified. 
The critical question for the researcher is to identify what aspects of long-operant institutions 
need to be changed to lower risk of loss and damage from natural disasters and concomitant 
manmade crises and what aspects need to be continued and strengthened especially because they 
have contributed to communal resilience for centuries. Exploration of continuity and change in 
such systems necessitate research methods that acquire information from collective deliberations 
about the meanings of patterns in social constructions. 
 
2.1.2. Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
A study of change in formal and informal norms of governance systems can best be approached 
by utilizing the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom 2005). The 
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IAD framework includes useful analytic techniques that guide the researcher in identifying the 
most salient action situations and participants that contribute to reconfiguration of formal and 
informal practices within a given action arena of the governance system. Because a governance 
system is of polycentric nature whereby authority to design and implement policies is distributed 
across government levels and sectors, the IAD framework facilitates the study of main actors, 
their dynamic preferences of policy issues, and emergence of institutional change from 
distributed local knowledge, self-monitoring and dispute resolution at multiple levels. In short, 
the analytic techniques and strategies developed within the IAD framework help the researcher 
in decomposing a complex system into important smaller parts so that one can study how these 
parts and their interactions produce important socioeconomic and political phenomena 
(McGinnis 2011). 
 The essential components of the IAD framework provided in Figure 1 below. Even 
exogenous factors such as biophysical conditions are not truly exogenous in a sense that 
outcomes affect them through feedback loops. While the sheer force of nature in earthquakes are 
truly exogenous, the magnitude and location of destruction it causes is socially determined 
(Cutter et al. 2013). Attributes of community are the initial conditions of the system that include 
social trust, cooperation and competition that affect the trajectory of change after the system 
experienced a shock. The rules-in-use in the processes of relief and reconstruction enable and 
constrain action and interaction of participants of the governance system. Action situations 
constitute salient subsystems where main actors are interacting to exchange information, 
resources, and trust to affect effectiveness and sustainability of the governance system in 
accomplishing its expected outcomes. As actors evaluate the exogenous factors, their actions, 
interactions and alternatives, and outcomes, they affect all these stages by dynamically altering 
 12 
the system. Learning loops and feedback affect both the system and its initial conditions as well 
as the exogenous factors (McGinnis 2011). 
 
Figure 1. Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework  
 
Source: Ostrom (2010, 646) as provided in McGinnis (2011, 172). 
 
The IAD framework has high compatibility with the strategic action field theory of social 
change as well as network perspectives of structural change in governance systems. These two 
theoretical approaches will be reviewed in the subsequent sections of this chapter and provide 
important guiding principles for analysis in this dissertation research. 
 
2.1.3. Strategic Action Fields (SAF) 
Formal and informal rules that operate governance systems, while created by human actions, also 
constrain these very human actions. Therefore, any policy-relevant theory of social change must 
resolve the agency-structure debate; the extent to which individuals, groups or organizations 
have agency versus the system that structures the actions of these actors to produce the intended 
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outcomes. As the IAD model masterfully does, the strategic action fields (SAF) also attempt to 
create a unified theory of social change that can resolve the structure-agency debate. The SAF 
theory is proposed by organization theory scholar Neil Fligstein and social movements scholar 
Doug McAdam. They suggest that by identifying and studying strategic action fields as 
fundamental units of collective action at the meso-level, we can better account for changes in 
governance systems (Fligstein and McAdam 2011). The author’s understanding of how 
government systems exist and operate are consistent with the social-constructivist view of 
institutions and the IAD framework whereby social systems are made up of nested subsystems 
and rules-in-use patterns of participant actions at multiple levels of logic, organizational sector 
and subsystem. Further, they propose to zoom in on what Ostrom (2005) calls ‘action arenas’ or 
‘action situations’ whereby the most salient actors interact strategically according to the rules-in-
use to affect change. SAFs in Nepal’s governance system would be disaster relief and 
reconstruction fields and the constitutional reform field. 
 According to Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2), the theory of strategic action fields 
consists of the following components: 1) Strategic action fields; 2) Incumbents, challengers, and 
governance units; 3) Social skill; 4) The broader field environment; 5) Exogenous shocks, field 
ruptures, and the onset of contention; 6) Episodes of contention; 7) Settlement. Incumbents are 
dominant actors that make the rules and run the strategic action field for their advantage. They 
dominate governance units that are used to regulate SAFs. Challengers are actors that have lower 
influence in the field but spire to challenge the incumbents to gain dominance in the field. 
Operating within the broader filed of environment, these actors use social skills (cognitive, 
empathetic, and communicative) to make the most out of window of opportunities that emerge 
from exogenous shocks or field ruptures (Goldstone and Useem 2012) - which can be thought of 
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as manmade crises that often follow natural disasters. Such windows of opportunity trigger 
episodes of contention, after which influence within the field is redistributed and settled. 
However, over time some parts of the field can be more settled, and others unsettled, recognizing 
the importance of accounting for continuity and change in governance systems at the same time. 
 
2.1.4. Network Paradigm 
The network paradigm and the set of tools that it offers are compatible with the IAD and SAF 
frameworks reviewed above. Both frameworks incorporate the basic premises of the network 
approach to social systems: systems are made up of organizations that interact with each other at 
multiple levels to affect micro, meso, and macro level outcomes in the system due to the salience 
of relationships among the actors in addition to their attributes (Carrington, Scott, and 
Wasserman 2005). Networks are made up of subnetworks, clusters, cliques, or communities. 
(Alter and Hage 1993). Many individuals, groups, or organizations operate within one or more of 
these subnetwork communities within the governance system. Concepts such as communication 
and collaboration among various actors within governance networks and subnetworks provide 
important contributions to our understanding of governance reforms. 
 The idea that relationships are salient as much as the attributes requires different methods 
of issue identification, description, and inference while the outcomes that social scientists care 
about are the same. Social network analysis tools and techniques allow the researcher to measure 
influence or centrality in the network, density and the complexity of the network, and 
cohesiveness of the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Ideas, behavior, information, viruses, 
resources, and so on spread across networked entities to produce the outcomes under 
examination by research scientists (Borgatti et al. 2009). 
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 In the context of disaster relief and recovery, inquiries into interorganizational networks 
that make response systems can help evaluate the extent to which actors coordinate among 
themselves to support specific roles and functions in the absence of a clear command structure 
due to the uncertainty created by the disaster. Gaps in communication and cooperation across 
first responder networks can be identified and studied using social network analysis (Comfort 
and Kapucu 2006). 
The network approach to governance studies and social network analysis tools are used in 
this dissertation to identify dominant actors in the system, their resources, social trust and 
organizational capacity to collect, exchange and use information. The perspective and tools are 
useful in studying social systems that undergo change that can be characterized by power law 
patterns and distributions. 
 
2.1.5. Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
Governance systems are human-constructed, complex adaptive systems whereby the system 
adapts to changing conditions due to interdependent and interacting factors that also include 
initial conditions and feedback effects (Katz and Kahn 1996; Miller and Page 2007). The 
complex adaptive systems approach is especially useful to studies that examine a comprehensive 
set of factors that affect a specific outcome in the system using mixed-methods and multiple 
sources of evidence (Yin 2013). This contrast with traditional statistical studies that employ 
multiple cases to explain an outcome using only one or two factors.  
Viewing governance as a complex adaptive system that is perturbed by the disasters and 
shifted to a new state allows one to study the various ways in which actors, resources, 
information and trust work together to affect changes in governance capacity. Exogenous shocks 
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such as large-scale earthquakes overwhelm the structure of the system that is used to maintain its 
routine functions. That is why the system will depend on emergent modes of organization among 
its participants due to expected failures in established command and network structures. 
Moreover, the dynamic uncertainty that is introduced by the earthquakes also require the 
complex adaptive system approach. The magnitude of shock’s impact on organizational 
structures and the degree of uncertainty calls for flexibility that invites the study of both 
dominant structures and emerging phenomena. This can yield important insights regarding how 
the system can be reformed to optimize its adaptive capacity (Comfort 2002).  
The CAS system is compatible with the approaches reviewed above and provide a useful 
framework of thought and analysis. The CAS approach includes several components: external 
environment, initial conditions, exogenous shock, interdependent factors, and feedback effects. 
 
a) External Environment 
A complex adaptive system operates to better adapt to its external environment and to sustain 
itself in that environment. At the same time the system has a role in changing its environment, at 
least by providing feedback. The external environment of a system imposes task requirements 
and dependencies on the system (Seybolt 2009). In low-income, fragile governance systems, the 
system’s external environment is the geopolitical system within which it finds itself. The task 
imposed, both domestically and internationally, on the system is to adapt the rules and norms of 
the system to its changing environment. The external geopolitical environment can be defined as 
power relations over influence/control of resources, interests, and identities among actors in the 
global and regional international system (Flint 2012). 
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Governance reform in developing countries is a highly complex and challenging task, 
given the fact that both domestic and international actors that play a role in the system had to 
reach an agreement with respect to the distribution of rights and obligations of the system. A 
high level of dependency on regional powers with respect to economic imports, investments, and 
national security while also operating by norms demanded by the UN, World Bank, and 
International Monetary Fund in return for development grants and loans make it more 
challenging for the system to adopt reforms with which its components are fully aligned. At 
times of high uncertainty and risk due to large-scale disasters and humanitarian crises, it is even 
more challenging for the system to use its hierarchical ordering mechanisms to respond to task 
requirements and dependencies. In such environments, hierarchies need to be coupled with 
markets and networks to make the system more flexible in responding to dynamic circumstance 
(Powell 2003). 
External actors with economic and security interests can compete to provide disaster 
relief and recovery assistance to increase their influence and the disaster-stricken country’s 
dependency.  Former rival countries can use the disaster as an opportunity for diplomatic 
rapprochement (Comfort 2000; Kelman 2006). 
 
b) Initial Conditions 
Initial conditions are in a sense lagged variables in a traditional statistical model. When changes 
occur in its external environment, adaptation of the system depends on its state or phase before 
the change in its environment. Initial capacity of government agencies with respect to lowering 
disaster risk and societal vulnerability, designing and implementing robust engineering 
standards, setting up collaborative networks that engage in sharing resources and information 
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through interoperable technologies and conducting joint exercises and simulations of response 
and recovery activities has considerable impact on the magnitude of loss and damage that natural 
disasters inflict (Raschky 2008). Initial capacity of the civil society organizations and the degree 
of trust, shared understanding of risk and vulnerability as opposed to social polarization, 
inequality, conflict, and complacency in disaster preparations can have a major effect on the 
magnitude of disaster impact (Tierney 2006; Wang and Kapucu 2007; Comfort et al. 2009). 
Initial geopolitical environment and international actors also affect the magnitude of disaster 
impact. Especially when the capacity of the state and society is low, international actors come in 
to provide financial, technological and institutional assistance. While such assistance increases 
initial state capacity, it can also produce moral hazard and dependency by crowding out local 
efforts and initiatives (Cohen and Werker 2008). In addition, not all international assistance is 
designed to help the host government as many aid projects are intended to further the economic 
and security interests of the donors (Drury et al. 2005). 
Disasters provide an excellent test of performance for governments, citizens, and 
organizations (Schneider 1990; Goodsell 2002). If the governance system is working effectively, 
then the system survives the test by mitigating the impact of the shock and by adapting to the 
changing environment and inputs emanating from the shock. However, in an analysis of county-
level presidential election results from 1988 to 2004, Healey and Malhotra (2009) argue that in 
the context of disaster mitigation, voters fail to reward politicians for preventative spending that 
ultimately minimizes public welfare losses, instead rewarding politicians for disaster relief and 
recovery spending. Reeves (2010) finds evidence that presidents are more likely to provide 
federal disaster assistance to electorally important swing states. 
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Institutional vulnerability and complacency/entropy increase the loss and damage from 
natural disasters (Comfort et al. 2009). Results from an empirical investigation of large scale 
natural disasters between 1984 and 2004 show that countries with better institutions experience 
less victims and lower economic losses from natural disasters. In addition, the results suggest a 
non-linear relationship between economic development and economic disaster losses (Raschky 
2008). Administrative systems such as federalism also affect disaster impact. Bureaucratic 
organization and framework (like FEMA before and after homeland security) also affect disaster 
impact (Congleton 2006; Kapucu et. al 2011). 
International assistance with disaster risk reduction potentially lowers disaster impact. 
However, in the presence of international disaster assistance and aid dependency, national 
governments have an incentive to underinvest in risk reduction and disaster preparedness 
activities (Cohen and Werker 2008). Economic dependency to international agencies and global 
and regional powers can potentially set up a negative trajectory for disaster impact. In addition, 
international aid and disaster assistance is also driven by domestic political and foreign policy 
considerations of donor states (Drury et al. 2005), which might not necessarily overlap with the 
objectives of the governance system in the disaster-stricken country. Clientelism, patronage, and 
corruption lead to greater disaster damage. Human vulnerability, inequality, and complacency 
amplifies the disaster damage (Fuchs et al., 2007). Higher education means less disaster impact 
(Toya and Skidmore 2007). 
 
c) Exogenous Shocks 
A sudden-onset exogenous shock such as a large-scale natural disaster can significantly affect 
the system and its external environment, triggering a complex learning and adaptation process in 
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the process of responding to such a shock. Such an exogenous shock can have a distributive 
consequence in a sense that it can empower some actors and reduce the influence of other actors 
within the system. The same can occur within the external environment of the system. In the 
former case, the sheer forces of nature can wipe out or displace political leaders and their agents 
and supporters, thereby directly affecting governance change. Natural disasters wipe out physical 
infrastructure, towns and villages or block access to them and displace populations from one 
jurisdiction to another, directly altering demographic balance and affecting election outcomes. In 
addition, the idea of a natural disaster triggering governance change, if widely accepted in 
society, can make governance change inevitable. In the latter case, changes in the influence of 
external actors can dynamically shift task requirements and resource dependencies that are 
imposed upon the system from its environment, or it might allow the system to improve its 
response in better resisting such external requirements. 
 
d) Interdependent Factors 
Critical factors such as resource capacity, social trust, and organizational capacity of the 
governance system with respect to information collection, analysis and dissemination interact 
together to produce adaptation and learning that will shift the system to a new normalcy after 
responding to the shock. Disasters lower organizational capacity of the governance system 
producing opportunity for new leaders to emerge from within and without to remedy the 
shortcoming of the state and initiate political change (Pelling and Dill 2010). Disaster victims 
and their friends, family and supporters can affect governance change by retrospective voting 
and/or protesting due to increased inequality, uneven grievances, relative deprivation, and 
attribution of blame to government (Gurr 1993; Gasper and Reeves 2011). Individuals and 
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communities unaffected by the disaster can also take opposite action by furthering social conflict 
and political change. As disasters weaken governance capacity, mobilize the civil society, and 
increase the influence of external geopolitical actors, the resulting contentious politics 
accelerates political change (Regan and Norton 2005; McAdam et al. 2008). The state might 
respond by increasing repression against the mobilized civil society groups (Wood and Wright 
2016). External actors can escalate the contentious domestic politics, as political change is a 
result of two-level games (Putnam 1988). These factors are covered in the next section of this 
chapter in the context of conceptual model of post-disaster governance. 
 
e) Feedback Effects 
Systems adapt to their changing environments to accomplish their goals and functions due to 
feedback effects. Adaptation occurs when the system learns from its outputs and outcomes. 
Changes in the governance structures and processes produce a feedback to its environment and 
interacting components. This makes the system dynamic as opposed to traditional statistical 
models that cannot incorporate endogeneity in the same model to explain an evolving outcome. 
The impact of future exogenous shocks will be shaped by the extent to which feedback and 
learning happen. Feedback effects work through individual, collective learning, improved 
standard operating procedures, and organizational memory (March and Simon 1958; March and 
Olsen 1976; Argyris 1993).  
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2.2. A Conceptual Model of Post-Disaster Governance Reform 
2.2.1. Definitions 
Catastrophic natural disasters are large-scale, naturally-triggered, rapid-onset, focusing events 
that result in substantial damage to human capital, physical infrastructure, and social 
organization (Birkland 1998; Wood & Wright 2016). They are typically earthquakes, hurricanes, 
tsunamis, cyclones, wildfire, floods, and tornadoes. Such catastrophes usually create additional, 
interacting disasters or crises such as aftershocks, landslides, food and energy shortages, and 
pandemics that create additional destruction, challenges, and complexities (Pelling and Dill 
2010; Wood and Wright 2016). While natural disasters are exogenous to social systems and hard 
to predict the precise location and timing of their activation, the damage they cause in social 
systems is jointly determined by natural and social forces. In addition to the laws of earth 
sciences, a host of socioeconomic and political factors mitigate or worsen the magnitude of 
misery that befalls human settlements (Cutter et al. 2003, 2008). Thus, when tracing the effects 
of catastrophic earthquakes on social systems, the researcher focuses not only on the natural 
shock and its magnitude and spatiotemporal distribution but also on the resulting damage that 
was mediated by disaster policy and management, distributive politics, market forces, scientific 
and technological development, and structural inequalities. 
Natural disasters are a type of crisis attributable to "nature, fate, or God" (Jennings 1999), 
meaning that they are exogenous shocks affecting social systems. Natural disasters are “non-
routine events in which societies or their larger subsystems (e.g., regions, communities) are 
socially disrupted and physically harmed” (Kreps 1989, 219). Natural disasters are a subset of 
extreme events or crises, which are defined as unexpected, urgent, and uncertain events 
(Rosenthal et al. 2001). In addition, disasters are deeply and inherently political occasions (Drury 
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and Olson 1998). 
Governance reforms are changes in the structural rules, norms, and institutions of a 
governance system that are designed to increase adaptive capacity of the system. Adaptive 
capacity improves as governance systems grow in diversity and complexity, shifting from single-
loop social learning to double-loop and triple-loop learning (Pahl-Wostl 2009). The political 
science literature refers to such transformational governance reforms as state building, political 
order, or institutional development (Brautigam et al. 2008). This dissertation prefers the 
governance theory to theories of the state and political systems because not only state institutions 
and political actors but also business firms, NGOs, civil society organizations, and international 
actors play crucial roles in the governance of a country in the 21st century (Ansell and Gash 
2008). 
Governance reform signifies a shift for the governance system from one state to another 
due to changes in its environments, inputs, structures, operators, constraints, and performance. 
Such changes can be observed in written rules, norms, practices as well as events that signify 
cooperation and conflict among actors (Almond 1956; Easton 1957; Comfort 1985; Ostrom 
1990; Holland 2006). Governance systems are a set of interdependent and interacting actors 
(individuals, groups and organizations) with varying roles and functions, decision rules, practices 
and norms that simultaneously enable and constrain political action and have a certain level of 
structure and stability (with shifting equilibria) (Almond 1956; Easton 1957; Mantzavinos et al. 
2004). The basic characteristic of modern political systems is that they include states that have a 
monopoly of physical coercion over a defined territory and population (Weber 1947; Tilly 1975). 
However, the role that non-state actors play has increased considerably over the years (Peters 
and Pierre 1998). 
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I define governance capacity as the ability of the governance system to provide core 
public services such as protection and regulation of behaviors and interactions among actors. 
This includes not only fiscal, but also legal, informational, cognitive, discursive, and symbolic 
infrastructure of the state to penetrate society (Weber 1948; Gellner 1983; Mann 1984; Scott 
1998; Bourdieu and Farage 1994; Kurtz 2013). Much of these properties of governance capacity 
are interlinked and networked, and usually amount to more than the sum of its parts (Castells 
1996). As such, governance capacity can be observed from the relational/network properties of 
political actors who exchange legal, financial, administrative, informational, and cultural 
resources using complexity theory and network science tools (Ruhl and Katz 2015). Scholars 
also use the term networked or collaborative governance capacity in this regard (Peters and 
Pierre 1998; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Ansell and Gash 2008). 
Non-state actors such as business corporations and civil society organizations also play 
important roles in the governance system. I define civil society to capture non-state actors, 
organizations and citizens, and their networked relationships, with varying levels of access to the 
material and cultural rights and resources in society (Bratton 1989; Edwards and Foley 1998; 
Fukuyama 2001; Gibson 2001). Depending on the level of social trust, fault lines for polarization 
and conflict, and patron-client relations and dependencies of civil society actors on political 
actors, and civil society organizations have varying levels of mobilizational capacity for 
organizing action and contentious politics (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). 
 
2.2.2. Natural Disasters, Post-Disaster Crises, and Windows of Opportunity 
Catastrophic natural disasters oftentimes produce temporary breaks in governance systems, 
opening space for renegotiation of the social contract with consequences for distribution of 
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economic resources and political rights (Pelling & Dill 2010). A large-scale natural disaster is 
often followed by other natural and human-induced crises. Such crisis events include not only 
aftershocks and landslides following earthquakes, but also food crises that can result from post-
quake liquefaction and drought. Outbreaks of communicable diseases such as cholera can also 
create serious post-disaster crises (Pelling and Dill 2010; Wood and Wright 2016). 
 When conceptualizing the impact of natural disasters on changes in structures and 
adaptive capacity of governance systems, a researcher needs to consider not only the natural 
shock itself, but also the subsequent aftershocks that can be both natural or manmade. This is 
where natural disaster and post-disaster manmade crises interact with initial conditions of 
vulnerability and social risk that can have significant impact on changes in governance systems. 
Another critical component is the societal response to the disaster and its subsequent crisis 
because expectations and processes of relief and reconstruction can redefine governance 
institutions and contribute to institutional decay, system entropy or institutional capacity building 
depending on how the society responds to nature’s shocks and subsequent manmade crises. In 
this sense, natural disasters not so much directly affect governance systems (except when 
earthquakes and/or post-quake pandemics kill high level political leaders) but indirectly affect 
governance system by producing changes in mechanisms or logics of social action. 
 
2.2.3. Mechanisms of Change 
Much of the literature in multidisciplinary fields of disaster research and environmental change 
deals with understanding disaster vulnerability (Cutter et al. 2003; Ribot 1995; Adger 2006), 
disaster resiliency (Tompkins & Adger 2004; Cutter et al. 2009), post-disaster recovery 
outcomes (Horwich 2000), and the dynamics and interdependencies between natural and human 
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systems (Liu et al. 2007). These studies have proven useful for the development of this 
dissertation’s concepts and measures regarding natural disasters and their linkage with social 
systems and outcomes. As the focus of this project is on governance systems, Pahl-Wostl’s 
(2009) conceptual framework for explaining changes in adaptive capacity of governance regimes 
and Pelling and Dill’s (2010) systems theory-based explanation of adaptive change in 
sociopolitical regimes have been very beneficial. 
Natural disasters and post-disaster relief and reconstruction processes affect governance 
reforms through the processes of social mobilization and contentious politics that involve 
changes in resource capacity, social trust, and organizational capacity. Political leaders have an 
opportunity to work hard and renew public trust and legitimacy of their leadership, while 
opposition members and emergent leaders have an opportunity to blame the government for 
damages and ineffective disaster response and rise to power as the natural disasters create high 
national and international spotlight (Pelling & Dill 2010). Temporary increases in social trust due 
to a common calamity creates a momentum for national unity and bold action (Toya & Skidmore 
2014). However, such unity can be short-lived due to myriad issues that the country needs to 
address to implement reconstruction activities. This has the potential to create contentious 
politics leading to structural changes in the governance system (McAdam et al. 2008). Moreover, 
disaster losses and damages have the potential to create a window of opportunity for 
constitutional reform whereby dominant elites rapidly move to pass new laws without much 
consultation with opposition and the public in an environment that had been characterized as 
highly politicized prior to the earthquakes. The stakes are higher as newly available resources for 
post-disaster reconstruction spending increase political competition and struggle for government 
office (ICG 2016). 
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As conflicts are resolved through governance reforms, increased informational capacity 
of the governance system, renewed social capital and social learning gained from overcoming 
complex issues of disaster politics can enhance adaptive capacity of the governance system 
(Pahl-Wostl 2009). Such complex processes of change can be systematically traced by using 
network data on public, private and international actors that forge adaptive governance by 
exchanging information and resources with one another in accordance with institutional rules and 
trust-based norms at multiple levels of operation (Comfort 1999). 
Many scholars observe that disaster research lacks a political analysis (for instance, Davis 
and Seitz 1982; Olson 2000) although “natural disasters occur in a political space” (Cohen and 
Werker 2008). Olson (2000) identifies there are two reasons attributable to such a void: 
traditional disaster studies-related fields (i.e. geography and sociology) underemphasize the role 
of politics; and many scholars and practitioners’ shared belief that “there shouldn’t be a politics 
of disaster.” Therefore, given such a scarcity of research, envisioning a clear relationship 
between natural disasters and governance reforms is a challenge. Despite the scarcity, a good 
number of scholars, based on their empirical findings, discuss the influence of catastrophic 
natural disasters on the contours of not only environmental but also social-political governance. 
For instance, Pelling and Dill (2006, 2-6), based on their exhaustive review of the existing 
literature, posit that there are at least seven social and political consequences of catastrophic 
natural disasters: “Disasters often hit politically peripheral regions hardest catalyzing regional 
political tension”; “disasters are a product of development policies and can open to scrutiny 
dominant political and institutional systems”; “existing inequalities can be exacerbated by post-
disaster governmental manipulation”; “the way in which the state and other actors act in response 
and recovery is largely predicated on the kind of political relationships that existed between 
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sectors before the crisis”; “regimes are likely to interpret spontaneous collective actions by non-
government actors in the aftermath of a disaster as a threat and respond with repression”; “in the 
aftermath of disaster, political leaders may regain or even enhance their popular legitimacy”; and 
“the repositioning of political actors in the aftermath of a disaster unfolds at multiple scales.” 
Although some of their hypotheses may not bear direct relevance to the case of Nepal, it is 
evident that natural disasters serve as catalysts of political actions and this is especially true in 
the case of catastrophic ones. A seminal work probing the relationship between natural disasters 
and political systems is Abney and Hill (1966)’s, in which they highlight the impact of Hurricane 
Betsy on elections in New Orleans. The two key takeaways of their study recurring throughout 
the subsequent literature are that disasters are symbolic and powerful in political discourse, and 
culture and administration are critical in shaping post-disaster social and political outcomes. 
Birkland (1997 and 2006) construes disasters as ‘focusing events’ that raise the question of 
governmentality in terms of political and technical failures, and he also reports that policy 
change is most likely following exceptionally large disasters.  In a similar vein, Tompkins (2005) 
finds that reconstruction following rapid-onset disasters can be viewed as an opportunity for 
policy and/or organizational reform. Also, perhaps the most anecdotal case of post-disaster 
political and policy change is the Chilean case of earthquake in 1939: It is widely believed that 
the event accelerated the country’s economic policy (towards an import substitution model of 
development) (Albala-Bertrand 1993). 
Although it is well-documented that catastrophic natural disasters have a triggering effect 
on governance reforms, the related literature still lacks details of mechanism through which 
social, economic, and political governance reforms become a function of catastrophic natural 
disasters. In other words, scholars have thus far paid less attention to social and technical factors 
 29 
that either moderate or mediate the relationship between catastrophic natural disasters and social, 
economic, and political governance reforms. It is thus the author’s aim to provide a plausible 
explanation to the mechanism of governance reforms initially triggered by catastrophic natural 
disasters and subsequently facilitated by sociotechnical factors that can be broadly grouped into 
three: Resource capacity, social trust, and organizational capacity. As there is a wealth of 
literature on the connection of natural disasters and sociotechnical factors as well as governance 
reform initiatives either benefitted from or thwarted by sociotechnical changes, it would not be a 
conceptual stretch to argue that natural disasters first influence sociotechnical dimensions of a 
society and in turn such dimensions have an effect on governance reforms.  
Figure 2 below provides a sketch of a conceptual model that includes mechanisms of 
change that logically connect natural disaster with governance reforms. Dashed lines around the 
three mechanisms of change denote that they are interdependent and moderate each other’s effect 
in the process of adaptation of the governance system. Two-way linkages between the three 
mechanisms of change indicate that there are positive feedback effects because as governance 
reforms adapt the system to the new environment and it affects resource capacity, social trust, 
and organizational capacity. 
 
Figure 2. A Conceptual Model of Post-Disaster Governance Reform  
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a) Resource Capacity 
Scholars of political science, international development, and organization theory consider 
resource capacity as a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective functioning of 
governance systems. Because non-tax revenue such as foreign assistance or petroleum sale 
receipts is not conducive to developing accountable governance systems, scholars and 
policymakers of state building and international development have recently redirected their focus 
on assisting low-income states such as Nepal to improve their resource capacity with respect to 
tax revenue generation (Moore 2007; Brautigam et al. 2008; OECD 2016). Moreover, scholars of 
international political economy who use cross-national panel data often rely on fiscal capacity 
measures (in addition to rule of law measures) to measure state or governance capacity, which is 
associated with a host of outcomes including levels of economic development and social peace 
(Fauvelle-Aymar 1999; Lieberman 2002; Besley and Persson 2009). This choice of measurement 
is justified due to economic and sociological historians claim that collection of tax revenue in 
return for protection from wars was the fundamental governance function historically (Tilly 
1975). Scholars of state failure in Africa have also used this idea to suggest that as the Cold War 
ended and outside revenue halted from American and Soviet sponsors, many regimes and states 
collapsed due to lack of resource capacity (Bates 2008). 
 Scholars of tax revenue in developing countries in their turn have focused on 
understanding how tax revenue is mobilized from the economy. Tax revenue partially depends 
on the amount of natural and human resources available in a given economy as well as technical, 
organizational, physical and social capital that is available. As human resources generate income 
through production and technological advancement, which then allows further extraction of 
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natural and agricultural resources and provision of services. Taxing greater economic activity 
with better organizational and informational capabilities can then provide the necessary revenue, 
a part of which is then invested in the development and maintenance of the economy and 
governance system (Bird et al. 2006; Gupta 2007). 
 Finally, in post-disaster environment, large amounts of resources are mobilized to redress 
the damage and destruction induced by natural disasters. In this process, total societal response 
and assistance from external actors can increase the resource capacity of the governance system 
(Horwich 2000). As sociologists and organization theorists have maintained, resource 
mobilization provides an important role in creating organizational capacity and succeeding in 
social movements and organizing (Jenkins 1983).  
Proposition I: Catastrophic natural disasters affect changes in the governance system 
through changes in resource capacity. 
 
b) Social Trust 
It is commonly held that social trust, along with social norms, participation, and network 
relations, constitutes social capital. In his study of social capital and social trust, Putnam (2001) 
defines social capital as trustworthiness and reciprocity that emerges from social ties among 
individuals. In a similar vein, Fukuyama (1996) defines trust as honest and cooperative 
(expected) behavior among community members that share a common social norm and social 
capital as a capacity that results from prevalence of trust in the society or communities. 
However, Woolcock (1998) does not treat social trust as part of the definition of social capital 
but a close consequence of it. Therefore, social trust can be thought of as a proxy for social 
capital. As the intent of this review is not to critique the concept of social trust, I use social trust 
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interchangeably with social capital in this dissertation in agreement with Woolcock (1998) for 
whom social trust is a reliable proxy of social capital. 
Dynes (2002) published a seminal paper on utilizing the concept of social capital to 
disaster-related issues (especially disaster response). However, as noted by Aldrich (2012), even 
though there is a large volume of scholarship on disasters and a large body of research on social 
capital, the two fields have not been integrated well into governance reform and decision-making 
studies. Aldrich’s observation does not necessarily mean there has not been any flow of 
individual studies probing the relationship between natural disasters and social capital. In fact, 
there is some empirical literature exploring the relationship between natural disasters and social 
capital and social trust. Although some scholars venture to cast doubt on the idea of disasters 
building social trust (for example Uslaner 2016) and suggest the exact opposite, equally many 
scholars present findings in support of the idea. Putnam (2002) finds that every measure of social 
capital as well as trust in government increased in a dramatic manner after the events of 9/11 in 
the United States. Dussaillant and Guzman (2014) present evidence that social trust has increased 
in areas affected by the 2010 earthquake in Chile. Chang (2010) finds that social cohesion 
increased with hazard severity in the case of the 2005 flood in Carlisle, United Kingdom. Calo-
Blanco and his colleagues (2017), based on their analysis of the Chilean cases, argue that social 
cohesion increases after a natural disaster but slowly subsides as environmental conditions 
stabilize. Cassar and her colleagues (2017) find that the 2004 tsunami in Thailand led to 
substantial and long-lasting increases in prosocial behavior. Last but not least, Toya and 
Skidmore (2014) present panel data evidence that suggests exposure to natural disasters brings 
about a potential spillover benefit of increased social trust. 
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As for the role of social trust on governance reforms, there is abundant theoretical and 
empirical literature stimulated by Putnam’s methods for measuring social capital. For example, 
social capital is positively associated with successful urban regeneration (Saegert and Winkel 
1998), neighborhood stability (Teinkin and Rohe 1998), and general health indicators (Kawachi 
et al. 1997). Such findings are indicative of there being a positive relationship between social 
capital and positive changes in government and a society.  Seeking additional empirics in support 
of the view that an increase in social trust has a positive influence on governance reforms, 
Heinemann and Tanz (2008) find in their analysis of institutional reforms in a cross-section of 
countries that social trust creates an environment conducive to governance reforms. Bjørnskov 
(2010) also finds that the trust-governance association is a positive one and there is a causal 
influence of social trust on structural governance reforms (especially economic-judicial 
governance reforms). Gregory (1999), another scholar suggesting the relevance of social capital 
to governance reforms, uses New Zealand as an example of such a relationship. Lastly, perhaps 
OECD’s report (2013) provides a good summary of the relationship between social trust and 
governance reforms. OECD (2013) acknowledges that social trust and public trust in government 
is as important an input to public sector reforms ranging from specific policies and programs to 
broader reforms in governance institutions as a fruitful outcome of it, thus creating a virtuous 
cycle of trust and governance. 
Proposition II: Catastrophic natural disasters affect changes in the governance system 
through changes in social trust. 
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c) Organizational Capacity 
Building governance capacity through constitutional and legal reform in developing countries 
requires development of not only human resource capacity, but also social and technical 
organizational capacity focused on principles of sound management, good governance, 
conducive organizational culture, and effective communication (Grindle 1997, 26-27). 
Organizational capacity in the disaster literature can be understood as all available strengths and 
resources that allow an organization to reduce or manage disaster risk and improve disaster 
resilience (UNISDR 2017). Moreover, capacity resides at three levels: in individuals, in 
organizations, and in the system and its environment within which individuals and organizations 
operate that is also referred to as societal or institutional level (UNISDR 2017). As this  research 
studies changes in a post-disaster governance system, it focuses on organizational capacity from 
a systemwide perspective because it is the interactions of organizations, their stakeholders and 
partners that make up their organizational capacity within the governance system. 
 As per the disaster literature, organizational capacity can be divided into two types of 
capacities: coping capacity and adaptive capacity (Parsons et al. 2016). Both coping and adaptive 
capacities are products of social processes (Berkes 2007; Wisner et al. 2004) that generate and 
maintain the ability to anticipate and overcome unpredictable shocks and adverse conditions 
(Parsons et al. 2016). Coping capacity is a set of characteristics of a society (and its institutions) 
that enables the society to prepare for a disaster, absorb the shock, and recover from disaster 
impact (Parsons et al. 2016) whereas adaptive capacity is associated with the decision-making 
process to adapt to current or future change through learning, adaptation, and transformation in 
an incremental and deliberative manner (Nelson et al. 2007; Parsons et al. 2016). Such an 
adaptive capacity is important as, per Pelling and Dill (2006), natural disasters are the products 
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of “maladaptation between interlocking socio-environmental relations at local, national, 
international, and supranational levels.” Coping capacity and adaptive capacity are different in a 
sense that the former emphasizes the community capacities in anticipating and responding to 
natural disasters whereas the latter focuses on facilitating “adaptation by governance, 
institutional, management, and social arrangements and processes” (Parsons et al. 2016; also see 
Birkmann et al. 2013, Gupta et al. 2010, and Keys et al. 2014). Moreover, coping capacity can be 
divided into themes of social character, economic capital, infrastructure and planning, emergency 
services, community capital and information and engagement while adaptive capacity can be 
divided into themes of governance, policy and leadership and social and community engagement 
(Parsons et al. 2016). 
Although organizational capacity residing at all levels (i.e. individual, organizational, and 
societal), whether that be coping or adaptive, is well-described in abstract terms by disaster 
scholars (and climate change scholars), they have been continuously challenged to identify 
generic and practical antecedents, determinants, and outcomes of capacity (Cohen el al. 2016; 
Hagelsteen and Becker 2013). What further complicates the challenge is that the two types of 
capacity can be conflicting rather than complementary: Some scholars argue that coping capacity 
is effective for short-term only and it thus should be either transformed into longer term adaptive 
capacity or at least some balance between short-term and long-term capacity needs should be 
sought in order to enhance resilience and sustainability (Berman et al. 2012; Ingram et al. 2006). 
Also, few scholars report that there is lack of empirical studies elucidating the mechanism of 
how natural disasters damage organizational capacity. Although there is no direct reference to 
how natural disasters affect organizational capacity, given that economic development is one of 
the four primary sets of adaptive capacity (the other three being social capital, information and 
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communication, and community competence; Norris et al. 2008), the relationship between 
natural disasters and economic development deserves scrutiny. Surprisingly, many 
macroeconomic findings suggest that the impact of some natural disasters are beneficial to the 
national economy although the average growth effects of natural disasters are negative (Barone 
and Mocetti 2014; Cavallo and Noy 2011; Fomby et al. 2009; Loayza et al. 2012). Barone and 
Mocetti (2014) suggest that such outlying cases are produced by “a disruptive creation 
mechanism” through which technical efficiency can be promoted. Therefore, given that 
economic development is one of the four primary sets of adaptive capacity, one could argue that 
natural disasters can bring a natural-disaster-hit society opportunity to organizational capacity 
building. 
 With respect to the influence of organizational capacity on governance reforms, many 
scholars report that capacity building is critical to the success of governance reforms in the 
aftermath of natural disaster. In fact, successfully building organizational capacity (especially 
adaptive capacity) ex post natural disaster is synonymous to successfully governing for resilience 
that can be characterized by “polycentric and multilayered institutions, participation and 
collaboration, self-organization and networks, and learning and innovation” (Djalante et al. 
2011). This is especially true if one defines governance as “the intentional shaping of the flow of 
events so as to realize desired public goods” (Parker and Braithwaite 2003 as quoted in Djalante 
et al. 2011) rather than as political control or statecraft. Even if governance is understood as 
political control or statecraft, successful organizational capacity building ex post natural disaster 
is important as state capacity is a key component in governing recurring natural disasters (Lin 
2015). Also, among many others, Brinkerhoff (2005) discusses the importance of organizational 
capacity in rebuilding governance in weak states. Lastly, as vividly illustrated by Engle and 
 37 
Lemos (2010), governance and institutions are critical to successful adaptive capacity building 
and resilience. 
 Because organizational capacity is conceptualized as an interactive and networked 
capacity of governance actors that are linked with their clients, stakeholders, partners and their 
environment and operate at multiple levels and sectors (Comfort 1999), this dissertation focuses 
on informational capacity as the most critical dimension of organizational capacity. Theories of 
complexity, organization and management sciences have conceptualized that information 
collection (El Louadi 1998), information processing (Wang 2002), and information exchange 
(Scott 1990) are critical interdependent factors of organizational structure and performance 
(Galbraith 1973; Rapert and Wren 1998). This conceptualization is aligned well with 
sociological theories of organizational capacity in network societies (Stinchcombe 1990; Castells 
1996) and sociotechnical systems of informational capacity that allows the system to read, record 
and manage people and goods for effective governance (Scott 1998) and facilitates rapid 
cognition, communication, coordination, and control in high-risk and high-uncertainty 
environments (Comfort 2007). As natural disasters impose a challenging task on the system, 
there is a high demand for the system to collect, analyze and exchange information. It is possible 
that post-disaster acquisition of new informational capacities of organizations and governance 
systems can have spillover effects as organizations try to minimize disaster risk in other parts of 
the country or meet information needs in other policy arenas, for technological innovations often 
spillover through people and geographies over time (Feldman 1999). 
Proposition III: Catastrophic natural disasters affect changes in the governance system 
through changes in organizational capacity. 
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2.2.4. Summary of the Conceptual Model 
Drawing on existing theories in social and policy sciences, this chapter developed a conceptual 
model that identifies three interdependent factors that help explain post-disaster governance 
reform in low-income, fragile states such as Nepal. Three theoretical propositions were derived 
from this model. First, catastrophic natural disasters are followed by extraordinary levels of 
resource mobilization with a window of opportunity to redefine material and sociotechnical 
foundations of the governance system. Second, parallel to resource mobilization, individuals, 
families, groups, and organizations respond to catastrophic events by initially increased levels of 
social trust and philanthropy which subsides after a few weeks and months following the 
disaster, as actors transition from response to recovery phases of disaster management. 
Heightened levels of awareness, social trust, and social capital and learning create a window of 
opportunity for dominant actors of the governance system to reach unity and agreement to 
quickly enact major changes in the rules of the governance system. Finally, catastrophic natural 
disasters provide an opportunity to increase organizational capacity of the system with respect to 
information collection, exchange, analysis, and use. While disaster response requires rapid 
collection and exchange of information in dynamic systems for saving lives and mitigating 
further risk, recovery and reconstruction also requires dynamic data collection and exchange 
systems due to requirements for monitoring and guiding the process of reconstruction to achieve 
expected results. 
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3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODS AND DATA 
3.1. Research Design 
The dissertation uses pre-post research design with multiple data sources and analytic 
techniques. A pre-post, within-case analysis in the short-term and in the medium-term will be 
conducted. The objective is to identify, describe, and explain how the 2015 earthquakes have 
affected governance reforms and outcomes in Nepal. To identify the effects of the earthquakes I 
compare the governance system and its components and environment pre- and post-earthquakes. 
The timeframe for comparison is two years before and two years after the earthquakes for 
medium term effects and three months before and after the earthquakes for short-term effects. 
I use a case study research design because it allows an in-depth examination of complex 
policy problems that result from interactions of actors at multiple levels with varying levels of 
access to information and resources (Yin 2013; Gerring 2004). The study of the 2015 
earthquakes and their impact on governance reforms and outcomes is a most-likely, “crucial 
case” for the theoretical model developed in this dissertation because the case fits the model 
closely (Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2007). A single case study that is designed and implemented 
with the knowledge of other cases has potential to not only improve understanding of the case 
and theory generation in the field, but also produce comparative insights to advance theory in 
social and policy sciences (Brady and Collier 2010; Waldner 2012). Case study research design 
fits well with complex adaptive systems approach to the study of governance systems as the 
former provides the necessary platform for identifying and tracing how changes in a system’s 
environment, inputs, structures, operators, and constraints affect its adaptive capacity, behavior 
and performance (Holland 1996, 2012; Comfort 1999). 
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 Case study research uses both quantitative and qualitative data. Within case analysis and 
process tracing techniques allow inferences by carefully considering rich qualitative information 
(including causal process observations) about the earthquakes and their impact on governance as 
well as the underlying mechanisms of change that connect one another in a sequential causal 
graph (George & Bennett 2005; Collier 2011; Waldner 2012; Bennett & Checkel 2015). I use 
analytic techniques of network sciences with quantitative data about organizations and their 
interactions to make inferences about the structure and processes of a system by incorporating 
measures of connections among units and the effects they have on governance reforms 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994; Jackson and Watts 2002). 
Insights gleaned from network analysis of quantitative data will be complemented by 
qualitative analysis using the theoretical framework reviewed in Chapter 3 and the conceptual 
model developed in Chapter 4, which allow me to understand how changes in resource capacity, 
social trust, and organizational capacity drive collective action for governance reforms (Ostrom 
2005; Fligstein and McAdam 2012). I will complement the insights gleaned from qualitative 
analysis with a citizen survey that measures public opinion regarding social trust toward 
organizations that have participated in disaster response and recovery activities in Nepal. 
 
3.2. Data Sources and Analytic Techniques 
Qualitative sources of data include previously published scholarly work, publicly available 
governmental and non-governmental agency reports, UN ReliefWeb and UNOCHA situation 
reports, Nepalese laws, policies and regulations, news reports, and notes from my field trip and 
interviews with experts in Nepal. I conducted pre-dissertation field trips to reconstruction sites 
within Kathmandu as well as outside of Kathmandu in the mountainous district of 
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Sindhupalchok and interviewed a dozen experts in March 2016. In April 2018, I undertook a 
second trip and conducted semi-structured interviews with experts representing over 37 
organizations to validate my conceptual model and to discover potential new mechanisms of 
social action. 
Publicly available quantitative sources of data include donations data from the Prime 
Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund web portal, dyadic events and knowledge graph data from the 
Global Data on Events, Locations and Tone (GDELT) available on GDELT’s website, and a 
citizen feedback survey in earthquake affected areas available on Open Nepal’s data portal. 
Table 1 below lists all data sources used in this dissertation along with timeframe and 
description. 
 
Table 1. Data Sources Used in the Dissertation Project 
Data Source Timeframe Description 
GDELT Global 
Knowledge Graph 
Apr 2013-
Jul 2017 
Interorganizational network data that is extracted with co-
occurrence algorithms that map organizational entities, their 
interactions, and themes (topics of discussion) from global and 
national media reports. It is used to demonstrate the sociotechnical 
foundations – information exchange and interorganizational 
cooperation – of the adaptive governance in Nepal. 
Donations data May 2015-
Jul 2017 
Combined from UNOCHA’s financial tracking system and the 
Nepalese Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund website. It is used 
to show how drastic rise in economic resources for government 
spending can alter incentives for political actors and trigger a series 
of events that culminate in transformations in the governance 
system. 
Citizen Feedback 
Surveys 
Jun 2015-
Nov 2015 
Four rounds of citizen perception surveys on relief and 
reconstruction activities in earthquake affected districts coordinated 
by international donor agencies and deployed by youth volunteers. 
This data is used for analysis of social trust, which is important for 
adaptive capacity of governance systems. 
Expert interviews 
and field 
observations 
Mar 2016, 
Apr 2018 
1) March 2016 pre-dissertation field observations and 
conversations with experts in Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bakhtapur, and 
Sindhupalchok to explore disaster policy and management 
challenges; 2) April 2018 field observations and 35 interviews with 
experts representing 37 distinct organizations that have important 
roles in Nepal’s governance system in Kathmandu, Lalitpur, 
Bhaktapur, and Kavre. 
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Secondary 
qualitative data 
All years Qualitative data from reports published by Nepal’s government 
agencies, academics, UN organizations, nonprofits, think tanks, 
national and global news media to trace the processes that link 
natural disasters to governance reforms in Nepal. 
 
The subsections below describe each of the data sources, measurement issues, and analytic 
techniques used to assess the conceptual model and theoretical propositions developed in this 
dissertation. 
 
3.2.1. GDELT Global Knowledge Graph (GKG) Database 
a) Database Description2 
The GDELT Global Knowledge Graph (GKG) database catalogues world events and their latent 
dimensions, geographic characteristics, and network structures, providing an automated 
collection of content analysis data for network analysis and media contextualization. The GKG 
algorithm captures a massive-scale network that connect all events, their thematic and 
geographic contexts, what actors are involved in them, and how the world is feeling about them 
every single day as of April 1, 2013. The GKG database provides a wealth of information about 
organizations that are being discussed in the global and national news outlets (including TV 
news transcripts, online blogs, and social media) as having active roles in the governance system 
and networks of Nepal from April 1, 2013 to the present day. 
 The GKG database includes two data streams. The first one is the daily Counts data, 
which includes records of numbers that are used in news reports to count objects such as the 
number of protesters, the number of people killed, the number of displaced persons, etc. This 
                                                 
2 This section is based on documentation available at https://www.gdeltproject.org/data.html#documentation. 
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allows tracking daily the number of people killed or affected, for instance in natural disasters, 
accidents, or epidemics, in the world. The second data stream captures the daily Graph data that 
contains a massive-scale network of inter-connected events, counts, actors (persons and 
organizations), locations (countries and states/provinces), themes (topics), tones (emotions), and 
sources (URLs). 
Each GKG record is a unique pairing of a set of names (events, counts, actors, locations, 
themes, and tones) and a set of news articles in which the set of names appears. Every morning 
the GDELT GKG engine processes each news article from the day before and groups the articles 
that contain the same sets of names. The output format of the Graph file is essentially a list, 
which contains unique sets of names along with the articles in which they appear each day 
separated by several delimiters. The same sets of names have the same identifiers and thus were 
de-duplicated based on their name set ID. The date of a GKG record indicates the date in which 
the unique sets of names are discussed in news media articles. Even though the sets of names that 
co-occur or appear together in the same sets of articles, no straightforward relatedness is implied 
or suggested; however, the relationships that emerge in multiple co-occurring sets can be inferred 
to exhibit properties of semantic or structural relatedness. In other words, the GDELT GKG 
database is based on co-occurrences of names, not on any kind of deeper structural 
understanding of their individual or organizational relatedness. 
The list of entities or organizations and locations in the GKG database are compiled using 
the algorithm developed by Leetaru (2012) and are delimited by semicolons. The list of 
organizations includes corporations, international governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations, and any other local organizations like local councils and fairs. The algorithm is 
highly adaptive and currently set up to err on the side of inclusion when the level of confidence 
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about a match is relatively lower with the purpose of making sure that a maximum number of 
smaller organizations operating around the globe that are of interest to many GKG users are 
captured. (I overcome this issue by developing an exclusion list to reduce irrelevant entities and 
redundancies. See the Data Retrieval section below for the discussion of the exclusion list). 
A GKG theme indicates discussions around a topic. There are 2,609 themes in the GKG 
database as of October 2017. These themes include governance, constitutions, political and 
administrative reforms, riots and protests, blockades, natural disasters, manmade disasters, 
earthquakes, varieties of crises related themes. All themes were created using sophisticated 
lexicological dictionaries and algorithms. The master file for the themes can be accessed from 
the GDELT website.3 
This dissertation uses the version 1.0 of the GDELT GKG database because GDELT 
analytics services for data retrieval for version 2.0 are not yet available. The main difference 
between versions 1 and 2 is in that the former includes data only from English language news 
sources while the latter translates 65 languages in the fly while collecting data. 
 
b) Data Retrieval 
Network data was retrieved from the GDELT GKG database using the tools provided by the 
GDELT Analysis Services – cloud-based tools and services that allow exploring, retrieving, and 
visualizing data from the GDELT databases free of charge. Among these tools, the GKG 
Network Visualizer was used to export graph data in .GEXF (v.1.2) format for advanced analysis 
using the free, open-source software suite GEPHI.4 
                                                 
3 The master file of GDELT GKG themes are available at http://data.gdeltproject.org/documentation/GKG-
MASTER-THEMELIST.TXT  
4 The tool is available at http://analysis.gdeltproject.org/module-gkg-network.html 
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 The use of this tool does not require knowledge of programming or data retrieval 
languages such as Structural Query Language (SQL).5 However, it requires one to understand the 
database and how the information is collected, processed, and stored to facilitate meaningful and 
advanced analysis. The tool allows the user to specify values along certain parameters such as 
date range, type of actors, location, themes, and threshold levels for inclusion and the system 
queries the entire database and provides matching results via e-mail. The parameters use Boolean 
logics for inclusion and exclusion. 
 The date ranges for data retrieval were chosen according to the research design. 
Specifically, I compare short term 3-month pre-post and medium term 2-year pre-post data to 
capture the impact of the 2015 earthquakes on governance reforms in Nepal. The location 
parameter was chosen as Nepal. For retrieving data for the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal, the 
NATURAL_DISASTER_EARTHQUAKE theme was used. Governance themes were identified 
from the master theme list and found to be relevant for governance networks, as presented in 
Table 2.6 
 
Table 2. List of Governance Themes in GDELT GKG Database 
Theme 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 
ELECTION 
GENERAL_GOVERNMENT 
GOV_DISSOLVEGOV 
GOV_DIVISIONOFPOWER 
GOV_INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
GOV_LOCALGOV 
                                                 
5 Users with such skills can utilize the Google BigQuery tools to query data from the GDELT databases. 
6 The following keywords capture all the themes in the table: gov, politic, public, constitution, legislat, election, 
policy, state_legitimacy, sovereignty, power_sharing. These keywords were used in data retrieval. 
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GOV_REFORM 
LEG_CONSTITUTIONALAMENDMENT 
LEGISLATION 
SLFID_POLITICAL_BOUNDARIES 
SLFID_RULE_OF_LAW 
SOVEREIGNTY 
STATE_OF_EMERGENCY 
TAX_POLITICAL_PARTY 
WB_1130_STRUCTURAL_POLICY_AND_REFORM 
WB_1922_GOVERNANCE_STRUCTURES 
WB_2034_STATE_LEGITIMACY_CAPACITY_AND_AUTHORITY 
WB_2035_PARLIAMENT_AND_LEGISLATURES 
WB_2038_LEGISLATIVE_SCRUTINY_AND_OVERSIGHT 
WB_2039_CONSTITUTIONAL_COURTS_AND_LEGAL_REVIEW 
WB_2093_ORGANIZATION_OF_PUBLIC_ADMINISTRATION 
WB_2095_MACHINERY_OF_GOVERNMENT 
WB_2142_LOCAL_GOVERNMENT 
WB_2462_POLITICAL_VIOLENCE_AND_WAR 
WB_2477_POWER_SHARING_AGREEMENTS 
WB_2903_POLITICAL_SYSTEMS_AND_GOVERNMENT 
WB_2905_CENTER_OF_GOVERNMENT 
WB_2906_POLICY_MAKING_AND_POLICY_COORDINATION 
WB_728_PUBLIC_SERVICE_DELIVERY 
WB_737_LOCAL_GOVERNANCE 
WB_831_GOVERNANCE 
WB_836_POLITICAL_ECONOMY_OF_REFORM 
WB_926_POLITICAL_PARTICIPATION 
 
Threshold levels for inclusion of nodes and edges can be specified. Low cutoff points 
would create massive networks of thousands of actors with tens of thousands of edges. This 
dissertation project sets the node cutoff point at 10 and the edge cutoff point at 5. In other words, 
for a node to appear in the data, it (i.e. the set of names) must be mentioned at least 10 times in 
news articles and for ties among nodes to appear in the data the nodes must have co-occurred at 
least 5 times in the news. These cutoff points were determined after attempting various cutoff 
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points, and values of 10 and 5 allow retrieval of manageable graph data that can be analyzed in 
GEPHI. Using threshold values based on the number of times each sets of names appear allows 
one to identify the key actors and study the broader trends in their relational structure over a 
period of time. 
I developed an exclusion list for data retrieval that would increase the relevance and 
accuracy of network data that I am using in this dissertation. The exclusion list consists of  
• news organizations such as CNN, Reuters, New York Times, Boston Globe, 
Times Magazine, and so on; 
• internet company names such as Google, Microsoft, Apple, Apple App; 
• social media names such as Facebook, Pinterest, LinkedIn, Google Plus, Flickr; 
• air travel company names such as British Air, Indian Air, United Airlines, Nepal 
Airlines, and so on; 
• airport names such as JFK airport, Dubai International Airport, Tribhuvan 
International Airport, and so on;7 
• and stock market names such as NASDAQ, Dow Jones, and New York Stock 
Exchange, Nepal Stock Exchange, Singapore Stock Exchange, Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, and so on. 
Using the above criteria, an exclusion list specific to each data query was created and the 
query was repeated with the exclusion list to improve relevancy and accuracy or the data. The 
resulting graph data file contains undirected network without any isolates and can be imported 
into GEPHI for extracting, analyzing, and visualizing inter-organizational networks. 
                                                 
7 Tribhuvan International Airport was kept in the network data for analysis of interorganizational coordination of 
disaster response in Chapter 6.  
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c) Network Extraction 
In working with big data and networks, it is important to extract the relevant parts of the network 
from a large-scale graph data that is computationally, analytically and visually challenging to 
make sense of. Therefore, after retrieving the undirected graph data from the GKG database and 
importing it into GEPHI v. 0.9.2 software, three steps were taken to extract networks before 
further analysis can be conducted.8 The first step included going over the list of nodes and 
ensuring no additional irrelevant organizations such as news organizations, social media outlets, 
or airlines appear in the node list.  
The second step was to filter the results based on the giant component algorithm, which 
removes the small components and keeps only the largest component of the network. This step 
removes extraneous pairs or cliques of organizations such as firms linked via the stock markets 
that are irrelevant to the discussions around actors of the governance network. For Chapter 6, a 
slightly different approach was followed because of the manageable size of the network of main 
organizations. The network data was exported to Microsoft Excel and several procedures were 
conducted in to further prepare the data for analysis. Duplicate nodes and edges were removed 
carefully without affecting the network structure. Jurisdictions and sectors of organizations were 
coded based on common knowledge and internet search when necessary. Acronyms were created 
for each organization so that visualizations are easier to interpret. 
The final step includes trimming the giant component to make the analysis more 
manageable by using the k-core algorithm in GEPHI. A k-core network, for a given undirected 
network, is a maximal sub-network where each node has at least k adjacent nodes (Batagelj and 
                                                 
8 In case of parallel edges, the merge strategy during data import included summation of edge weights. 
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Zaversnik 2003). This procedure recursively removes all the vertices in the giant component, in 
this case with a degree of less than k=2; in other words, it sets a minimum requirement of two 
connections for every node. The k-core trimming was skipped in Chapter 6; after the prepared 
data was re-imported to Gephi for computing network statistics and visualization, the giant 
component algorithm was used before computing the betweenness and closeness centrality 
scores. 
 
d) Network Metrics 
I measure changes in Nepal’s governance system and its structure using following metrics: 
quantitative information regarding changes in the relational structure and system properties of 
the governance system. This allows construing exchange of information and resources among 
organizations over time to track the structural and system capacity of governance in Nepal by 
juxtaposing local vs. national, Nepalese versus international, and state versus non-state actors 
that collectively affect the capacity and performance of the governance system in Nepal. 
Measures of system structure include 1) identifying actors, specifying their composition 
as actors are nested within one or more components of the system, and classifying actors into 
categories of theoretical relevance; 2) mapping the formal architecture of the system based on the 
tree-like schemas of organizational charts and public-private partnerships; 3) mapping emergent 
hierarchies of the network architecture that are multi-scalar and shift dynamically depending on 
countervailing forces operating in top-down and bottom-up manner – many measures used in this 
context are distribution of social (geodesic) distance, average path length, clustering coefficients, 
network density, number of subgroups/communities, degree, closeness, betweenness, and other 
measures of centrality and authority; 4) capacity of the system for information storage and 
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processing (Bonacich 1987; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Podolny and Page 1998; Barabasi 2003; 
Watts 2003; Lake 2007; Jackson 2008; Lazer et al. 2009; Helbing 2010; Newman 2010; Ruhl 
and Katz 2015). 
Measures of system behavior include the capacity of the system to collect and 
disseminate information, trust and resources that collectively affect outcomes of cooperation and 
conflict in the earthquake response and recovery in Nepal. Different system structures produce 
different effects on system behavior. Open versus closed, hierarchical versus non-hierarchical, 
dense versus loosely-connected networks yield different results in dealing with complex 
problems in uncertain environments. Negative and positive feedback between the system and its 
environment and among the system’s components affect system performance. Systems also 
produce emergent behavior, as relationships and structures produce effects that are different than 
the sum of its parts due to thresholds, tipping points, cascades, and critical mass (Schelling 1978; 
Marwell et al. 1988; Holland 1998; Comfort 1999; Corning 2002; Jackson and Yariv 2007; Ruhl 
and Katz 2015). 
Degree Centrality measure the extent of a node’s connectivity in the network – the 
number of ties a node has, normalized by the total number of ties in the network (Freeman 1978). 
Weighted degree centrality is a degree centrality measure that accounts for the weights of the ties 
or edges in the network. 
Betweenness Centrality measures the importance of each node in terms of its brokerage 
role in the network. In other words, it measures the normalized frequency with which each node 
provides a shortest-path connection between other nodes in the network (Freeman 1977). The 
greater the betweenness centrality of a score, the more important its brokerage role is in the 
network, as calculated using the method developed by Brandes (2001). 
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Closeness Centrality measures the mean of the shortest geodesic distance from a given 
node to all other nodes in the network normalized by the total number of nodes in the network 
(Bavelas 1950). The greater the closeness centrality score of a node is, the closer the node’s 
geodesic distance is to all other nodes in the network. 
Network Diameter is the social or geodesic distance between the two farthest nodes in the 
network. Geodesic distance is the shortest path between nodes. A pair of connected nodes have a 
geodesic distance of 1. For a network of diameter k, the two most distant nodes of the network 
are connected to each other via k-1 number of nodes. Average Path Length or mean geodesic 
distance measures the average number of “steps” or “degrees of separation” each node is away 
from all other node (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
Network Density measures how complete the network is. In other words, a complete 
network has all possible ties among its nodes and a density of 1. It is calculated by summing the 
number of ties and dividing it by the total number of all possible ties (Wasserman and Faust 
1994). 
Network Modularity measures modular decomposition of a network into a number of sub-
networks or communities. The greater the modularity score of a network, the more sophisticated 
is its community structure and better compartmentalization of its communities that have a real-
world importance. The algorithm used for community detection was developed by Blondel and 
colleagues (2008) with random decomposition for higher accuracy while also accounting for 
edge weights. The resolution algorithm for community detection was developed by Lambiotte 
and colleagues (2009). Lower resolution (integers) results in greater number of communities. 
Average Clustering Coefficient measures the extent to which a network is clustered, i.e. 
the degree to which nodes are situated in clusters or neighborhoods of higher connectivity 
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(Latapy 2008). Networks that are highly clustered but have lower average path length exhibit 
“small world” properties such as faster diffusion of ideas and behavior (Milgram 1967; Watts 
and Strogatz 1998). 
The spline value of 0.8 is chosen for node size ranking, which is based on betweenness 
centrality scores in GEPHI visualizations. This allows the visualization of more nodes with 
larger size based on their betweenness scores even though there are large differences between the 
highest ranked and the second and third highest ranked organizations in terms of their brokerage 
power. 
 
e) Limitations 
There are some limitations related to automated data collection by the GDELT GKG algorithms. 
The algorithms produce some false positives in detecting locations and organizations. One hopes 
such false positives do not matter much for this research because the focus on key actors and the 
broader trends will reduce the use of false positives, which tend to be outliers. The use of giant 
component and k-core filtering also aids in removing irrelevant organizations and false positives.  
In addition, while the GKG engine de-duplicates the sets of names on a daily basis, de-
duplication does not happen when the sets of names occur in different days. When that happens, 
it is possible the same sets of names occurred again or was simply reported again in a different 
day. Therefore, it is possible that some nodes and edges are redundant. This issue is partially 
addressed when the node and edge thresholds are used in data retrieval and when parallel edges 
were merged using the summation method on edge weights in importing data into GEPHI. This 
limitation on the use of edge weights lessens if one assumes that the news about more important 
actors are picked up by more organizations and repeat greater number of times than the news 
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about important key actors. When necessary, this limitation was addressed by manually de-
duplicating the nodes, and then the edges in the network. 
There are some limitations related to automated data collection by the GDELT GKG 
algorithms. The algorithms produce false positives in detecting locations and organizations. One 
hopes such false positives do not matter much for this research because the focus on key actors 
and the broader trends will reduce the use of false positives, which tend to be outliers. However, 
as is known well in the field of social network analysis, measurement error and missing data 
have consequences for inference. 
In addition to the problems associated with entity and theme extraction, the method of 
observing governance networks through the media has its own limitations. Typically, whether 
human-coded or computer-coded, when data about governance actors and their transactions are 
observed through media reports, the data is biased toward the most central actors, whether 
positive or negative (Yi and Scholz 2016). 
 
3.2.2. Donations Data 
Donations data was downloaded from OpenNepal.Net.9 The datasets compiles donations that are 
disbursed, committed, and pledged from various sources including UN Office of Coordination 
for Humanitarian Affairs’ financial tracking system and the Nepalese Prime Minister’s Disaster 
Relief Fund website. There is an ordinal difference among types of donations with respect to 
fungibility of donations. Disbursed donations are actual financial transaction between a donor 
organization and a recipient organization. Committed donations are strongly promised donations 
from a donor organization to the recipient organization. Pledged donations are relatively softer 
                                                 
9 http://earthquake.opennepal.net/organization 
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promises that will then translate into commitment and then disbursements. The donations dataset 
is used to show how drastic rise in economic resources for government spending can alter 
incentives for political actors and trigger a series of events that culminate in transformations in 
the governance system. 
 
3.2.3. Citizen Feedback Surveys 
Four rounds of citizen perception surveys were conducted about the relief and reconstruction 
activities of government agencies and I/NGOs in earthquake affected districts coordinated by 
international donor agencies and deployed by youth volunteers. This data is used for analysis of 
social trust, which is important for adaptive capacity of governance systems. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, one of the major ways large-scale natural disasters affect governance reforms is 
through social trust. 
The surveys elicit response from earthquake affected citizens regarding their challenges, 
information needed to access resources that are available to address their challenges, and the 
level of trust and satisfaction they have for services provided by local, national, international, 
and nonprofit organizations from May through November of 2015 (covers the first six months 
after the earthquakes struck). Appendix C provides the list of variables covered by the 
questionnaire used in these surveys. The data was downloaded from the website of the 
Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX).10  
 
                                                 
10 https://data.humdata.org/showcase/nepal-earthquake-citizen-perception-survey 
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3.2.4. Expert Interviews and Field Observations 
In early March of 2016, after about ten months following the earthquakes, I undertook a two-
week pre-dissertation field trip whereby I had a chance to observe activities related to recovery 
and reconstruction implemented by various actors of Nepal’s governance system. There I had a 
chance to speak with experts in academia, government, international agencies, and the private 
sector about how the earthquakes affected their operations and assets, and to familiarize myself 
with the range of options they are considering or implementing to address the challenges they 
were facing in the post-disaster governance context. These field observations and conversations 
with experts in Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, and Sindhupalchok helped me to explore 
disaster policy and management challenges in Nepal. 
 In early April of 2018, I conducted a three-week long field trip to Nepal to undertake 35 
semi-structured interviews with experts representing key actors in Nepal’s governance system. 
Appendix A lists the names of 37 major organizations that my interviewees are associated with 
and Appendix B lists a set of questions that I used to guide my interviews. The research trip was 
funded by a doctoral dissertation research grant (#1757111) from the Disasters, Risk and 
Management Sciences program of the US National Science Foundation and interview questions 
were approved by the Institutional Review Board at University of Pittsburgh.  
While the majority of the interviews took place in Kathmandu and Lalitpur, a few were 
conducted in Bhaktapur and Kavre. The majority of the interviewees had association with a 
government agency. Academic institutions and nongovernmental agencies also featured 
prominently in terms of organizational affiliation of the expert interviewees. Figure 3 below 
shows the distribution of interviewee organizations across sectors. 
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Figure 3. Sectors of Organizations Represented in Expert Interviews  
 
  
 Expert interviews and field observations were used to understand the extent to which 
theoretical propositions developed in this dissertation are featured in expert knowledge and 
discussions in Nepal. They also served to cross-check and validate my findings from secondary 
sources of data gathered from news articles and organizational reports. Because of the flexibility 
that semi-structured interviews with experts allow, I was also able to discover new ways of 
thinking about governance challenges in Nepal. 
 Because experts did not feel comfortable with having the interview recorded on a device, 
the majority of interviews were recorded with a pen in a paper notebook in abridged fashion. As 
soon as the interview was over, the abridged notes were expanded and typed up on a secure, 
password protected and encrypted computer without saving any personally identifiable 
information. 
 The resulting 46-page interview data was then exported into Atlast.ti software for 
qualitative coding and analysis. Given theoretical propositions developed in this dissertation, the 
main coding procedures included identification of discussion of 1) how the earthquakes affected 
Nepal’s resource capacity and played a role in governance reforms; 2) how the earthquakes 
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affected Nepal’s social trust to facilitate governance reforms; and 3) how the earthquakes 
affected Nepal’s organizational capacity with respect to capabilities to collect, analyze, 
exchange, and use information. After reading through the data to code for these through 
discussions, additional codes were identified through reading for open coding. These codes 
included initial conditions, fear of loss of control, leadership, social learning, Madhesi demands, 
external pressure, popular pressure, reconstruction requirements, and window of opportunity. 
Finally, the analytic tools of Atlas.ti’s network manager and co-occurrence were used to 
visualize the extent to which these concepts were identified in expert interviews. 
 
3.2.5. Other Data Sources 
Qualitative data from reports published by Nepal’s government agencies, academics, UN 
organizations, nonprofits, think tanks, national and global news media to trace the processes that 
link natural disasters to governance reforms in Nepal.  Such qualitative information regarding 
changes in rules and behaviors of organizations and outcomes of response and recovery activities 
after the earthquakes documents constitutional amendments, changes in government leadership, 
and actions and interactions of organizations in support of policy alternatives regarding 
earthquake response and reconstructions. The sources of these data sources are cited throughout 
the dissertation. 
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4.0 THE CONTEXT OF NEPAL  
4.1. Situating Nepal 
Before providing contextual details about governance and natural disasters in Nepal, it is 
important to situate Nepal in comparison to other countries so that the scope and boundaries of 
the research question can be clarified. Such information can be useful to understand the question 
that many comparative social scientists could ask: what are Nepal’s post-disaster governance 
reforms a case of?  Understanding how Nepal fits in with respect to economic, social, and 
political factors with other countries assists in answering this question. 
Nepal is classified as one of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) by the World Bank 
and the United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs. Nepal’s per capita national 
income stood at US $740 in 2015.11 Nepal ranked 29th with respect to per capita national income 
among the 48 LDCs as shown in Figure 4a below. Because of heavy involvement of the United 
Nations, bilateral aid agencies, and INGOs in Nepal’s socioeconomic development programs, 
Nepal was able to increase secondary school enrollment rates and life expectancy and reduce 
poverty, malnourishment, and infant mortality. However, large portions of the adult population 
still depend on agriculture and therefore the literacy rate of Nepal is not as high as one would 
expect give the rate of secondary school enrollment (see Figure 4 for select indicators). 
Despite positive trends in educational attainment, life expectancy, and poverty reduction 
efforts, Nepal still faces socioeconomic instability that emanates from its structural inequality 
and vulnerability to natural, economic, and political shocks. Due to rigid social hierarchy, some 
segments of the population are extremely vulnerable to hunger, exploitation, and other negative 
socioeconomic outcomes. Moreover, political protests/instability and natural shocks like 
                                                 
11 https://data.worldbank.org/country/nepal 
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earthquakes, droughts, and floods often lead many vulnerable individuals and families to slide 
back to extreme poverty even if they have just climbed out of it due to development 
programming and increased migrant remittances. Dependence on food and energy imports as 
well as foreign aid and remittances also make the Nepalese vulnerable to shocks in regional and 
global economic markets. Such high vulnerability to economic, political, and natural shocks are 
typical for low-income countries categorized under LDC. 
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Figure 4. Select Development Indicators of Nepal with other Least Developed Countries 
a) Gross national income per capita 
 
b) Secondary school enrollment ratio 
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c) Literacy rate 
 
d) Infant mortality rate 
 
Source: UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs (2018).12 
 
 With respect to political indicators, Nepal represents an average country in the world. 
Freedom House rated Nepal as “partly free” in 2015, scoring 4 for civil liberties and 3 for 
political rights where 1 represents the best and 7 the worst.13 Nepal scored under average for low 
income countries in political stability and government effectiveness in 2015; in contrast it scored 
                                                 
12 https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldc-data-retrieval.html  
13 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/nepal  
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above average with respect to voice and accountability, rule of law, regulatory quality, and 
control of corruption as shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5. Governance Indicators of Nepal and LDCs in 2015  
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011)14 
 
4.2. The Governance System of Nepal 
Natural disasters such as the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal are shocks that provide an excellent test 
of governance effectiveness (Schneider 1990). Nepal experienced that shock as it was going 
through a painful but protracted political transition that had reduced effectiveness and capacity of 
governance institutions in Nepal. Following democratic movements in early 1990s, the Kingdom 
of Nepal had transitioned to a constitutional monarchy whereby Prime Minister elected by 
majority political parties in the parliament governed the country (Kantha 2015). However, the 
                                                 
14 The chart was created using http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports  
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instability of transition further dragged Nepal into a civil war from 1996 through 2006. In 2006, 
all sides to the conflict signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and in 2007, the 
Interim Constitution of Nepal declared the country as a democratic federal state and the 
Constituent Assembly (CA) in 2008 abolished the monarchy and declared Nepal as a secular 
republic (Schneiderman et al. 2016). 
The CPA provisions stated that rebel soldiers of the Communist Part of Nepal (CPN) – 
Maoist incorporated in the Nepal Army, victims of war crimes compensated, and the CA draft a 
constitution within two years of its first session after elections. While the first provision was 
completed after long but painful integration of soldiers, the second and third provisions were 
taking too long to complete due to 139 different political parties jockeying for power and 
influence. From 2008 to 2015, because the political leaders were unable to come to an agreement 
and adopt a new constitution, Nepal faced heighted instability and was governed by seven 
different prime ministers and governing coalitions. Daily functions of government such as 
service provision and public infrastructure projects suffered severely as the instability in 
government precluded it from even spending its budget. This is reflected in governance 
indicators presented in Figure 6 below. The 2015 earthquakes produced the necessary catalyst 
and within 44 days after the earthquakes major political leaders of Nepal agreed on 16 
contentious issues that had been delaying the constitution adoption (ICG 2016). 
 Because of economic tolls of political transition over the previous two decades, Nepal 
had grown dependent on foreign grants and loans from the World Bank, Asian Development 
Banks, European Union aid agencies, US Agency for International Development, and United 
Nations agencies such as UN World Food Program, UN Development Program, UN World 
Health Organization, UN Children’s Fund, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and so on. 
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Such dependence on foreign aid and loans gave foreign actors much power to shape the process 
of state reform in Nepal. Moreover, because Nepal depends on India with respect to national 
security and economic transit, India has had enormous influence on determining who governs 
Nepal. Geopolitical and economic dependence play an important role as either enabling or 
constraining factors in disaster relief operations (Kelman 2006). 
 
Figure 6. Governance Indicators of Nepal, 1996-2013  
 
Source: World Bank (2014) Worldwide Governance Indicators15 
 
4.3. The 2015 Earthquakes in Nepal 
The 2015 earthquakes of M7.8 on April 25 and of M7.3 on May 12, 2015 led to the death of 
8,787 and injury of 22,304 individuals. The earthquakes were the worst since the 1934 Bihar 
earthquake of M8. The two earthquakes destroyed or partially damaged a total of 469,539 
                                                 
15 http://dms.nasc.org.np/sites/default/files/documents/Governance_1.pdf  
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buildings in 31 of Nepal’s 75 districts, affecting about half of Nepal’s population of 28.5 million. 
The overall damage to the Nepalese economy is estimated at USD 5.2 billion (National Planning 
Commission 2015). The overwhelming majority of the earthquake victims and survivors are 
from the 14 most severely affected districts of Nepal. In these districts, 24,000 classrooms were 
destroyed, affecting 950,000 children. Figure 7 below maps the geographic areas of Nepal where 
the seismic shocks occurred. In addition, during April 25-October 18, 2015, there were 70 
quakes, 14 floods, 56 landslides in Nepal (UNOCHA 2015).  
 Many earthquake victims are low-income, rural inhabitants of Nepal, as poorer people 
tend to live in areas that are prone to natural disasters and in houses made of mud bricks. Nepal 
is the poorest country in South Asia. Its GDP in 2014 was 19.6 billion and its population at 28.5 
million (World Bank 2015). Nepal is dependent on remittances, tourism, foreign aid, and 
imports. In 2010, Nepal’s trade deficit was 27% of its GDP (Paudel & Burke 2015). Only 17.3% 
of the population in Nepal lives in urban areas. The adult literacy rate in Nepal is at 57.4%. Only 
11.1% of Nepalese are Internet users, while 52.8% the population uses mobile phones 
(UNICEF). 
Figure 7. The 2015 Earthquakes and Aftershocks in Nepal  
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Source: New York Times (2015) 
 
4.4. Disaster Policy and Management in Nepal 
The Natural Calamity Relief Act, 1982, mandates the Ministry of Home Affairs as the lead 
disaster management agency and the Minister to chair the Central Natural Disaster Relief 
Committee. The Minister also manages the coordination with international relief agencies. The 
Cabinet may declare national emergency in catastrophic events, in which case the Prime Minister 
would chair the National Council for Disaster Management. Since the 1988 earthquake, when 
about 1,000 people were killed, 6,553 injured, and about 65,000 buildings damaged in eastern 
and central regions of Nepal, the government of Nepal has initiated several risk reduction and 
capacity building projects with the assistance of international organizations.  
 In 1993, the Government of Nepal partnered with the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), the World Bank (WB), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to develop a 
building code that includes modern principles of earthquake resistance. Nepal government 
authorized the new building code with the Building Act of 1998. In 2003, the government made 
it mandatory for all government buildings to comply with the code. The Local Self-Governance 
Act, 1999, mandates District Development Committees (DDCs), Municipalities, and Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) to respond to disasters by creating Disaster Relief 
Committees and Emergency Operation Centers at all levels. 
The National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management, 2009, provides a roadmap for 
making Nepal a disaster resilient country. International aid organizations are also heavily 
involved in Nepal to assist the country with varieties of programs such as education, health, 
climate change, fight against poverty, and so on. Under this umbrella, there have also been 
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programs to make school, hospital, and other public buildings earthquake resistant. Various 
ministries in the Government of Nepal partner with the United Nations and other international 
organizations to plan and prepare for natural disasters such as floods, avalanches, landslides, and 
earthquakes. The government adopted the UN cluster system in which a ministry and an 
international agency would act as co-leads in each cluster, as shown in Figure 8 and Table 3 
below. 
 
Figure 8. Nepali National Disaster Management Framework  
 
Source: ReliefWeb (2015) 
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Table 3. A Co-Lead Cluster Approach to Disaster Governance in Nepal 
Cluster Government of Nepal Lead Agency Co-Lead Agency 
Health Min. of Health and Population WHO 
WASH Min. of Urban Development UNICEF 
Shelter Min. of Urban Development IFRC, UNHABITAT 
Food Min. of Agricultural Development WFP, FAO 
Logistics Min. of Home Affairs WFP 
CCCM Min. of Urban Development IOM 
Education Min. of Education UNICEF, SC 
Protection MWCSW; NHRC UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA 
Telecom Min. of Information and Communications WFP 
Nutrition Min. of Health and Population UNICEF 
Early recovery Min. of Urban Development UNDP 
 
Source: ReliefWeb (2015) 
 
 
The Nepal Army runs the Multi-National Military Coordination Center (MNMCC) to 
coordinate disaster relief activities with the aiding foreign military agencies. The MNMCC 
reports to the NEOC. The NEOC runs the On-Site Operation Coordination Center (OSOCC), 
which is designed to cooperate with the MNMCC to achieve civilian-military cooperation. Other 
ministries in the Government of Nepal also partner with the United Nations and other 
international organizations to plan and prepare for natural disasters such as floods, avalanches, 
landslides, and earthquakes. The government adopted the UN cluster system in which a ministry 
from the Government of Nepal leads each cluster and a UN agency or an international agency 
supports the lead ministry as a co-lead/partner agency. The clusters also receive strategic advice 
from the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) that is led by the UN Resident/Humanitarian 
Coordinator and composed of the UN agencies, International Organization for Migration, Red 
Cross and INGOs. from the Figure 9 below depicts Nepal’s national policy framework for 
disaster management. 
 
Figure 9. Nepali National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF) 
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 Source: ReliefWeb (2015) 
 
International non-governmental organizations that have been operating in Nepal for quite 
some time coordinate their activities within the Association of International NGOs (AIN), which 
is led by Save the Children in Nepal. Within AIN, there is a group of INGOs that have projects 
related to disaster risk and management. In addition, there is also a body called Disaster Risk 
Consortium that coordinates activities of public, private, NGO and international organizations in 
Nepal that have projects related to disaster risk reduction. 
 
4.5. Nepal’s Governance System After the Earthquakes 
Catastrophic natural disasters oftentimes produce temporary breaks in governance systems, 
opening space for renegotiation of the social contract with consequences for distribution of 
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economic resources and political rights (Pelling & Dill 2010).  In the case of Nepal, the 
governance system was in the middle of a protracted constitution making process following the 
conclusion of its decade-long civil war when the earthquakes hit the country. The earthquakes 
catalyzed this process by heightening the urgency for establishing effective governance to 
address the enormous challenge of post-disaster recovery, especially because the international 
community headed by the UNOCHA pressured the government to speed up the constitutional 
process to receive reconstruction aid grants (ICG 2016). The massive losses and damages that 
the earthquakes produced also tipped the balance of power between the ruling parties and 
opposition parties, as the former usually take the blame for failures of pre-disaster risk reduction 
efforts and of post-disaster response and recovery operations. In a fragile, low-income, 
multiparty political system without leaders able to reach compromise and unity in the face of a 
“focusing event” (Birkland 1998), elite conflict and political contestation can easily spread 
downstream to the masses as new and old politicians mobilize their bases in support of their 
policy agendas and political programs (Gawronski & Olson 2013). 
To better understand how the 2015 earthquakes catalyzed constitutional reform in Nepal, 
one needs to comprehend the disaster vulnerability and resilience of Nepalese communities 
depending on their socioeconomic, ecological, and geographic location within the country 
(Cutter et al. 2009). In the case of Nepal, the country is situated in a highly seismically active 
geography with harsh weather and topographic conditions suggesting that natural systems have 
already created the conditions for vulnerability of Nepal’s population to multiple, recurring 
disasters such as monsoon floods, droughts, earthquakes, avalanches, and landslides. Over 70 
percent of Nepal’s’ population lives in rural areas and engages in subsistence agriculture in a 
harsh climatic environment. Earthquakes and other natural disasters have the capacity to alter 
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socio-ecological systems of rural Nepalese, because transformed soil and shifted water resources 
might prohibit farming for affected communities. Moreover, international aid organizations tend 
to introduce cash crops and market-based modes of production in disaster-stricken areas of Nepal 
to inadvertently upend centuries of practice in subsistence agriculture (Epstein et al. 2017). Aid 
agencies could also inadvertently create moral hazard problems whereby better-off residents in 
connected geographies deliberately do not rebuild their houses because they know they will get 
help from donors, whereas households in remote mountainous areas do not have access to aid 
agencies and they often have to rebuild on their own (McGillis & Spoon 2017). 
In addition to ecological vulnerabilities, because of failures in social systems, built 
infrastructure, and ineffective regulations regarding urban and suburban growth, building 
construction, and land use and zoning, Nepalese citizens are highly vulnerable to natural 
disasters (Bhattarai and Conway 2010). For example, there is not enough open space in 
Kathmandu Valley for emergency and disaster response actors to move around in densely 
populated areas. Even police vehicles, ambulances, and firefighters cannot pass congested traffic 
on local roads. Because of the socioeconomic and spatial inequalities in Nepal, most earthquake 
victims were women from low-caste groups in the outskirts of Kathmandu Valley and rural areas 
of central Nepal (Boersma et al. 2016). 
Such high disaster vulnerability due to ecological and social factors creates conditions for 
mass mobilization for political action and governance reform in the aftermath of a massive 
earthquake. This is especially the case due to Nepal’s democratic opening after mass movements 
of the 1990s, subsequent proliferation of political parties along ethnolinguistic cleavage, and 
decade-long Nepalese Civil War (1996-2006), which ended by active diplomacy of international 
and regional actors using the United Nations peace building platform (Kantha 2015). Without 
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studying Nepal’s governance system and its participating actors in detail, one could expect 
increased conflict and even collapse of the state in the aftermath of the 2015 earthquakes. While 
complexities and diversity in Nepal’s governance system has the potential for double and triple 
loop learning and enhanced adaptive governance capacity (Pahl-Wostl 2009), structural 
inequalities in the distribution of economic resources and political rights/power of groups across 
Nepal’s regions as well as economic and geopolitical dependence of Nepal to India have made 
such improvement a challenging task. Therefore, post-earthquake reconstruction in Nepal 
depends not only on initial conditions of social forces, market prices, and government action 
(Horwich 2000), but also on geopolitical considerations such as the border crisis and unofficial 
economic blockade imposed on Nepal by India due to Nepal’s leaders not addressing India’s 
demand on what Nepal’s new constitution should entail. The blockade resulted in shortages of 
fuel, medical supplies and construction materials in Nepal for six months and brought the 
reconstruction process to a halt, taking a toll on earthquake victims in harsh winter conditions. 
In the context of Nepal, due to the natural landscape and climate of the country, the post-
earthquake environment was full of secondary natural challenges and shocks such as aftershocks, 
landslides, monsoon and freezing winter temperatures in the mountainous areas. While outbreaks 
of contagious diseases were prevented, a serious manmade crisis in post-disaster context was of 
political and geopolitical nature whereby the quick adoption of the new constitution was 
followed by minority protests in the south and unofficial economic blockade by India which 
worsened relief and recovery efforts in post-earthquake Nepal (Comfort and Joshi 2017). 
While caused exogenously, catastrophic natural disasters oftentimes produce temporary 
breaks in governance systems, opening space for renegotiation of the social contract with 
consequences for distribution of economic resources and political rights (Pelling and Dill 
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2010).16 In the case of Nepal, the governance system was in the middle of constitution making 
process following the conclusion of its decade-long civil war when the earthquakes hit. The 
earthquakes catalyzed this process (Iyengar 2015) by heightening the urgency for establishing 
effective governance to address the enormous challenge of post-disaster recovery, especially 
because the international community headed by the UNOCHA pressured the government to 
speed up the constitutional process in order to get the reconstruction funds.17 The massive loss 
and damage that the earthquakes produced also tipped the balance of power between the ruling 
parties and opposition parties, as the former usually take the blame for failures of pre-disaster 
risk reduction efforts and of post-disaster response and recovery operations.  
Even though it was a common knowledge that a powerful earthquake was coming 
(Bilham 2015) and successful educational campaigns had been implemented in schools and 
public arenas, implementation of building codes in public and private buildings and public 
infrastructural upgrading was uneven across socioeconomic groups and geographic areas (EERI 
2016). In a fragile, low-income, multiparty governance system without leaders able to reach 
compromise and unity in the face of a “focusing event” (Birkland 1998), elite conflict and 
political contestation easily spreads downstream to the masses as new and old politicians 
mobilize their bases in support of their policy agendas and political programs. 
Political use of the earthquakes to fast-track constitutional reform backfired as protests 
from politically marginalized Madhesi groups in the Terai plains that were unaffected by the 
earthquakes triggered border crisis with India (ICG 2016). Relatedly, political use of the 
                                                 
16 Whether this opportunity is realized to effect change depends on additional factors such as citizen perception of 
regime legitimacy and satisfaction with government performance, triggering events and tipping points (critical 
mass), and attribution of blame/responsibility for the disaster (Birkmann et al. 2010; Abney & Hill 1966; Arceneaux 
& Stein 2006). 
17 See Pelling and Dill (2006) on disasters as catalysts of political action. 
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earthquakes to gain office led to serious unintended consequences as the work of the National 
Reconstruction Authority got delayed and citizens suffered from postponed reconstruction 
activities as well as the border crisis. 
 The earthquakes and the ensuing domestic and regional political contestation produced a 
window of opportunity for Madhesi elites to mobilize the masses to enhance their political rights 
and power in Nepal’s new governance system. While major political parties compromised on a 
new constitution after three months of the earthquakes, the Madhesi demands for more rights and 
representations were unmet. In the shadow of India-China contestation over Nepal as well as 
parliamentary elections and Modi’s nationalist populism in India in support of Hindi speaking, 
co-religionist Madhesi population of Nepal, new networks of Madhesi politicians emerged to 
take advantage of the situation.18 Because the plains had not suffered from the earthquakes but 
the hills and mountains of the central region of Nepal did, the Madhesi riots and with tacit 
support from the Indian government led to the blockade of the borders to force the hands of 
mainstream Nepalese politicians who represent the hills and the mountains, as the restriction of 
the passage of gasoline and construction materials brought the recovery process to a complete 
halt. 
 In addition to the border crisis, there was a political crisis with respect to selecting the 
head of the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) – a national agency in charge of 
reconstruction routinely established after a major disaster – that further delayed the 
reconstruction process. While the NRA was established on paper with legislation after only eight 
months of earthquakes on December 25, 2015, it took the government about two years to agree 
on a chief of the agency who would oversee spending USD 4.1 bln. The main reason for the 
                                                 
18 See Kantha (2015) for a brief history of the role Indi has played in supporting Nepal’s government against 
opposition groups and vice versa. 
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delay in establishing the NRA leadership and offices was lack of leadership that could forge 
unity and stability in the face of a catastrophic disaster to rebuild the country. Instead, the 
process of negotiations exhibited elite divisions with respect to vision, allocation of funds, and 
mandate for the agency. Thus, the already weak, unstable government institutions in Nepal 
became even weaker in the face of border crisis and delays in enabling the National 
Reconstruction Authority due to the crises associated with constitution making and state building 
in Nepal. 
Lack of accountable, capable local governance structures in rural areas (where most 
damage occurred) and ineffective inter-governmental coordination mechanisms from national to 
local bodies created a massive challenge for relief and reconstruction (Regmi 2016). Adoption of 
a new constitution, new elections at local, provincial and national levels, and bureaucratic reform 
based on the new constitution were widely expected to have addressed these issues; however, 
they never materialized until after the earthquakes. 
 Donors have varying preferences in their methods of distributing disaster aid to affected 
individuals and sectors of the economy. Some prefer working with the government, while others 
choose to work with global INGOs who have local offices in Nepal. Some disaster assistance 
projects employ Nepalese citizens, while others hire global consultants or donor country citizens. 
Issues such as corruption, party patronage within the government and civil society, and all too 
frequent leadership change in the Government of Nepal are serious concerns for donors who 
want to ensure transparency and accountability of their donations. Divisions within the donor 
community can be a serious obstacle against effective disaster recovery. 
  The Government of Nepal prefers that donations go through government agencies for 
several reasons. First, the government and political party officials that make up the government 
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need legitimacy and by distributing funds and construction materials to their constituencies, they 
believe they can improve their legitimacy. If aid organizations implement reconstruction projects 
on their own and take credit for it, the government looks weak vis-à-vis aid agencies. The 
second, the aid bureaucracy/industry in Nepal has its own issues with accountability and 
efficiency.  Civil servants and academics in Nepal believe that they do not know how decisions 
are made in the aid circles and that the aid industry crowds out Nepalese talent and ideas, making 
the government and people even weaker and more dependent on aid.19 Third, Nepalese 
government officials question the way INGOs allocate the funds; they claim that INGOs have 
too high overhead costs because they hire Western nationals instead of Nepalese citizens and 
spend too much on consultants to write reports. Nepalese government officials would rather 
spend evaluation money on delivering more reconstruction goods.20 Some of these concerns 
were in play when the Government of Nepal decided to take control of the recovery process by 
reinstating import duties on relief and reconstruction materials on June 23, 2015, merely 42 days 
after the second earthquake.  They argued that donors were creating dependency and lowering 
the Nepalese people’s capacity and resiliency (Boersma et al. 2016). 
 Disaster aid often has implications for advancing national security and economic interests 
of donor countries. When international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, 
World Bank, and SAARC are bound by preferences of major states that contribute to the budgets 
of those agencies, countries such as China prefer alternative mechanisms of disaster aid 
distribution and coordination. In the face of competing security and economic interests, the 
Government of Nepal finds it necessary to ensure national sovereignty and bureaucratic 
autonomy over the implementation of disaster assistance projects, while attempting to reduce 
                                                 
19 This observation is based on personal communication with some organizational leaders in Nepal. 
20 This observation is based on personal communication with some organizational leaders in Nepal. 
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economic and political dependency on major powers, especially India and China. Fragmented 
and unstable governance makes this task very challenging as foreign policy interests of donor 
countries lead them to support certain Nepalese political parties who would best align with their 
interests. In lieu of disaster diplomacy, it appears that a geostrategic disaster competition takes 
place. The earthquakes closed off the country’s roads to China, exacerbating Nepal's already 
heavy economic dependence on India. China and India competed for influence by providing 
relief and reconstruction assistance. Madhesi protests and Indian economic blockade delayed 
reconstruction and increased Chinese influence (STRATFOR 2015). 
 Moreover, with years of experiencing instability, political patronage, corruption, and 
donor driven ideas about shrinking government, the Nepalese bureaucracy has lost its political 
insulation and expertise. The reality of the situation in Nepal is that there are not many expert 
civil servants who have the knowledge, skills, and institutional memory to cope with these 
serious challenges, besides the ever-changing cast of political appointees. Even the few expert 
civil servants who exist are afraid of being prosecuted for corruption, because corruption laws 
are too strict and ambiguously defined and selectively implemented.21 In addition, the Structural 
Adjustment Policies have made the government very lean and dependent on the international aid 
community, while also relying on NGOs to provide public services.  Divisions within the donor 
community, disagreements between the aid bureaucracy and the government, and issues of 
dependency have introduced more complexity and challenges with respect to post-earthquake 
reconstruction in Nepal. 
One of the serious gaps in the capacity of Nepal’s governance system was the absence of 
the middle tier of governance structures that link the local institutions to national government 
                                                 
21 This observation is based on personal communication with some organizational leaders in Nepal. 
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agencies. Because of this problem, the reconstruction process has delayed, as the national actors 
could not exchange information and work together with local actors (Regmi 2016). This 
challenge was exacerbated by the enormity of the reconstruction task, as Nepal’s exposure to 
multiple, recurring disaster risks in the rugged terrain and harsh climate as well as its experience 
with irregular land use, unplanned urbanization, and under-regulated construction industry has 
posed a major challenge to the existing governance system in addressing the challenges of 
reconstruction. Moreover, civil society organizations have provided relief and reconstruction as 
well as “the space for citizens to express their concerns, articulate them to the proper authorities, 
and demand a better government response” (Bakija 2016). 
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5.0 THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NETWORKED 
RESPONSE 
This chapter provides an analysis of the disaster governance system of Nepal by 
identifying the main actors, salient issues, and gaps in governance of the disaster response 
system. Using GDELT knowledge graph data, published reports, and expert interviews, the 
chapter shows that the scale of the 2015 earthquakes overwhelmed Nepal’s disaster response 
network, and large number of external actors that responded to Nepal’s appeals to assistance 
contributed to the perception and fear of loss of control as many foreign military and civilian 
actors dominated the scene. National level public organizations had significant coordination 
problems with local and district level organizations in Nepal. Moreover, due to tensions with UN 
agencies and donors, cooperation of the national ministries with international organizations 
suffered in the disaster response network. Massive mobilization of resources in disaster relief 
phase as well as perception of loss of control in managing one’s own internal affairs such as 
Search and Rescue (SAR) and management of displaced populations provide an important 
background for subsequent chapters. 
Effective interorganizational communication and cooperation are key elements of 
successful disaster response. Scholars advise measuring interorganizational networks through 
multiple sources of data. Typically, human-coded event data from content analysis of news and 
published reports is used. This approach usually requires much time and resources. Alternatively, 
the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) database contains graph data that is 
coded from contents of global and national media reports using advanced algorithms. Because 
GDELT database contains a massive-scale network of interconnected events, organizations, 
locations, and topics, it provides an alternative source of data to evaluate whether disaster 
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governance networks have actually operated according to their designed policies and plans. The 
present chapter also analyzes the performance of the 2015 Nepal Earthquake response networks 
to see whether they worked as planned by policymakers and public managers. Governmental and 
NGO reports are coded to map the planned network and the GDELT knowledge graph data is 
used to map the actual network. Measures of density, centrality, and cohesiveness are used from 
the literature on disaster response networks to make the comparisons.  
Effective interorganizational communication and cooperation are key elements of 
successful disaster response (White 1999; Sylves 2008). The present chapter uses GDELT data 
constructed from media reports to evaluate the effectiveness of a natural disaster response 
network. In so doing, the chapter aims at improving collective understanding of enabling and 
constraining factors that drive cooperation between national government agencies and 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations responding to complex 
emergencies in developing country settings – a critical question raised by scholars like Comfort 
(1990) and Natsios (1995). The chapter also briefly evaluates the strengths and weakness of a 
particular of the GDELT data source in conducting a social network analysis of 
interorganizational cooperation in the 2015 Nepal Earthquake response in relation to contextual 
knowledge about the case obtained from desk research, other scholarly works, and fieldwork and 
expert interviews. 
Scholars often measure interorganizational networks through multiple sources of data. 
Typically, human-coded event data from content analysis of news and published reports is used 
(e.g., Comfort and Kapucu 2006; Lia and Hsu 2018). This approach usually requires much time 
and resources. Alternatively, the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) database 
contains graph data that is coded from contents of global and national media reports using 
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automated algorithms. Because GDELT database contains a massive-scale network of 
interconnected events, organizations, locations, and themes (topics), it provides an additional 
source of data to evaluate whether disaster governance networks have actually operated 
according to their designed policies and plans. 
 
5.1. Effectiveness of the Disaster Response Network 
Effective management of response to large-scale natural disasters like the 2015 Nepal 
earthquakes is contingent upon a complex set of interdependent factors (Comfort 1999). The 
most important factors are the extent to which risk reduction activities are effectively 
implemented prior to the disaster. However, risk reduction depends on the level of economic 
development, distribution of resources across social groups, and governance capacity of a given 
country and takes years if not decades to undertake (Cutter et al. 2008). 
The next set of factors can be grouped under the rubric of preparedness and include 
coherent policy and management framework for joint planning, communication, and 
collaboration among diverse sets of organizations that have varying levels of financial, human, 
and organizational resources (Perry and Lindell 2003). Policy and planning documents such as 
national frameworks for disaster management need to be actively implemented during 
simulations and exercise for the organizations to effectively prepare for large-scale earthquakes. 
However, even the most prepared disaster relief networks can fail because of the unexpected 
nature of high-risk disaster that often create high uncertainty in a dynamic environment (Comfort 
and Kapucu 2006). Therefore, such response networks are truly tested only when the actual 
disaster happens. 
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Once the disaster strikes, the first goal of the response network is to restore normalcy as 
quickly as possible while minimizing loss of life and property and preventing secondary 
consequences of a disaster such as public health catastrophes, social upheaval, political disorder, 
and economic collapse. Attaining these objectives is often a tall order because disaster response 
networks quickly overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster and needs of the affected populations. 
A surge in the number of response actors that results from appealing to international 
organizations for support can create serious communication and coordination issues even when a 
coherent policy and management framework is in place prior to the disaster (Nolte and Boenigk 
2011). In resource-poor countries, it becomes especially important to communicate and 
coordinate better as many organizations operate with minimal financial, human, and 
organizational capacity (Saban 2015). 
Evaluating the effectiveness of disaster response networks based on only inputs and 
outputs such as number lives saved during search and rescue activities and the quantity of food 
and shelter provided in early phases of relief does not provide a sufficient evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the disaster response network. The reason is there will always be losses in 
human life and unsatisfied human needs in large-scale disasters. In addition, the number of 
responders deployed, the number of equipment used, the amount of food and shelter provided 
may still lead to a failed disaster response. Moreover, it is hard to judge how many lives could 
have been saved if a given amount of additional inputs was procured and deployed. Therefore, it 
is important to focus on how available resources were provided to affected populations with 
minimal failures in communication and coordination. 
A more viable approach to the evaluation of disaster response networks then is analysis 
of the extent to which organizational actors were prepared to communicate and coordinate their 
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actions prior to the disaster and of the extent to which they actually were able to do in the face of 
a disaster (Comfort and Kapucu 2006). Comparison of the network-in-plan with the network-in-
action can provide crucial insights for identifying and learning lessons (Birkland 2006), 
especially when done with careful consideration of domestic context as well as benchmark cases 
from the country’s past or other comparable, contemporary cases from similar countries. Such an 
analysis of network effectiveness is important for critical outcomes such as community capacity 
(Provan and Kenis 2008) and organizational resilience (Lai and Hsu 2018) that public policy and 
administration scholars study. It is also important for practitioners and policy makers because 
network properties and structures shape the rules of engagement in complex, dynamic 
environments such as mass-scale earthquake relief (Byman et al. 2000). 
The next sections start with a summary of network statistics for the 2015 earthquake 
response networks in Nepal. I then discuss which types of organizations have played influential 
roles in the actual disaster response network compared to their respective roles, or lack thereof, 
in the policy documents of the Government of Nepal. Finally, key organizations and their roles 
are discussed to provide a detailed analysis of their pivotal role in the network. 
 
5.2. Network Statistics 
Once interorganizational network data is extracted and preprocessed as described in the previous 
section, it results in a network of 273 organizations and 853 undirected ties and 12 connected 
components (Table 4). On average, each organization has about 6.2 ties. The diameter of the 
network is 6. This means that the farthest two organizations in the network with respect to 
geodesic distance are connected to each other through six other organizations. Geodesic distance 
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is the shortest path between two organizations.22 Mean geodesic distance, which is also called 
average path length, is about 3. In other words, on average organizations in the network are 
situated three steps or “degrees of separation” away from one another (Wasserman and Faust 
1994). This is a relatively closely connected network. Usually, spread of ideas, propagation of 
behavior, and transmission of diseases are effective up to three degrees of separation. 
 The density of the network is 0.023. Network density measures how complete the 
network is. In other words, a complete network has all possible ties among its nodes and a 
density of 1. It is calculated by summing the number of ties and dividing it by the total number of 
all possible ties (Wasserman and Faust 1994). While the network has only 2.3 percent of all 
possible ties, it is moderately dense for an interorganizational disaster response network. 
Network modularity measures modular decomposition of a network into a number of sub-
networks or communities. The greater the modularity score of a network, the more sophisticated 
is its community structure and better compartmentalization of its communities that have a real-
world importance.23 The disaster response network has a moderate network modularity score of 
about 0.6. The algorithm detected 19 subnetworks, including five largest ones. 
Average clustering coefficient measures the extent to which a network is clustered, i.e. 
the degree to which nodes are situated in clusters or neighborhoods of higher connectivity 
(Latapy 2008). Networks that are highly clustered but have lower average path length exhibit 
“small world” properties such as faster diffusion of ideas and behavior (Milgram 1967; Watts 
                                                 
22 A pair of connected nodes have a geodesic distance of 1. For a network of diameter k, the two most distant nodes 
of the network are connected to each other via k-1 number of nodes. 
23 The algorithm used for community detection was developed by Blondel and colleagues (2008) with random 
decomposition for higher accuracy while also accounting for edge weights. The resolution algorithm for community 
detection was developed by Lambiotte and colleagues (2009). 
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and Strogatz 1998). While the average path length of the disaster response network is not low, 
the average clustering coefficient is moderate at 0.7. 
 
Table 4. Network Statistics 
Number of Nodes 273 
Number of Edges 853 
Average Degree 6.249 
Network Diameter 6 
Network Density 0.023 
Modularity 0.574 
Connected Components 12 
Average Clustering Coefficient 0.703 
Average Path Length 2.934 
 
Note: See Appendix D for charts showing distribution of the centrality measures. 
 
5.3. Frequency Distribution by Organization Type 
With respect to frequency distribution, as shown in Figure 10, external bilateral organizations 
make up the largest number of organizations in the network, namely 85. National government 
agencies and INGOs are the second and third most common organizations in the network, 
respectively. Subnational government agencies and political parties have the lowest presence in 
the network. Despite their small number, three of the four political parties represented in the 
network are the largest four parties and have near-ubiquitous presence across all sectors and 
jurisdictions in Nepal. While it is possible that Nepalese private firms and NGOs are 
underrepresented in English-language media outlets, the data speak to the fact that international 
organizations (bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental) overshadow Nepalese governmental 
and non-governmental organizations in the disaster response network due to Nepal’s dependence 
on foreign assistance and surge capacity of international actors. 
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Figure 10. Frequency of Organizations by Type (N=273, E=853) 
 
 
5.4. Network Centrality by Organization Type 
Degree Centrality measures the extent of a node’s connectivity in the network – the number of 
ties a node has, normalized by the total number of ties in the network (Freeman 1978). Degree 
centrality is the most basic measure of influence in a network. When degree centrality measures 
are averaged and broken out across organization types, multilateral and bilateral governmental 
agencies are the top two types of organizations, reducing national government agencies of Nepal 
to the third place. Still, national government agencies are more connected than domestic and 
international NGOs. It is interesting to observe that domestic NGOs have higher degree 
centrality scores than international ones (Figure 11), despite the fact that the role of domestic 
NGOs are not clearly formulated in the Nepal’s National Disaster Response Framework. This is 
consistent with the findings of Bisri and Beniya (2016). This is likely the case because domestic 
NGOs have depended on international NGOs and multilateral donors for funding; however, after 
the earthquakes they also received large amounts of funds from local and Non-Resident Nepalis 
(diaspora living or working abroad) as well as from foreign individual philanthropists who 
developed ties with them while on a touristic journey in Nepal. 
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Figure 11. Mean Degree Centrality of Organizations by Type (N=273, E=853) 
 
 
However, when Eigenvector Centrality measures – a more refined measure of influence 
that takes into account connectivity of the nodes to which a node is connected – are used, both 
domestic and international NGOs have higher mean scores than the national government 
agencies of Nepal and external bilateral organizations (Figure 12). These findings attest to the 
fact that 1) frequency does not explain everything as relations and interdependencies are 
important in disaster response; and 2) external multilateral organizations, Nepalese NGOs and 
international NGOs in Nepal had been working on disaster risk reduction and preparedness 
issues as the national government of Nepal was busy dealing with political transition and 
international bilateral organizations have not had as long presence and as great influence in 
Nepal as multilateral agencies and NGOs have. 
 
Figure 12. Mean Eigenvector Centrality of Organizations by Type (N=273, E=853) 
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Betweenness Centrality measures the importance of each node in terms of its brokerage 
role in the network. In other words, it measures the normalized frequency with which each node 
provides a shortest-path connection between other nodes in the network (Freeman 1977). The 
greater the betweenness centrality of a score, the more important its brokerage role is in the 
network, as calculated using the method developed by Brandes (2001). With respect to this 
measure of influence, external multilateral organizations are in a dominant position of the 
network, surpassing all other actors by a large difference. It is because of the dominance of the 
United Nations as well as actors such as Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. Even 
though local and international NGOs have higher eigenvector scores, likely because of their 
close ties with multilateral organizations, the national government agencies of Nepal surpassed 
them with respect to their betweenness centrality scores. Political parties also have relatively 
higher influence because of their engagement with multilateral organizations and brokerage of 
ties between international and domestic actors. In contrast, the private sector and subnational 
organizations had negligible brokering power in the disaster relief network (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13. Mean Betweenness Centrality of Organizations by Type (N=248, E=828) 
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Closeness Centrality measures the mean of the shortest geodesic distance from a given 
node to all other nodes in the network normalized by the total number of nodes in the network 
(Bavelas 1950). The greater the closeness centrality score of an organization is, the closer the 
organization’s geodesic distance is to all other organizations in the network. It appears external 
multilateral agencies are closest to all other organizations in the network than any other type of 
organization. Overall, it seems all organizations in the network are situated in the network such 
that they all have more or less even closeness to others in the network with the exception of 
political parties, which have lower closeness centrality scores (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14. Mean Closeness Centrality of Organizations by Type (N=248, E=828) 
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5.5. Most and Least Central Organizations 
Among external multilateral actors, denoted with dark blue nodes in Figure 15, the United 
Nations agencies in general had the highest degree centrality score with the World Food Program 
having the highest in particular. This is likely because of the importance of the presence of WFP 
in Nepal with long existing anti-poverty programs and logistical capabilities that allow the 
organization to access even the remotest mountainous villages. EU agencies in general had the 
second highest degree centrality score followed by the World Bank, the World Health 
Organization, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Asian 
Development Bank, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  
In contrast, the UN Population Fund and the UN Office for the Coordination of the 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) were among external multilateral organizations with the 
lowest degree centrality scores. The latter is probably the case because the United Nations have 
had a strong presence in Nepal for decades and the head of the UN Country Team – UN Resident 
Coordinator (RC) – also took over the role of Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) obviating the need 
for UNOCHA to send one. The office of RC in the UN headquarter/compound in Patan, Lalitpur 
played an important role in coordinating relief operations for all international humanitarian 
actors (Datta et al. 2018). 
The same set of actors are dominant in the disaster relief network with respect to 
alternative measures of centrality: eigenvector, betweenness and closeness. The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) joins the list of top actors according to the latter measures. 
With respect to least central actors, surprisingly the UN Humanitarian Air Service joins the list. 
Among external bilateral actors colored in pink in Figure 15, international development 
agencies, especially the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UK 
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Department for International Development (DfID) have played the most central role in the 
disaster relief network. Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) within the USAID have 
been a useful instrument of assistance within Nepal’s disaster relief network. Similarly, the 
Indian National Disaster Response Force, the Indian Air Force, the Indian Army, the National 
Disaster Management Authority of India, and the Embassy of India also appear in the top list 
with respect to degree centrality measures. The next set of actors are Singapore security forces 
including their air force, army, civil defense units, and police. Israeli and Pakistani military 
forces also played active roles in the search and rescue operations, consistent with the findings of 
Thapa (2016). 
In contrast, the US Army, Chinese international search and rescue teams, the Red Cross 
Society of China, Indian Railways and the Indian Oil Corporation were on the list of actors with 
the lowest degree centrality measures in the disaster response networks. Despite the US Army’s 
low degree centrality score, the US Marine Corps and the US Air Force have much higher scores 
especially because one of the U.S. Marine Corps helicopters crashed in a remote mountainous 
region of Nepal while on a disaster relief mission. The Chinese Red Cross and search and rescue 
teams are highly praised by the Nepali leaders and external scholars alike who point out that 
while keeping silence and not networking/coordinating with other actors, Chinese disaster relief 
agency provided effective rescue and shelter provision (Wolbers et al. 2016). 
Considering alternative measures of centrality, the same set of actors are influential in the 
disaster response networks. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) joins the list of 
influential actors with respect to eigenvector centrality; however, JICA has a very low 
betweenness centrality score. Malaysian Red Crescent Society also took part in the disaster relief 
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network; however, it is among bilateral actors with lowest eigenvector, betweenness, and 
closeness centrality scores. 
 
Figure 15. Interorganizational Disaster Response Network in Nepal, Apr 25 - Jul 25, 2015 
 
Note: The software Gephi version 0.9.2 software was used to visualize the network extracted from the GDELT 
Global Knowledge Graph database. Appendix H provides the list of descriptions for labels used in the graph. 
 
 Among national government agencies of Nepal color coded in green in Figure 15, the 
Tribhuvan International Airport, the Nepal Army, Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs, the Nepal Earthquake Relief Fund, the Central Natural Disaster Relief 
Committee, the National Planning Commission, and the Nepal Police appear on the list of most 
central actors, respectively, in terms of degree centrality measure. Interestingly, the National 
Disaster Response Framework of Nepal does not discuss the role of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the National Planning Commission, even though they have played important roles. 
Moreover, the Armed Police Force of Nepal does not appear in the top 10 list of highly 
connected agencies, even though it is part of the Ministry of Home Affairs and took active role in 
disaster response. The Ministry of Education and the Nepal Telecommunications Authority 
appear to have the least number of ties among national government agencies. 
 As for subnational government agencies, lack of their presence in the relief network 
could be explained by two factors. First, Comfort and Joshi (2017), coding the disaster relief 
network using Kathmandu Post news articles, report that about 14 percent of the actors in the 
network were district government agencies. Given this information, the network identified by 
GDELT in this study underreports the number of subnational actors. However, even in Comfort 
and Joshi (2017) report only about 2 percent actors from local (subdistrict) government. This 
leads to the second explanation, namely either local government actors were not represented in 
the Kathmandu Post articles either or, as Manandhar and colleagues (2017) argued, lack of 
elected local government officials precluded the local institutions from playing an effective role 
in the disaster response. Even in some localities where response capacity did exist, lack of 
effective communication with district and national organizations delayed effective response and 
recovery (Regmi 2016; Manandhar et al. 2017). Both explanations found support from 
qualitative expert interviews I conducted in earthquake affected districts such as Kathmandu, 
Lalitpur, Bakhtapur, Sindhupalchok, and Dulikhel in March 2016 and April 2018. 
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5.6. Subnetworks in the Network 
As discussed above, the modularity algorithm detected 19 subnetworks within the disaster 
response network based on their structure. Subnetworks 15, 3, 2, 10, and 5 are the main 
communities detected by the algorithm, accounting for 77% of the organizations within the 
disaster response network. Figure 16 shows distribution of the number organizations across 
modularity class.  
 
Figure 16. Frequency of Organizations by Modularity (N=273, E=853) 
 
 
 An interesting observation from the visualization of subnetwork modularity classes in the 
disaster networks in Figure 17 is that while multilateral agencies, Western bilateral agencies, and 
INGOs appear if different subnetworks of the disaster response network, the national 
government agencies of Nepal and Indian government agencies are coupled together within the 
same subnetwork. This finding speaks to the fact that Indian government and security actors 
dominated the response scene and the media elaborately discussed many issues including some 
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controversial issues related to portrayal of Nepal in Indian media and the strong reaction by the 
Nepali public that triggered anti-India sentiments.24 
 
Figure 17. The Disaster Response Network by Modularity, Apr 25 – Jul 25, 2015 
 
Note: The software Gephi version 0.9.2 software was used to visualize the network extracted from the GDELT 
Global Knowledge Graph database. 
                                                 
24 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-32579561  
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5.7. Summary 
The main findings of this chapter show that the disaster response network following the massive 
2015 earthquakes in Nepal was dominated international multilateral and bilateral governmental 
institutions as measured by centrality scores. Perceived loss of control in the disaster response 
network to Indian actors as well as the UN actors led government officials and political party 
leaders in Nepal to attempt to regain control of the disaster governance network. Within a month 
of the earthquakes, the government of Nepal ended the emergency phase of the response and re-
imposed import duties to all the incoming goods at the customs. Moreover, the government 
required that financial donations go through the Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund or 
Nepal’s central bank. Political party leaders attempted to reignite nationalism, anti-India 
sentiment, and self-sufficiency narrative to regain control of the situation. This is consistent with 
the findings of Wolbers and colleagues (2016) who show that anti-dependency narrative was 
used by political officials to regain control of the resources flows in the humanitarian response 
network. 
 While complex response activities in highly uncertain and dynamic environments of 
catastrophic events suggest that no one actor is truly in control of the entire network (Comfort 
and Joshi 2017) and thus shared management of response activities would be a more effective 
approach, lack of coordination and duplication of efforts among bilateral international 
governmental and non-governmental actors, as reported by experts in Nepal, can lower the 
effectiveness of networked response activities. Moreover, Manandhar and colleagues (2017) 
argue that there were overlapping mandates by the Nepal Army, Nepal Police, and the Nepal 
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Armed Police Force and lack of clear line of authority as the lead agency – the Ministry of Home 
Affairs – could not command its peer ministries. 
 The analysis of the graph data extracted from the GDELT database is certainly useful in 
understanding the effectiveness of disaster response activities in Nepal. However, a rich 
understanding of the context from other studies, surveys, and interviews is necessary in order to 
make sense of the findings from analysis of the big data collected by GDELT. One main 
limitation of the data extracted from GDELT was the fact that actors of lower centrality were not 
represented well in the network. The version 2 of the GDELT Global Knowledge Graph database 
will be explored in future research as it includes Nepali language news and social media as well. 
However, the latter could make accurate entity extraction more difficult, and it will require more 
manual intervention in data preparation to reduce duplication of nodes and edges.25 Methods and 
algorithms can be developed by using entity names that can be cross-checked with databases of 
existing organizations. 
  
                                                 
25 This is a typical problem with automated extraction of entities from text data (Pfeffer and Carley 2012).  
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6.0 NEPAL’S RESOURCE CAPACITY BEFORE AND AFTER THE EARTHQUAKES 
This chapter discusses the state of resource capacity in Nepal and how it changed in the 
aftermath of the 2015 earthquakes, creating incentives and enabling conditions for dominant 
actors in the system for governance reforms. In order to demonstrate the impact of the 2015 
earthquakes on resource capacity of Nepal’s governance system, it is important to provide 
baseline information regarding Nepal’s resource capacity and organizational infrastructure used 
to mobilize resources. As reviewed in Chapter 2, commanding increasing levels of resources due 
to post-disaster resource mobilization can be a motivating factor for governance actors to adopt 
institutional and policy measures that would then maximize the benefit they receive from those 
resources in terms of economic and political influence. 
Reforming the governance system hinges on resource capacity, which is typically 
measured by the amount of resources the governance system is capable of mobilizing and 
developing. One of the basic features of high-capacity governance systems is that they can 
generate high tax revenue, which structures state-citizen relations due to compulsory and 
oftentimes coercive enforcement of tax collection and development of the tax base – the 
economy. Increased economic activity due to post-disaster resource mobilization expands the tax 
base and improves the revenue capacity of the governance system. Tax mobilization in strong 
governance systems is organized such that individuals and organizations have incentives to 
benefit individually by their activities and not be overburdened by their obligation to pay taxes 
for collective well-being. Increasing productive activities of the economy to expand the tax base 
and to mobilize additional, non-tax revenue requires public infrastructure development, effective 
utilization of natural resources, and investments in human capital and knowledge creation by 
leveraging additional resources using private sector and external partners. 
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6.1. Resource Capacity Before the Earthquakes 
6.1.1. Fiscal Resources 
Nepal’s governance system has had low capacity to mobilize resources. First, with respect to 
government revenue, the Nepalese government mobilized USD 3.82 billion in FY 2014, which 
makes up only 18.38 percent of the country’s gross national product and amounts to USD 134.87 
per capita. Adjusted to purchasing power parity, which provides a more comparative 
understanding, the government revenue was equivalent to USD 12.63 billion, or USD 445.92 per 
capita. Overwhelming 88 percent of government revenue was tax revenue, indicating that in 
addition low tax mobilization, Nepal does not have significant non-tax resources such as 
petroleum or natural gas. Nepalese government expenditures, on the other hand, make up 23.33 
percent of the GDP, which is higher due to foreign aid and borrowing (MOF 2015).  
In contrast, tax revenue makes up about 35 percent of GDP on average in Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, which have high capacity 
governance systems (OECD 2016). This suggests that the governance system of Nepal needs a 
stronger capacity to mobilize revenue to achieve greater, infrastructure development, well-being 
and prosperity. 
Nepal’s tax system is rather regressive, meaning that the tax burden is shouldered more 
by the poor than the rich. The reason for that is, as can be seen in Table 5, 44 percent of the 
government revenue is generated by consumption tax – Value Added Tax (VAT), as opposed to 
only 22 percent from income tax (MOF 2015; NPC 2015). The reason is that VAT is easier to 
collect than income tax, and many advanced economies in the world rely on VAT. In early 
1990s, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assisted Nepal in developing 
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the VA system. Passing the Value Added Tax Act of 1995, despite opposition from the business 
community, Nepal first started collecting VAT on November 16, 1997. Before then, Nepal had 
various taxes such as sales tax, hotel tax, contract tax, and entertainment tax (Puri 2011; Shrestha 
2000). The VAT system has been successful because it allowed the system to stabilize revenue 
despite the ongoing civil war with the Maoists (Shumshere 2009). 
 
Table 5. Public Revenue Composition of Nepal, 2011-2013 
  FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 
  NPR bn. Percent NPR bn. Percent NPR bn. Percent 
Tax revenue 172.8 87% 211.7 87% 259.2 88% 
     Income tax 42.1 21% 52.9 22% 66.1 22% 
     Property taxes 6.6 3% 3.6 1% 5.3 2% 
     Consumption tax (VAT) 88.4 45% 110.6 45% 129.3 44% 
     Trade tax 35.7 18% 44.7 18% 58.5 20% 
Nontax revenue 25.6 13% 32.7 13% 36.8 12% 
     Charges 10.2 5% 0.3 0% 0.3 0% 
     Sale of services 1.6 1% 6.9 3% 11.2 4% 
     Dividends 8.6 4% 9.4 4% 10.8 4% 
     Others 5.2 3% 16.1 7% 14.5 5% 
Total 198.4 100% 244.4 100% 296 100% 
Source: Nepal’s Ministry of Finance (MOF 2015). 
 
 
Reforming and strengthening Nepal’s governance system depends considerably on 
improving Nepal’s public revenue collection efforts by addressing the challenges that are 
precluding the government from achieving greater revenue. One way to improve revenue 
collection would be to simplify and automate the process of payments because as it can be seen 
in Table 6, Nepalese taxpayers spend considerably greater amount of time and effort for tax 
compliance, compared to other South Asian and more developed countries. That would mean 
decreasing the number of payments per year and reducing the number of hours spent filing the 
taxes (World Bank 2017). 
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Table 6. Efficiency of Tax Payments in Nepal 
  Nepal South Asia OECD (20) Best Performer 
Number of tax payments 
per year 34 28.5 10.9 
3 (Hong Kong SAR, 
China) 
Hours spent making tax 
payments 339 277.3 160.7 55 (Luxembourg) 
Tax rate (as % of profit) 29.6 43 40.1 18.47% (OECD 32) 
Source: World Bank (2017a). 
 
 
The main challenges in Nepalese governance system’s tax efforts are many people are 
not registered to pay income tax and VAT tax because much of economic activity occurs in the 
informal sector. Many people owe tax arrears due to inability to pay, and a very large number of 
cases overwhelm the Revenue Tribunals of Nepal where government pursues those with arrears, 
committing fraud and evasion. The large magnitude of tax arrears in Nepal suggest that tax rules 
are lax and enforcement processes are ineffective (MOF 2015; Sharma and Duwadi 2013). 
Moreover, while tax incentives for private sector infrastructure development and hydropower 
production has weakened the revenue efforts (Dixit 2017) and exemption of agricultural 
production from taxation due to subsistence considerations has also reduced public revenue 
(Dahal 2009; Shumshere 2009). Improving agricultural productivity is very crucial because 2/3 
of Nepal’s population lives in rural areas and 1/3 of its GDP originates from agriculture even 
though only 16.7 percent of Nepal’s land is arable (IRIN 2012). 
 However, it is important to keep in mind that even as greater revenue is raised, its 
positive impact on governance depends on the effective allocation and implementation of public 
expenditures. As it is well known, Nepal’s government has historically had challenges in 
spending and implementing projects (Wildavsky 1972). Even in FY 2013 Nepal’s government 
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experienced delays in spending and thus 46 percent of the budget had to be spent in the last 
quarter and 21 percent of the budget was spent in the last month of the fiscal year. This created 
fiscal contraction as public revenue outstripped the government capacity to effectuate public 
investments (MOF 2015). 
 
6.1.2. Non-Fiscal Resources 
Improving revenue mobilization also depends on the capacity of individuals and organizations to 
simply shoulder the burden of taxes due to poverty, lack of infrastructure, inefficient exploitation 
of natural resources, and lack human capital development. 
Nepal’s revenue mobilization is constrained by its poverty as Nepal is a least developed 
country (LDC), one among 48 LDCs globally or 13 in Asia. Nepal is the second poorest country 
in South Asia following Afghanistan (NPC 2015). Nepal’s gross national income was US $20.8 
billion in 2014. Adjusting for purchasing power parity, this figure was US $68.74 billion, which 
is slightly less than the GDP of West Virginia and marginally greater than that of Idaho (BEA 
2017; World Bank 2017b). Over the past decade before the earthquakes, Nepal’s GDP grew at 4 
percent annually, which is very low for a developing country. Gross national income per capita 
was US $730 in 2014. Adjusting for purchasing power parity it was US $2,430 while the global 
average was US $15,226 and South Asian average US $5,289 (World Bank 2017b).  
Absolute poverty rate is high Nepal; as of 2015, 24.8 percent of the population lives in 
extreme poverty – under USD 1.25 a day (NPC 2015). Based on multiple measures of poverty 
such as internationally administered multi-cluster poverty index (MPI), 44 percent of Nepal’s 
population lived in poverty in 2014 (OPHI 2015). Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.458 
in 2011, ranking 145th in the world (UNDP 2014). According to the World Food Program Nepal 
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is a food deficit state, as 48 percent of the children under the age of five have chronic 
malnourishment problems (60 percent in mountain areas), which is greater than to the rate of 42 
percent in Somalia (WFP 2009). In addition, child labor is high – every third child aged 5-17 is 
involved in child labor (NPC 2015). 
Poverty is exacerbated by geographic and socioeconomic inequality in the country, 
creating further obstacles for economic development and revenue mobilization. Spatial 
inequality is high in Nepal as the absolute poverty rate in the Far Western region was 59 percent 
and in the Western region 33 percent in 2011 (NPC 2015). As Figure 18 shows, many districts in 
the Far Western region and some in eastern part of the Terai region suffer from low HDI values.  
 
Figure 18. Human Development Index in Nepal’s Districts, 2011 
 
Source: UNDP (2014, 15). 
Socioeconomic disparity in Nepal is also high. The Gini coefficient for Nepal was 0.328 
in 2010. The poorest 40 percent of the population has only 12 percent of the national income 
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(NPC 2015). Extreme poverty falls mostly on certain castes/ethnicity and women/girls. National 
absolute poverty rates for certain castes and ethnicities are 45 percent whereas the national 
average was 25 percent in 2010 (CBS 2011). As can be seen in Figure 19, HDI was highest for 
Hill Brahmans (0.557) and lowest for Madhesi Dalits at 0.4 in 2011. Gender Development Index 
(GDI) was 0.482 in 2011 and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) was 0.568 in 2011 
(NPC 2015). 
 
Figure 19. Human Development Index by Caste/Ethnicity, 2011 
 
Source: UNDP (2014, 17). 
 Another challenge for revenue mobilization is the problem of developing physical 
resources such as basic infrastructure building and natural resource exploitation, creating 
challenges for effective governance and development in Nepal. Inadequate bridges and road 
networks contribute to higher food prices and therefore lower food security and well-being in 
Nepal (Shively and Thapa 2017). Natural resource scarcity, especially in water and land in Nepal 
create local level conflicts, making the problem of governance and development much more 
challenging (Upreti 2004). 
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Roads are the backbone of Nepal’s economy and its residents’ livelihoods and yet, only 
half of the population in Nepal has access to paved roads. In rural hill areas and mountains 
regions, one-third of residents walk more than four hours to reach an all-season road (World 
Bank 2016b). According to the Department of Local Infrastructure Development and 
Agricultural Roads, Nepal has 6,683 rural roads, extending to 50,943 km. Of these, 1,575 km are 
blacktop, 14,601 km are gravel, and 34,766 km are earthen fair-weather roads (FNCCI 2017). 
Despite building additional 65,500 km road in the past decade, Nepal’s road density is only 0.44 
km/km2. Nepal’s roads are not safe for driving based on international standards (NPC 2015).  
Road infrastructure development in Nepal started in 1950 and before then Nepal had no 
roads and was not connected to any international road networks. Its only linkage was through the 
single railway line of Nepal from Janakpur to Jainagar (53 km) that was built in 1928. After the 
construction of roads and provision of subsidized fuel from India in 1956, trucking became a 
major mode of freight transport and busses became a primary mode of movement for passengers 
(Gaire 2014). Only 19% of roads in Nepal are all-weather roads, while only 11% of total roads in 
Nepal are paved with asphalt. Two of the 75 districts are still not connected by roads (FNCCI 
2017). 
According to the president of the Confederation of Nepalese Industries H. B. Sharma the 
main problem with Nepal’s poor infrastructure development record is government monopoly in 
infrastructure development in Nepal, poor quality standards, and near-constant delays in project 
implementation. Moreover, due to revenue capacity issues, the number of infrastructures projects 
being developed is also insufficient. A minimum annual investment of USD 3 billion is required 
to finance better infrastructure for Nepal (Dhungana 2017). Recently there has been more private 
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sector involvement in road construction in the form of public private partnerships; however, 
delays are still common in project implementation (World Bank 2016b; interviewee #). 
Another reason for Nepal’s poor road infrastructure is lack of maintenance as the roads 
deteriorate due to use and weather-induced hazardous events. There is a backlog of road 
maintenance for more than 50,943 km of rural roads. That is why most Nepalese roads are in 
poor condition (FNCCI 2017). While air travel is well developed due to Nepal’s tourism 
industry, it is still not affordable to many Nepalese citizens. Moreover, only 11 of the 47 airports 
have proper surfaced runways and air safety standards and quality are not good due to high 
altitude and weather conditions (World Highways 2014). 
Besides roads and bridges, Nepal also has weak infrastructure in many sectors including 
industry (only 15 percent of Nepal’s GDP is from the industry26), housing sector (7 percent of 
urban Nepalese live in squatter settlements and only 29.8 percent of Nepal’s housing stock is 
considered safe for living). Banking and financial infrastructure is also in poor condition as only 
25.3 percent of individuals age 15 and above own a bank account and 3.7 percent a debit card 
(World Bank 2014). The only infrastructure that is better developed in Nepal is its 
telecommunications as about 90 percent of the population has access to telecommunication (NPC 
2015). While communications are essential for strong governance, physical connectivity is also 
important for economic and political development of the country. 
Nepal’s revenue mobilization capacity is weak also because of inefficient natural 
resource utilization. Nepal’s main natural resources are land, water, forests, and its mountains. 
Only 16.7 percent of Nepal’s land is arable, and 47.5 percent of the arable land requires 
irrigation. Therefore, productive use of land depends on water. However, for four months, Nepal 
                                                 
26 Unofficial estimates suggest that only 6 percent of Nepal’s GDP originates from industrial production. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/15/world/asia/in-nepal-a-better-life-with-a-steep-price.html 
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has too much water and for eight months Nepal has inadequate water, bordering effective 
droughts (IRIN 2012).  
Nepal also does not use its forest and water resources for energy in an efficient manner. 
About 53.8 percent of the population still uses wood as the main fuel. 28.7 percent uses LPG for 
cooking in 2011. Only 74% of Nepal’s population has access to electricity (NPC 2015), while 
those who have access to it lose power up to 18 hours a day due to short supply.27 While Nepal 
has great potential for hydropower development, currently only 10 percent of the hydropower 
potential is exploited in Nepal (NPC 2015). 
Nepal uses its tourism resources relatively more efficiently, as the country ranked 38th 
among 184 countries in terms of the tourism sector’s contribution to national employment in 
2014. In the same year, the tourism sector in Nepal accounted for 487.5 thousand jobs, which 
accounted for 3.5 percent of total employment in the country. The tourism sector accounted for 
4.3 percent of Nepal’s GDP (Kathmandu Post 2015). Alternative estimates indicate that 1.2 
million Nepalese citizens rely on tourism sector jobs and 20 percent of the population’s 
livelihood depends on tourism sector (Kunwar and Limbu 2015). 
With respect to human resources, Nepal’s population was 28,323,282 in 2015 (World 
Bank 2017b). However, the economy in Nepal has employment problems and many in Nepal 
seek job opportunities abroad. About 3.8 million permits were issued by Nepal’s Ministry of 
Labor and Employment for employment abroad in the last two decades. That would amount to 
14 percent of Nepal’s current population (MOL 2016). Because of such high number of labor 
migration, remittances going back to Nepal amounted to USD 6.6 billion in 2015, making up 
29.2 percent of Nepal’s GDP. In 2013 Nepal was a top four emigration country in the world after 
                                                 
27 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-14/nepal-unveils-first-full-budget-in-three-years/5593454 
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India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (World Bank 2016a). Many of Nepalese labor migrants work in 
low-skill jobs because the education system is not well developed in Nepal. In 2001 National 
Census, the literacy rate in Nepal was at 66 percent of the population (CBS 2012). 
Nepal has recently developed good engineers, information technology professionals, and 
health sector professionals resulting from cooperation of the country with organizations such as 
International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), World Health 
Organization (WHO), World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), United Nations Development Program, Nepal Society for 
Earthquake Engineering, and so on. However, the majority of these professionals are located in 
the Kathmandu Valley and the Central Region of Nepal, if they haven’t left the country in search 
of better job opportunities abroad (Table 7). A recent report on civil service reform in Nepal 
concluded the same problem of concentration of quality civil servants in Kathmandu and lack of 
willingness and motivation to work in civil service in the rest of the country (Bajracharya and 
Grace 2014). This situation further contributes to socioeconomic and spatial inequality in Nepal 
leading to the vicious cycle of poverty, inequality, and low education. 
 
Table 7. Civil Servants Across Nepal’s Regions 
Region N Civil Servants Percent Percent of total 
population 
Eastern 13,039 16.34 21.92 
Western 12,331 15.45 18.58 
Far Western 6,602 8.27 9.55 
Central 37,987 47.5 36.49 
Mid-Western 9,775 12.25 13.46 
Total 79,734 100 100 
Source: Bajracharya and Grace (2014, 14). 
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 Thus, the governance capacity of Nepal with respect to resources is fragile because of 
underdeveloped economy, inefficient use of natural resources, poverty, spatial and 
socioeconomic inequality, underdeveloped infrastructure, harsh terrain and weather conditions, 
low industrial capacity, political instability and conflict, and environmental degradation (NPC 
2015). Notwithstanding the low level of resources and conflict, the country had macroeconomic 
stability in terms of revenue growth, low fiscal deficit (less than 4% on average in the past 
decade), low inflation, healthy balance of payments despite large trade imbalances (due to 
remittances), low public-sector indebtedness (25% - 15.4 external, 9.1 domestic - of GDP in 
2015), foreign exchange reserves are 40% of GPD – worth one year of imports of merchandize 
(due to remittances MOF 2015) (NPC 2015). 
 The relatively prudent steering of the economy is largely because of Nepal’s partnership 
with donors and development agencies. In 2014, official development assistance to Nepal that 
goes through government budget was 62.54 percent of government’s development budget and 
12.95 percent of all government expenditures (NPC 2015). Total foreign aid is over 25 percent of 
government revenue, as about 40 percent of official development assistance dollars do not go 
through government budget (off the book) and many INGOs spend additional millions of dollars 
outside of official development assistance (MOF 2017). The largest five donors are … In terms 
of foreign direct investment, in FY13-14 Chinese investments exceeded Indian ones for the first 
time even though cumulatively Indian FDI amounts were twice the amount of Chinese 
investments.28 In addition, Nepal also borrows internally and externally to make up for missing 
resource capacity of the governance system (NPC 2015). 
 
                                                 
28 http://www.doind.gov.np/images/industrial-static/ind_stat_2070_71.pdf 
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6.2. Resource Capacity After the Earthquakes 
6.2.1. Donations 
Even though it is natural to think of large-scale disasters having a negative effect on resource 
capacity of a country due to destruction of property and loss of life, such disasters can lead to 
mobilization of large amounts of resources and contribute to resource capacity building. The 
April and May 2015 earthquakes of Nepal weakened the resource capacity of Nepal’s 
governance system in the short run because of destruction in physical infrastructure, loss of 
human capital, and reductions in governments revenue efforts because of the earthquakes as well 
as the subsequent political protests and border crisis/blockade. The economy also lost substantial 
amount of resources due to destruction of heritage sites and loss of revenue from the tourism 
industry. 
The GDP growth rate decreased to three percent from an expected rate of five percent 
(NPC 2015). The earthquake damages were estimated to be between one third and one half of 
Nepal’s GDP. At least three percent more of Nepal’s population slid into absolute poverty as a 
result of the earthquakes (NPC 2015). When presented with officially certified proofs and 
documentation, the national government waived income taxes, excise duties, license fees, and 
home rental taxes to small businesses and individual taxpayers who lost property due to the 
earthquakes for FY2014-15 (NBSM n.d.). 
However, vast of amount of resources also started to flow in after the 2015 earthquakes. 
External multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies, INGOs, private individuals and organizations 
donated or committed to donate resources that collectively exceed the annual budget of 
Government of Nepal. Within two months of the earthquakes, a donor’s conference facilitated by 
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the United Nations and hosted by the Government of Nepal ended with development partners 
pledging USD 4.3 billion (Table 8). 
 
Table 8. Donations, Commitments and Pledges for Relief and Recovery 
Type of Donation April 2015 - Dec 2016 (USD) 
Disbursement 0.7 million  
Commitment 1.2 billion  
Pledge 3.5 billion  
Source: Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund 
 
  
Competing actors in Nepal’s governance system would naturally want to be the stewards 
of these resources because they can create a lot of political capital by overseeing the distribution 
of these resources to earthquake affected communities. However, because of perceptions of 
government corruption and inefficiency, international actors prefer to channel these resources 
through INGOs and NGOs in Nepal. From their perspective, government actors redirect funding 
according to their own priorities, if not outright capture resources for their personal use or for the 
use of their narrow constituencies who may or may not have suffered from the earthquakes. At 
the same time, many Nepali government and academic actors perceive INGOs, NGOs, and the 
multilateral actors as wasteful. Their claim is that outside organizations spend too much funds on 
non-tax paying foreign consultants and writing reports that do not deliver concrete benefits to 
earthquake victims. As Figure 20 and Figure 21 show below, while bilateral governmental and 
multilateral inter-governmental actors provided the bulk of donations, much of these funds were 
channeled through multilateral agencies that have long had active programs in Nepal as well as 
domestic NGOs of Nepal. Only 10.24% of the disaster relief donations were channeled through 
agencies of the Government of Nepal. 
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Figure 20. Distribution of Donations by Donor Type 
 
 
Figure 21. Distribution of Donations by Recipient Type 
 
 The Prime Minister’s Office attempted to channel donations through itself by setting up 
the Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund (PMDRF). 499 organizations and/or individuals 
donated to this fund (see Table 9). However, these are often small funds and involve many 
Nepali and private sector organizations. As the visualization in Figure 22 shows, the PMDRF 
stands on its own in the donation network. While the Government of Nepal (GON) did received 
donations from major multilateral and bilateral actors, it is clear that it is competing for resources 
with the UN agencies and Red Cross agencies who are dominant in the network with respect to 
receiving donation funds. 
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Table 9. Main Recipient Actors with Highest In-Degree Centrality Score 
Label Organization Name 
In-Degree 
Centrality 
PMDRF Prime Minister's Disaster Relief Fund 499 
VR Various Recipients 88 
UNICEF UN Children's Fund 36 
GON Government of Nepal 36 
WFP World Food Program 35 
OXFAM GB Oxfam Great Britain 19 
ARC American Red Cross 15 
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross 14 
SC Save the Children 12 
IOM 
International Organization for 
Migration 
11 
UNDP UN Development Program 11 
UNFPA UN Population Fund 10 
UNOCHA 
UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
10 
CRC Canadian Red Cross 10 
WHO World Health Organization 9 
 
 
Figure 22. The 2015 Earthquakes Donation Network in Nepal (N=890, E=1099) 
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Note: Visualization was created using Gephi 0.9.2. Nodes and Labels are sized with respect to in-degree centrality 
score with a spline value of 0.8 and the network layout is in accordance with Fruchterman Reingold. 
 
 With respect to disbursed amounts of donation for relief and early recovery efforts, UN 
agencies contributed the highest amount as the World Food Program, UNICEF, and the Central 
Emergency Response Fund of the world governance body contributed over 27 percent of total 
amount. Private individuals and businesses provided the second greatest amount of disbursed 
funds – about 13 percent. The US government and the UK government were among the highest 
with respect to bilateral governmental assistance (Table 10). 
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Table 10. Top Donor Organizations by Disbursement 
Top 10 Donor Organization Disbursed Amount 
(USD) 
Disbursed 
Percentage 
World Food Program  103,606,246 14.47% 
Private (individuals and organizations)  92,977,408 12.98% 
United Nations Children's Fund  73,021,054 10.20% 
United States of America  42,361,535 5.92% 
United Kingdom  40,288,992 5.63% 
European Commission  26,174,939 3.65% 
UN Central Emergency Response Fund  20,582,198 2.87% 
Canada  20,082,637 2.80% 
Norway  19,354,679 2.70% 
Thailand  17,878,584 2.50% 
Others  259,834,814 36.28% 
Total  716,163,086.00  100.00% 
 
 Multilateral development institutions committed the largest amount of donations for 
rebuilding Nepal. The Asian Development Bank committed about one third of all committed 
amounts, whereas the combined commitment amount for the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund was about 21 percent of all committed funds. The US government committed 
5.29 percent of all committed donations (Table 11). 
 
Table 11. Top Donor Organizations by Commitment 
Top 10 Donor Organization Committed Amount 
(USD) 
Committed 
Percentage 
Asian Development Bank  400,002,964 32.53% 
Japan  254,888,449 20.73% 
World Bank  202,500,000 16.47% 
United States of America  65,072,046 5.29% 
Private (individuals and organizations)  50,226,764 4.08% 
International Monetary Fund  49,700,000 4.04% 
European Commission  30,226,408 2.46% 
Germany  20,104,711 1.63% 
Canada  17,311,735 1.41% 
Norway  15,988,301 1.30% 
Others  123,775,931 10.06% 
Total  1,229,797,309 100.00% 
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 With respect to pledged funds for reconstruction, the Government of India tops the list 
with 28.40 percent of all pledged funds, with Asian Development Bank taking the second place 
with 17 percent and the World Bank the third place with 14 percent of all pledged funds. The 
Government of China pledged to contribute the fourth largest amount – 13.7 percent (Table 12). 
 
Table 12. Top Donor Organizations by Pledge 
Top 10 Donor Organization Pledged Amount (USD) Pledged 
Percentage 
India 1,000,000,000 28.40% 
Asian Development Bank 600,000,000 17.04% 
World Bank 500,000,000 14.20% 
China 483,000,000 13.72% 
Japan 260,000,000 7.38% 
United States of America 130,481,490 3.71% 
European Commission 124,270,000 3.53% 
United Kingdom 109,280,000 3.10% 
Disasters Emergency Committee 100,591,716 2.86% 
Canada 60,000,000 1.70% 
Others 153,617,034 4.36% 
Total 3,521,240,240 100.00% 
 
 On the receiving end of donation funds, UNCIEF and the World Food Program combined 
received over 40 percent of all disbursed funds for relief and early recovery efforts. In contrast, 
the Prime Minister’s Office received only about 10 percent of the disbursed funds. Even though 
Red Cross agencies are well connected in the donations network, they received rather small 
amounts of donations and played similar role to that of subcontracting INGOs and NGOs to 
larger multilateral organizations (Table 13). 
 
Table 13. Top Recipient Organizations by Disbursement 
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Top 10 Donation Recipient Organization Disbursed 
Amount 
(USD) 
Disbursed 
Percentage 
United Nations Children's Fund  171,395,035 23.93% 
World Food Program  116,292,943 16.24% 
Prime Minister's Disaster Relief Fund  67,790,887 9.47% 
Various Recipients  55,086,468 7.69% 
International Federation of Red Cross  21,869,523 3.05% 
International Organization for Migration  14,157,564 1.98% 
Oxfam Great Britain  11,605,002 1.62% 
Save the Children  10,485,214 1.46% 
Thai Red Cross Society  8,500,000 1.19% 
United Nations Development Program  7,897,385 1.10% 
(blank)  120,708,413 16.85% 
Others  110,374,652 15.41% 
Total  716,163,086 100.00% 
 
 Among recipients of commitments and pledges, the Government of Nepal received 58 
percent and 97 percent, respectively (Table 14 and Table 15). However, if and/or when these 
pledges materialize, the donors usually decide as to what type of projects in which areas of the 
country and through what channels will be spent. My interviews with high level decision makers 
in Nepal demonstrate that the donors often changed their priorities – what they consider is 
important for them to fund (Interviewee #25). Moreover, many bilateral donors use multilateral 
agencies to channel their donated funds. For example, when the Government of India 
materialized USD 16.2 million of its pledged USD 1 billion in aid, it did not deliver the funds to 
the Government of Nepal. The Government of India contracted with the UN Development 
Program ($8.79 million) and the UN Office for Project Services ($7.41 million) to help rebuild 
safer houses in Gorkha and Nuwakot districts of Nepal.29 
 
                                                 
29 http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/news-centre/news/2018/Government-of-India-UNDP-and-UNOPS-
partner-to-expedite-reconstruction-in-Nepal.html 
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Table 14. Top Recipient Organizations by Commitment 
Top 10 Donation Recipient Organization Committed 
Amount (USD) 
Committed 
Percentage 
Government of Nepal  716,612,873 58.27% 
Various Recipients  310,292,971 25.23% 
United Nations Children's Fund  28,778,857 2.34% 
Oxfam Great Britain  20,099,918 1.63% 
World Food Program  12,511,091 1.02% 
International Federation of Red Cross  12,024,985 0.98% 
Save the Children  10,725,011 0.87% 
International Organization for Migration  8,040,542 0.65% 
Various NGOs  7,858,613 0.64% 
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development  6,717,776 0.55% 
Others  96,134,672 7.82% 
Total 1,229,797,309 100.00% 
 
 
Table 15. Top Recipient Organizations by Pledge 
Top Donation Recipient Organization Pledged Amount 
(USD) 
Pledged Percentage 
Government of Nepal 3,402,392,583 96.62% 
Various Recipients  115,193,990 3.27% 
Various NGOs  2,919,859 0.08% 
Oxfam Great Britain  612,240 0.02% 
Save the Children  114,068 0.00% 
United Nations Agencies  7,500 0.00% 
Grand Total 3,521,240,240 100.00% 
 
 Even though much of the donations did not go to government coffers, other actors such as 
NGOs and private firms that play important roles within Nepal’s governance system did benefit 
from these resources as they received grants and contracts to deliver specific services related to 
earthquake relief and reconstruction. In my interviews with experts in Nepal, many governmental 
agencies, NGOs, and private firms stated that their funding increased considerably, and 
operations expanded significantly due to the earthquakes. According to one interviewee, political 
parties were able to claim credit for many services provided by Nepali NGOs because many 
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NGOs were aligned with, if not directly influenced by, political parties. The interviewee claimed 
that the UML party was able to consolidate power by winning elections because it controls the 
majority of the NGOs in the country and 2/3 of all Nepali employees of the UN and INGOs are 
UML supporters (Interviewee #31). 
 There are other channels through which relief and reconstruction activities can increase 
the resource capacity of the governance system of Nepal. As Nepal’s governance system is very 
decentralized and involves many actors across different levels and sectors, all the relief and 
recovery resources benefit these actors in one way or another. For example, the National 
Reconstruction Authority, along with its partners such as the UN, the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, Japanese International Cooperation Agency, and so on mobilized over fifty 
sectors of the economy (Interviewee #31), many Nepali NGOs, private firms, and individuals 
benefit from increased economic activity. The increased economic activity contributes 
significant amounts to government coffers in the form of sales and income tax receipts. 
 
6.2.2. Fiscal Resources 
 Financial statistics provided by Nepal’s Ministry of Finance corroborates my argument 
and shows increasing tax revenue in Nepal after the earthquakes and decreasing dependence on 
foreign aid grants and loans. Table X shows that tax revenue increased by 18% in the year of the 
earthquakes and by 32% in the following year. The decrease in foreign aid in FY2015-16 
probably reflects the fact that many donors diverted their funds from routine development 
programs to disaster relief and recovery related programs and thus were not able to support the 
budget of the Government of Nepal. However, in FY2016-17 foreign aid funds increased 
drastically because of support for reconstruction, even though it has declined again in the two 
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subsequent years. The overall budget figures appear to align with the fact that the resource 
capacity of Nepal’s government has been increasing over the years and increased even more 
drastically because of the 2015 earthquakes.  
 
Table 16. Annual Changes in Revenue and Aid in Nepal (in Billion NRs.) 
 
Tax 
Revenue 
% Change 
Aid 
Grants 
and Loans 
% Change 
Total 
Revenue 
% Change 
FY 2014-15 356  73  441  
FY 2015-16 421 18% 67 -9% 528 19% 
FY 2016-17 554 32% 107 59% 566 7% 
FY 2017-18 658 19% 72 -32% 730 29% 
FY 2018-19* 838 27% 59 -19% 890 22% 
Note: *Estimate. Source: Ministry of Finance.30 
 
Even when increased levels of post-disaster resource mobilization and capacity building 
occurs in private organizations, individuals and families as well as non-governmental 
organizations due to increased levels of remittances, donations, foreign grants and loans, the 
public purse will grow because of sales and income tax receipts obtained from increased 
economic activity. Rebuilding houses, schools, hospital, roads and bridges activates multiple 
sectors of economic activity, which can increase tax revenue. In addition, government agencies 
collaborate with businesses in public-private partnerships and give out contracts to NGOs. 
Increased levels of resources capacity of collaborative partners have a positive effect on the 
overall resource capacity of the governance system. As one of the experts I interviewed noted, 
due to increased levels of internal resource mobilization from import taxes and increased 
contribution of remittances to Nepal’s economy, the Government of Nepal is starting to rely less 
                                                 
30 http://mof.gov.np/en/archive-documents/budget-speech-17.html 
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on foreign aid and thus becoming stricter in regulating the activities of INGOs and UN agencies 
(Interviewee #3). 
However, with respect to the spending side of the revenue capacity there has been some 
critical issues. While Nepal had weak pre-disaster capacity to implement government 
expenditures, in the post-disaster government system, due to opening of new government offices 
and moving of personnel and resources from the central government to provincial and municipal 
levels in accordance with the new constitution has dramatically increased public spending. In 
April 2018, as the Government of Nepal was preparing a new budget for the new fiscal year, 
there were concerns related to lack of sufficient funds in government coffers. Two of the experts 
interviewed in April 2018 noted that the political class has expanded due to the new constitution 
and administrative reforms and it is going to be challenging from a fiscal perspective to sustain 
the increased number of government offices and personnel across Nepal (Interviewee #4 and #5). 
 
6.2.3. Non-Fiscal Resources 
 In addition to donations and fiscal resources, other non-fiscal resources have been 
affected by the earthquakes as well. Even though the tourism sectors suffered for a year after the 
earthquakes, it has bounced back. Moreover, many tourists that have visited Nepal over the 
decades had made strong links with their Nepali trekking guides, local community leaders, and 
their host families. After the 2015 earthquakes, many of these former tourists who lived in 
developed countries raised funds in their church, workplace, school, and so on and reached out to 
their contacts in Nepal to spend the money to address people’s needs. For example, one 
interviewee who was expert in the tourism sector but also had engineering background helped 
rebuild a school in his father’s village in Dhading district. He could do this when a tourist friend 
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of his from Australia reached out to him after she raised funds there to use the funds for 
rebuilding efforts. In one and a half years they rebuilt the school with US$ 150,000 in a remote 
village (Interviewee #7). 
 Other interviewees gave examples of similar experiences among their friends, family, and 
contacts. In one of the community meetings, I observed one Belgian tourist asking Nepali 
community leaders how she could help with school rebuilding and other similar projects because 
she recounted how a tour guide saved her and her husband’s lives during the earthquakes as they 
were traveling in Nepal then. Since then, they have raised funds in Belgium and have made 
several trips to Nepal to help rebuild schools and improve educational capacity in remote 
villages. In addition, one expert has recounted that he had gone to college in the US and worked 
in two different cities before returning to Nepal. His former classmates, colleagues, and 
neighbors from the US reached out to him with private donations and raised funds from their 
American communities and asked my interviewee to spend the funds on relief and rebuilding 
activities. The interviewee recalls the funds were in the US $50,000 – 100,000 range. He said 
even many ordinary people were getting funds at least in US $10,000 because of their friends 
and family abroad (Interviewee #22). 
 Similarly, millions of Nepalis live in developed nations around the world. The Nepali 
diaspora outside of Nepal is called Non-Resident Nepalis (NRN) in Nepal. NRNs around the 
world raised extraordinarily large sums of funds to help with relief and reconstruction activities 
in Nepal. They transferred their funds to Nepali organizations through friends and colleagues and 
undertook relief and rebuilding efforts in a community-driven manner. Several of my 
interviewees (for e.g. Interviewee # 2 and # 27) received funds from their NRN colleagues 
abroad and used their business and friendship ties in Nepal to help rebuild schools and houses to 
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assist the vulnerable populations. I had a chance to observe a school opening ceremony and 
house turn over ceremony in the Sindhupalchok district. 
 Remittances also played an important factor in resource mobilization for relief and 
rebuilding in Nepal. Expert interviewees mentioned that many more Nepalis are abroad due to 
the earthquakes so that they can send money home to rebuild their houses. Consequently, there is 
shortage in labor required for blue collar work involved in rebuilding houses. As a result many 
experts mentioned that low skilled individuals from Madhesh and India have been working in 
central and mountainous areas of Nepal in construction jobs. As daily labor wage for house 
construction had gone up three times from 350 rupees a day to over a thousand rupees a day, it 
has benefited many low-skilled individuals to make a more livable wage (Interviewee #31, 32, 
35). 
 The concept of resource capacity was mentioned 60 times across 35 expert interviews. 
Because the resource capacity has interdependence with other concepts, the network 
visualization shows 8 neighboring concepts. Figure 23 visualizes all 60 mentions of resource 
capacity and the 8 concepts that co-occur with resource capacity in these 60 mentions. Experts 
brought up the importance of resource capacity for Nepal’s post governance reforms and 
institutional capacity building efforts in multiple ways, including the importance of tax revenue, 
foreign grants and loans, private investments, migrant remittances, infrastructure financing and 
development, human resource development as well as social and organizational resources.  
 
Figure 23. Semantic Network of Resource Capacity in Expert Interviews 
 124 
 
Note: Atlas.ti software was used to create the visualization with the author’s interview data. 
 
As Table 17 demonstrates, resource capacity has higher interdependence with 
organizational capacity, social learning and social trust – the concepts discussed in the next two 
chapters. Resource capacity was also mentioned in connection with initial conditions and 
external pressure. While the earthquakes have affected resource mobilization and capacity, it is 
also important to account for increasing trend in development of Nepal’s economy, albeit in 
slower and less consistent pace, prior to the earthquakes in Nepal. External pressure is also 
important as foreign donors and lenders have an important role in Nepal’s resource capacity and 
thus can have influence in decision making regarding governance reforms and policy changes. 
 
Table 17. Co-Occurrence of Resource Capacity in Expert Interviews 
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Note: The table was produced using the author’s interview data with Atlas.ti software. 
 
6.3. Summary 
This chapter analyzed the impact of the 2015 earthquakes on resource capacity of Nepal’s 
governance system using mixed-methods and multiple sources of evidence. In so doing, it 
described the pre-disaster level of resource capacity in Nepal and analyzed disaster donations 
data that documents mobilization of resources by Nepali actors as well as their international 
partners in the UN system and multilateral development organizations. The chapter also used 
financial statistics provided in government and nongovernmental organization reports as well as 
expert interview data to show how the fiscal, economic, and human resource capacity of Nepal 
compares before and after the earthquakes. Incentives to command these resources and the 
increased resource capacity has increased the capacity of Nepal’s governance system and 
facilitated the adoption of the new constitution and implementation of administrative reforms to 
implement the federal constitution that mandates the creation of central, provincial, and local 
bodies of authority. Increased level of resource capacity has contributed to adaptation of the 
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system in the post-disaster environment and allowed the Nepali actors to gain more autonomy 
with respect to internal policy decisions as well as in managing their diplomatic ties.  
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7.0 SOCIAL TRUST IN NEPAL BEFORE AND AFTER THE EARTHQUAKES 
This chapter analyzes how the 2015 earthquakes affected governance reforms and 
institutional capacity building in Nepal through changes in social trust. As reviewed in Chapter 
4, social trust is critical for any governance system to function effectively because in the absence 
of social trust the necessary level of interactivity and cooperation among the units of the system 
cannot be sustained in decentralized governance systems that rely on both vertical and horizontal 
linkages. Social trust, in combination with resource capacity and organizational capacity, is an 
important -micro and meso-level mechanism that contributes to macro-level changes in the laws 
and structures that shape governance systems. In post-earthquake Nepal, sudden increases in 
social trust created a window of opportunity for drastic measures such as the passage of the new 
constitution in the face of resistance by powerful external actors like India that has historically 
challenged Nepal with border blockades from time to time when all other levers of influence did 
not materialize. The chapter traces pre-post changes in social trust in Nepal using published 
reports and articles as well as primary expert interview data and secondary citizen feedback 
surveys of relief and recovery activities in earthquake affected districts of Nepal.  
 
7.1. Social Trust Before the Earthquakes 
Social trust as the logic of social action will be traced at the levels of citizen-citizen, leader-
leader, and state-citizen. At the citizen-citizen level, the level of social trust in Nepal was rather 
low before the earthquakes owing to the fact that Nepal has had high social conflict in the past 
two decades prior to the earthquakes. High rates of extreme poverty and correlation of poverty 
with civic and political rights across ethnolinguistic, geographic, and caste-based social groups 
and gender has contributed to social cleavage and vulnerability to external shocks such as natural 
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disasters, political instability, and market failures. At the leader-leader level, elite conflict has 
been high, albeit in downward trend after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) in 2006, because of political factionalism within a multiparty system that was weakened 
by unstable governing coalitions. Lack of social trust among major political leaders created an 
atmosphere of distrust as external actors like India could easily influence Nepali leaders who 
were suspicious of each other to defect on cooperative understandings and agreements within 
coalition governments. At the level of state-citizen or leader-follower, corruption and bribery in 
government offices, political parties, courts, law enforcement agencies, and licensing and 
certification boards as well as extensive political party patronage and instability-breeding 
political protests had maintained an environment of citizen distrust of authorities. Widespread 
protests and hunger strikes against injustices among ordinary Nepalese citizens had reflected low 
levels of social trust and legitimacy of governance institutions in Nepal. The influence of India 
on Nepal’s internal governance affairs especially after the rise of nationalist Hindu conservatives 
to power in India in 2014 had worsened the already low trust environment in Nepal. 
 
7.1.1. Citizen-Citizen Relations 
High levels of poverty and inequality among citizens of a country is associated with high levels 
of social and political conflict (Cederman et al. 2011) as well as lack of development (Easterly 
and Levine 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 2002). Especially in Nepal, high poverty and inequality 
can create the conditions for lack of social trust and increased levels of conflict and 
underdevelopment (Murshed and Gates 2005; Sharma 2006; Macours 2010). Nepal is one of the 
48 least developed countries (LDCs) in the world and one among 13 in Asia. Nepal is the second 
poorest country in Asia after Afghanistan (NPC 2015). Gross national income per capita was US 
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$730 in 2014 (World Bank 2017b). Absolute poverty rate is high Nepal; as of 2015, 24.8 percent 
of the population lives in extreme poverty – under USD 1.25 a day (NPC 2015). Based on 
multiple measures of poverty such as internationally administered multi-cluster poverty index 
(MPI), 44 percent of Nepal’s population lived in poverty in 2014 (OPHI 2015). Human 
Development Index (HDI) was 0.458 in 2011, ranking 145th in the world (UNDP 2014). 
According to the World Food Program Nepal is a food deficit state, as 48 percent of the children 
under the age of five have chronic malnourishment problems (60 percent in mountain areas), 
which is greater than the rate of 42 percent in Somalia (WFP 2009). 
Poverty is exacerbated by geographic and socioeconomic inequality in the country, 
creating further obstacles for economic development and stable governance. Spatial inequality is 
high in Nepal as the absolute poverty rate in the Far Western region was 59 percent and in the 
Western region 33 percent in 2011 (NPC 2015). Poverty and inequality is further worsened by 
high levels of religious, ethnic, gender, and caste-based fractionalization in Nepal, which has 
contributed to low levels of social trust. Nepal has 102 ethnic groups and 17 officially recognized 
languages (CBS 2012). Despite the abolishment of the official caste system, caste-based 
inequality endures in Nepal and discriminates against individuals based on religion, language, 
ethnicity, and gender grounds (Stash and Hannum 2001). Such an inequality is pervasive and 
deeply embedded within the social structure of Nepal whereby high-caste Hindus owned much 
of the land, enjoy economic and political privileges, and social status. Low-caste members of the 
society are excluded from land ownership, political and civil rights, and representation in civil 
service. Brahmins and Chhettris, the highest-caste groups in Nepal are only 29 percent of the 
population but make up over 80 percent of civil servants in army, policy and government offices 
(Jamil and Dangal 2009). It is challenging to establish stable governance institutions and achieve 
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greater levels of economic development in Nepal where there are low levels of social trust, civic 
association, and cross-ethnic solidarity (Askvik et al. 2011). Low-level of trust among citizens is 
not conducive to establishing legitimate, fair and just governance systems that work well for all 
regardless of their social identity (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). 
As reviewed in Chapter 4, such high inequality, poverty, and lack of trust within and 
across communities creates social and geographic vulnerability and exacerbates risk for damage 
from natural disasters. Poor and marginalized families often build housing on flood plains and 
earthquake hazard zones, and in cities slum dwellers set up housing that lacks earthquake safety 
and devoid of spaces for evacuation and search and rescue activities during emergencies. 
  
7.1.2. Leader-Leader Relations 
As described in Chapter 2 and detailed in Section 9.2 of the following chapter, Nepal had 
suffered from lack of trust and cooperation among its political leaders leading up to the 
earthquakes in 2015. Constant jockeying for power, defections from common understandings 
and agreements in unstable governing coalitions had defined the governance system of Nepal 
during its transition from an autocratic Hindu kingdom to a secular democratic republic. While 
communal inequalities and distrust among citizens travel up to political leaders, lack of trust and 
cooperation among leaders can also show negative influence on social trust among citizens. 
Especially in the context of pervasive divisions and factionalism among political parties that 
permeate government offices, NGOs, trade unions, private businesses, and civil society (Basnyat 
et al. 2017). Many of the experts interviewed for this study pointed out lack of cooperation 
among political party leaders as the main cause of instability and underdevelopment in Nepal’s 
governance system. 
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7.1.3. Citizen-State Relations 
Because civil service, nonprofit organizations, and private firms are all involved in patron-client 
relationship with political parties in Nepal, lack of social trust among citizens and lack of 
cooperation among political leaders and the resulting nepotism, favoritism, and patron-client 
relationship in allocation of collective resources reduces public trust in and social legitimacy of 
governance institutions. According to Transparency International’s Global Corruption 
Barometer, 90 percent of the Nepalese citizens perceive political parties as being corrupt or 
extremely corrupt. Further 85 percent of the population believes that public officials and public 
servants are corrupt or extremely corrupt and 72 percent considers corruption in the country has 
increased in the previous two years (2012-2014). The major challenge in Nepal is to insulate the 
civil service from politics so that political parties cannot deteriorate the professional public 
management.31 
Because of the problem of democratization, Nepal has experienced a culture of constant 
protests that disrupt day to day public management and economic activities of individuals. 
Moreover, because of unresponsive government, many private citizens resort to hunger strikes to 
attract attention of public officials to solve their problems. Many cases of such distrust of the 
court system and government offices is documented in detail in the following chapter. 
At the local level, village and district administration committees do not function in a fair 
and representative manner because elected local government institutions have expired in 2002 
and no local elections were held since then (until 2017). Bureaucratic appointees from the center 
                                                 
31 http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2014-05-21/political-interference-in-bureaucracy-abetting-corruption-
says-ti-report.html 
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and all-party mechanisms in Nepal’s districts have been perceived as coalitions of unelected 
elites who share government development budgets among themselves using corrupt schemes.32 
 Nepal’s political leaders had both opportunities and threats to reform prior to the 2015 
earthquakes, and unfortunately, were unable to make enough progress on governance reforms to 
ensure political stability and economic development in Nepal due to lack of social trust at all 
levels. Nepal’s leaders had opportunities in terms of resources, timing, and international attention 
on resolving their governance issues but missed those opportunities due to threats to reform such 
as fragmented political party system, ethnicized politics, and lack of autonomy from India and 
international donors. As a result, prior to the 2015 earthquakes, Nepal’s leaders failed to meet 
four deadlines to agree on a new constitution that would strengthen the governance system (IRIN 
2012). 
 Integration of Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army and transitional justice issues with 
respect to the relatives of the victims of the civil war had to be dealt with for the constitution 
writing process to advance. These two issues maintained the low social trust and presented a 
threat to successful governance reforms until after the catastrophic earthquakes. 
Prior to the 2015 earthquakes, the electoral victory of Modi contributed to further 
creating an environment distrust and became a threat to Nepal’s secular transition reforms, as 
conservative Hindu nationalists rose to power in India.33 At the same time, Modi’s 
“Neighborhood First” policy intensified competition with China for influence over Nepal leading 
to an opportunity of a better bargaining position for Nepal in attracting foreign capital into the 
economy, while carefully considering both China’s and India’s preferences with respect to 
                                                 
32 https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/analysislocalgovernancenepal.pdf 
33 https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13712/modi-win-in-india-could-endanger-nepal-s-secular-transition 
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Nepal’s federal governance structure.34 Foreign direct investments from Chinese industries were 
three time greater than those from Indian industries in FY 15-16, while cumulatively India still 
was ahead of China with three times greater foreign direct investments.35 
 
7.2. Social Trust After the Earthquakes 
Following the devastating earthquakes of April/May in 2015, there was a sudden increase in 
social trust in Nepal at the levels of citizen-citizen, leader-leader, and state-citizen or leader-
follower, which then slowly subsided in the months and years that followed. The sudden increase 
in social trust at the citizen-citizen level in post-disaster Nepal is reflected in the fact that inter-
ethnic, cross-geography, and cross-caste cooperation occurred as Nepalis of all walks of life 
rushed to help their friends, family, and neighbors no matter what their socioeconomic or 
political background was. At the elite level, many political leaders, inspired by the increased 
levels of trust and philanthropy in Nepal, felt the responsibility to act to rebuild the country with 
a solid foundation – through a stable constitution and governance institutions. Increased levels of 
inter-elite cooperation allowed major political leaders to make concessions and compromise and 
reach a deal on the new constitution. At the state-citizen relationship, the Nepal Army, the Nepal 
Police, and the Nepal Armed Force, along with other actors, rushed to help earthquake victims 
and survivors, which increased citizen trust of government. However, as it typically does, social 
trust has subsided in the months and years following the immediate relief and early recovery 
phase as the difficult border crisis made life more difficult and brought to a halt the already slow 
and painstaking process of post-disaster reconstruction in Nepal. 
  
                                                 
34 https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/the-geopolitics-of-nepals-federal-structure/ 
35 http://www.doind.gov.np/images/industrial-static/Industrial_statistics_7273.pdf 
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7.2.1. Citizen-Citizen Relations 
The large-scale destruction caused by the 2015 earthquakes in Kathmandu Valley and the central 
hills and mountainous areas of Nepal generated high levels of social trust among citizens of 
Nepal facilitating cooperation across social, ethnic, caste, and communal groups in Nepal. Such 
high social trust mobilized the youth, professionals, civic associations, and neighbors to help 
each other and ameliorate their fellow citizens’ suffering, producing emergent organizational 
behavior in the system. Social trust was enhanced to such a degree that social disorder and 
looting did not occur in Nepal (Interviewee #2 and 28). 
Expert interviews and field observations provide evidence that right after the earthquakes 
people dropped what they were doing and rushed to help earthquake victims in their 
communities as well as in remote communities (Interviewee #2). Even those whose housing units 
were not damaged lived in tents in open spaces for fear of stronger aftershocks. Neighbors and 
businesses opened their yards and open spaces for all to set up a tent, and inter-group activities 
such as cooking, eating, and doing daily chores together created a high level of interaction 
among neighbors of various socioeconomic status (Interviewee #10). Neighbors of higher 
income provided food and other materials to neighbors of low caste that lacked means 
(Interviewee #28). Meat and alcoholic drinks were also consumed copiously as neighbors 
barbecued in their open space tents on a daily basis for at least a month (Interviewee #9). 
The concept of social trust was mentioned 54 times in expert interviews, which made it 
the second most mentioned concept along with social learning and organizational capacity after 
resource capacity, which was mentioned 60 times. Figure 24 visualizes the semantic network of 
social trust as well as its neighbor concepts. 
Figure 24. Semantic Network of Social Trust in Expert Interviews 
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Note: Atlas.ti software was used to create the visualization with the author’s interview data. 
 
 Experts discussed many cases in which social trust increased due to the earthquakes in 
the context of increased social learning (21 times), improved organizational capacity (16 times), 
and resource capacity (9 times). Social learning is interesting in that increased level of trust and 
interaction among citizens and social groups led to exchange of information and knowledge 
sharing that resulted in enhanced understanding and awareness of not only disaster 
vulnerabilities and risk reduction investments, but also on other issues related to their everyday 
lives and businesses. Concepts of fear of loss of control, popular pressure, and leadership also 
came up while discussing social trust (Table 18). 
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Table 18. Co-Occurrence of Social Trust in Expert Interviews 
 
Note: The table was produced using the author’s interview data with Atlas.ti software. 
 
7.2.2. Leader-Leader Relations 
Experts also discussed the notion of social trust in the context of increased trust and cooperation 
among political leaders who came together to reach a compromise deal on finally and speedily 
adopting the new constitution that they have been debating and unable to agree in the previous 
seven years. Many business leaders pointed out that high level of social trust generated by the 
earthquake among political leaders created the right conditions for “moving on” with the 
political transition so that a new constitution can be adopted to create a capable and stable 
governance system that can prioritize rebuilding and developing the nation’s infrastructure 
(Interviewees #2, 3, and 27). 
 Despite the increased level elite interaction and consensus, it is important to note that 
political leaders act strategically, and in the presence of an opportunity some leaders can defect 
cooperative understandings and agreements. External actors such as the Indian government 
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agencies, UN agencies, European organizations, and the Chinese government, among others, 
may influence the decisions of political leaders regarding structural reforms in the governance 
system. However, the elite unity and cooperation that was enhanced by the earthquakes got even 
more strengthened as political leaders perceived that they loss control in the governance system 
in the immediate aftermath of the earthquakes as emergent behavior from civil society and 
overwhelming number of international actors dominated the system. As UN agencies, INGOs, 
and foreign consultants discussed the possibility of pandemic breakouts such as cholera, as 
happened in post-earthquake Haiti and many other cases, the Nepali leaders reacted strongly by 
stating that “Nepal will not fail as a nation” and “will not become a Haiti” (Interviewees #26, 28, 
and 35). 
 Moreover, such fears of national disintegration grew stronger as the Indian Army and 
foreign militaries, as recounted by the experts, dominated the airspace in Nepal whereby the 
Nepal Army felt unable to control the situation. Even when thanked for their assistance and 
asked to leave, the Indian military took longer time to leave the country, as pointed out by 
experts. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that the Indian Government sent its Foreign 
Secretary to Nepal to personally demand postponement of the adoption of the new constitution 
because it did not meet its demands such as creating an autonomous Madhesi province in the 
south of Nepal and making Hinduism a state religion. This further increased the Nepali political 
leaders’ fear of national and territorial disintegration of Nepal. Such perceived fear further 
increased the unity and cooperation among the elite, who withstood Indian resistance and forged 
ahead with the new constitution.  
Madhesi riots and unofficial blockade of Nepal’s southern border with India in retaliation 
against the passage of the constitution brought even more unity among Nepal’s political leaders, 
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except the Nepali Congress that did not call the situation a blockade.36 The blockade halted the 
movement of essential goods such as petroleum, food, and medicine and fueled nationalist and 
anti-India sentiments. In the local, provincial, and national elections that followed, the political 
leaders who withstood the Indian resistance and championed governance reforms in Nepal won 
the majority vote and was able to form a stable government. Nepali Congress leaders lost their 
position of dominance in the system for not resisting against the perceived Indian onslaught 
against Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Interviewee #3, 4, 21, 28, and 29). 
Civil society activists and intellectuals discussed a more nuanced impact of social trust on 
governance reforms in Nepal. According to them, the earthquakes and the resulting social trust as 
well as the popular pressure from dominant social groups allowed the mainstream political party 
leaders to incite nationalist and anti-India sentiments in order to discredit advocates of a 
constitution that is more inclusive of ethnic minorities in regard to granting them more 
autonomous provinces and positive discrimination in civil service recruitment. Such activists, 
along with Indian interests, European and UN agencies, Madhesi groups, and Nepali Congress 
lost their influence in the dominant post-disaster narrative of resilient, patriotic Nepali peoples 
who act in unity against the divisive foreign forces and in avoidance of dependency on foreign 
aid to rebuild a strong governance system in Nepal. Some interviewees even brought up the 
notion of shock therapy or “shock doctrine,” popularized by Naomi Klein in her 2007 book 
entitled “The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism.” Such activists, along the same 
                                                 
36 One expert noted that “the Indian blockade targeted Nepal when Nepal was in its weakest moment due to the 
earthquakes (Interviewee #26). Another interviewee noted, however, that the blockade was targeted to weaken the 
specific government led by Prime Minister Oli, not all Nepal (Interviewee #29). While the Indian Government 
disagrees that it was a blockade and states that the border crisis was created by Madhesi protesters, the United 
Nations General Secretary and other world leaders called on all sides, including the Indian Government to lift the 
border obstruction to avoid a humanitarian crisis in the earthquake-stricken country of Nepal. Leaders of many UN 
agencies in Nepal openly called the situation “border blockade” (UN News 2015). 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/12/517922-ongoing-border-blockade-imports-sends-food-and-fuel-prices-
skyrocketing-nepal  
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lines, were very skeptical of many political and business leaders who made fortunes in the most 
difficult moments of Nepal as it suffered from the earthquakes and economic blockade, because 
of which the price of essential goods surged over through times (Interviewee #10, 22, and 23). 
 
7.2.3. Citizen-State Relations 
Social trust at the level of citizen-state dyad also increased substantially in the aftermath of the 
earthquakes in Nepal, as evidence by expert interviews of the author and Citizen Feedback 
Surveys implemented by youth volunteers and INGOs in Nepal. Evidence suggests that because 
of disaster relief activities of the Nepal Army, Nepal Police, and Nepal Armed Police Force, 
citizen trust toward those institutions increased significantly. Many citizens who had viewed the 
police as punishers started to view them as heroes (Interviewee #2, 8, and 28). Even civil 
servants, including the police contributed their monthly salary to the government disaster relief 
fund (Interviewee #8). Public opinion surveys also found that the level of trust toward the army 
has increased from 80 percent to 89 percent,37 and public trust toward government institutions in 
general and army (88 percent), police (88%), and armed police force (86%) in particular 
increased significantly after the earthquakes, even though it later subsided (army to 76% and 
police 74%).38 One interviewee noted that political parties in the center remained to have low 
public trust, local offices of political parties were involved in helping citizens with disaster relief 
and recovery (Interviewee #35). 
 Because of the increased level of interaction between the citizen and the state as 
government employees, not only public trust on institutions but also social learning increased as 
                                                 
37 http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Himal-media-poll-have-faith,2515  
38 Independent Impacts and Recovery Monitoring Nepal Phase 2 Quantitative Survey, http://asiafoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/ IIRMPhase2_executiveSummary_QuantitativeReport.pdf 
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citizens learned how to access government services. Moreover, government agencies sent out 
mobile teams to remote mountainous areas to help earthquake victims and survivors with 
preparing the necessary paperwork for accessing reconstruction subsidies (Interviewee # 25). 
Where government teams fell short, nonprofits and civil society groups stepped in to help the 
citizens in acquiring the necessary information for accessing public services (Interviewee #23).  
 While public opinion surveys and expert interviews focus on general social trust, Citizen 
Feedback Surveys asked several questions regarding their trust or organizations, fairness of relief 
activities, and adequacy of information. The first round of the surveys was implemented in mid-
July, second at the end of August, third in September and fourth in October. When asked about 
the fairness of support, only 28 percent of respondents answered positively as opposed to 54 
percent that answered negatively in the first round. In the fourth round, positive answers 
increased to 42 percent and negative answers declined to 43 percent (Figure 25). Among 
respondents who thought that relief support was not provided in a fair way, many pointed out 
that provision of relief materials was not fair because issues of political party patronage and 
geographic access especially when materials were distributed on a first-come-first-serve basis, as 
villagers in remote areas and those who received information later were not able to secure relief 
materials (Figure 26).  
 
Figure 25. Perception of Fairness in Relief Distribution 
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Figure 26. Perception of Unfairness Factors in Relief Distribution 
 
 
When asked whether they were satisfied with government services related to relief and recovery, 
23 percent of respondents gave a positive answer (mostly or completely yes), whereas 64 percent 
gave a negative answer (very little or not at all) in the first round of the survey. These number 
changed from the first round to the fourth round as 30 percent and 56 percent, respectively 
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(Figure 27). Most respondents with negative answers pointed out that their dissatisfaction is 
related to problems associated with government assistance with building materials, its handling 
of cash for work programs and housing inspection. Field observations and expert interviews 
utilized in this dissertation also point to the fact that it was a long, challenging process for remote 
villages to get their building designs and construction plans approved by government as it is a 
requirement for receiving assistance for reconstruction. 
  
Figure 27. Satisfaction with Government Relief Services 
 
 
 In the fourth round of the survey, when citizens were asked why they were dissatisfied 
with government’s efforts in earthquake relief and recovery, many respondents answered that the 
government made promises that it could not deliver and that it had unclear plan with respect to 
reconstruction policy. That is likely why man respondents were dissatisfied with the delayed 
reconstruction phase of the disaster. Respondents also mentioned that part of their dissatisfaction 
is also with distribution of goods based on political party affiliation and caste (Figure 28). 
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Figure 28. Reasons for Dissatisfaction with Government Services in the 4th Round 
 
 
 In contrast, 27 percent of respondents were satisfied with I/NGO efforts in relief and 
recovery, whereas 54 percent was dissatisfied in the first round of the survey. In the fourth 
round, these numbers have improved to 50 percent and 36 percent, respectively (Figure 29). 
While this shows that public trust of I/NGOs started off at a similar rate with that of government, 
it improved markedly over the next three months. This is likely the case because citizen 
dissatisfaction of government increased due to unofficial Indian economic blockade and 
obstruction of the movement of essential goods across the India-Nepal border. Citizens 
mentioned building materials and cash for work program as their primary reason for their 
dissatisfaction with NGO performance. 
 
Figure 29. Satisfaction with I/NGO Relief Efforts 
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 In the fourth round of the survey, when citizens were asked why they were dissatisfied 
with NGO efforts in earthquake relief and recovery, many respondents answered unclear and 
unmet promises to provide relief, but also pointed out that NGOs distributed relief based on caste 
and that they did not trust NGOs. This speaks to the fact that local NGOs in Nepal are 
community-based organizations and embedded in their identity-based group structures. As 
discussed by experts in the interviews, many NGOs are aligned with political parties and are not 
transparent in terms of how they are spending their funds due to lack of rigorous government 
oversight. As of April 2018, the new government of Prime Minister Oli started an active 
deliberation of a new legislation that restrict and regulate operations of NGOs, especially the 
ones that receive funding from external sources (Interviewees #3 and #20). 
 
Figure 30. Reasons for Dissatisfaction with I/NGO Services in the 4th Round 
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Many scholars and activists claim that often post-disaster uncertainty creates an 
environment that bad actors such as human traffickers and violent mobs can take advantage of. 
With that in mind, the survey asked if respondents perceived an increase in risk in their 
communities. To this question, 19 percent of respondents replied positively and 15 percent 
negatively (Figure 31). Many who respondent positively stated that the increased levels of risk 
originate from their community, which likely speaks to the fact that gender and caste-based 
inequality has been an important part of social relations in post-disaster Nepal. 
 
Figure 31. Perception of Risk of Violence and Harassment 
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7.3. Summary 
This chapter analyzed how the 2015 earthquakes affected governance reforms and institutional 
capacity building in Nepal through changes in social trust. As reviewed in Chapter 2, social trust 
is critical for any governance system to function effectively because in the absence of social trust 
the necessary level of interactivity and cooperation among the units of the system cannot be 
sustained in decentralized governance systems that rely on both vertical and horizontal linkages. 
Social trust, in combination with resource capacity and organizational capacity, is an important -
micro and meso-level mechanism that contributes to macro-level changes in the laws and 
structures that shape governance systems. In post-earthquake Nepal, sudden increases in social 
trust created a window of opportunity for drastic measures such as the passage of the new 
constitution in the face of resistance by powerful external actors like India that has historically 
challenged Nepal with border blockades from time to time when all other levers of influence did 
not materialize. The chapter traces pre-post changes in social trust in Nepal using published 
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reports and articles as well as primary expert interview data and secondary citizen feedback 
surveys of relief and recovery activities in earthquake affected districts of Nepal.  
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8.0 NEPAL’S ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
EARTHQUAKES 
This chapter analyzes how the changes in the levels of organization capacity within 
Nepal’s governance system – increased level of interorganizational connectivity among the 
actors of Nepal’s governance system and their enhanced capacity for information collection, 
exchange, and use following the 2015 earthquakes – have contributed to governance reforms and 
improved governance capacity in Nepal. Because disaster response and post-disaster 
reconstruction requires large-scale efforts in collecting, exchanging, processing and using 
information to make policy and governance decisions, Nepal’s post-disaster information capacity 
enhanced significantly. Such informational capacity has had spillover effects as governance 
actors started using the same tools and techniques to address other policy and governance 
problems. As a critical component of organizational capacity, informational capacity has 
enhanced significantly in Nepal’s governance system as a result of massive earthquakes and 
large-scale effort to respond and rebuild afterwards. The chapter also shows that actors that had 
greater pre-disaster organizational capacity had greater opportunity to further increase their 
capacity in the post-disaster governance system of Nepal due to increased levels of resources and 
changes in the governance system that solidified their rights and privileges. 
 
8.1. Organizational Capacity Before the Earthquakes 
In addition to changes in resource capacity and social trust, one needs to measure changes in 
organizational infrastructure of Nepal’s governance system to understand the impact of the 2015 
earthquakes on political reforms in Nepal. This section provides an account of how key 
organizational actors were structured and institutionalized and how they exchanged information 
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on key themes through networks of public, nonprofit, private, local and international 
organizations within two years prior to the April/May 2012 earthquakes in Nepal. In this period, 
the main features of the organizational infrastructure of Nepal’s governance system included 
over-centralized national government and lack of local governance capacity, weak mid-tier 
structures that mediate policy prioritization and implementation between the center and the local, 
highly corrupt and inefficient practices of administrative and party officials, thin civil service 
bench and lack of policy experts and administrative leaders due to politicization of the 
government bureaucracy, government monopoly in economic policy and program 
implementation, politicization of civil society, firms, and professional associations and trade 
unions by political parties, and near-constant reshuffling of political parties in government due to 
unstable governing coalitions. 
 
8.1.1. Post-2006 Governance in Nepal 
According to the country’s Interim Constitution of 2007 and its subsequent amendments, Nepal 
is a secular, federal republic with a multi-party electoral system. While the president is the head 
of state and commander-in-chief of the Nepal Army, the prime minister is the chief executive of 
government. Both the president and prime minister are elected by the parliament, or the 
Constituent Assembly until a new constitution is adopted. The 601 members of the Constituent 
Assembly are elected by popular vote through a mixed electoral system whereby 240 members 
are elected via first-past-the-post rules, 335 through proportional representation, and the 
remaining appointed by the prime minister (MOF 2015). 
Prior to adoption of the new constitution, the governance system of Nepal functioned at 
central, district, and local levels whereby the national government at the center in Kathmandu 
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runs the country through civil service personnel located in 75 districts, 14 administrative zones 
(anchal), and five development regions. According to the Local Self-Governance Act of 1999 
and amendments, while 3,915 Village Development Committees (VDCs), 58 municipalities, 75 
District Development Committees (DDCs) were considered local governments, 75 Chief District 
Offices and 14 administrative zones were part of the central government reporting to 
Kathmandu. Because there were no local elections to VDCs, DDCs, and municipalities since 
they were dissolved in 2002, Chief District Officers appointed by the central government have 
been in charge of local governance as well (MOF 2015). Each of the 75 districts had a court ran 
by a chief judge and a judge that are appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court upon 
recommendation of the Judicial Council. In addition, Nepal had 16 Appellate Courts tiered 
between the Supreme Court and the District Courts.39 Table 19 provides detailed information 
regarding Nepal’s administrative zones. 
 
Table 19. Development Regions, Zones, and Districts of Nepal 
No Name Zones N Districts Headquarter Population Area (km2) 
1 
Eastern 
Development 
Region 
Koshi, 
Mechi, 
Sagarmatha 
16 Dhankuta 5,811,555 28,456 
2 
Central 
Development 
Region 
Bagmati, 
Janakpur, 
Narayani 
19 Kathmandu 9,656,985 27,410 
3 
Western 
Development 
Region 
Dhawalagiri, 
Gandaki, 
Lumbini 
16 Pokhara 4,926,765 29,398 
4 
Mid-Western 
Development 
Region 
Bheri, 
Karnali, 
Rapti 
15 Birendranagar 3,546,682 42,378 
                                                 
39 https://www.kullabs.com/classes/subjects/units/lessons/notes/note-detail/269 
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5 
Far-Western 
Development 
Region 
Mahakali, 
Seti 
9 Dipayal 2,552,517 19,539 
Source: Ministry of Finance (MOF 2015). 
 
 While local governance bodies have weak (if extant) revenue capacity of their own due to 
poverty, conflict and underdevelopment. According to the Local Self-Governance Act of 1999, 
the central government makes direct budgetary transfers to District Development Committees, 
municipalities, and Village Development Committees. In FY12-13, the central government 
transferred NPR 23.3 billion, only 8.1 percent of total central government expenditure, to local 
bodies. 3.4 percent of the transfers were unconditional grants that are used for development 
activities such as agriculture and livestock extension, primary education, and health. The 
remaining portion of the transfers are conditional grants from which social payments such as 
pensions and disability checks are made. In the allocation formula, population determines 40-
60% of the central government transfers, poverty and HDI rates 25%, and the remaining is 
determined by geography (10%) and cost index (25-30%). While local government bodies 
contribute to budget making (priorities), line ministries make most of the decisions on behalf of 
subnational governments due to rigid (fast-paced) timetables prescribed by law (MOF 2015). 
This suggests that Nepal had a highly centralized governance system with weak local capacity as 
of April 2015. 
 
Table 20. The Structure of Nepal’s Government, July 2013 
 Number 
of Units 
Expenditure 
(NPR millions) 
Percent 
Total 
Ministries, including their offices in administrative 
zones 
45 270,054 68 
Autonomous government agencies 1,460 95,000 23.9 
District Development Committees 75 32,000 8.1 
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Municipalities 58 
Village Development Committees 3,915 
Total 5,553 397,054 100 
Source: Ministry of Finance (MOF 2015). 
  
As of April 2015, Nepal’s governance system had problems of corruption, red tape, and 
inefficient program implementation. In 2015, Nepal scored 27 out of 100 in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking the country 130th (out of 188) in the world 
for transparency, accountability and corruption in public life (CPI 2015). In 2011, corruption as a 
measure of governance index by the World Bank was -0.83 (the range is +2.5) for Nepal (World 
Bank 2012) and the quality of public administration was 3.1 out of 6 (NPC 2015). The national 
government officials, courts, police, and party officials were found to be highly corrupt by public 
opinion and expert surveys in 2013.40 
 Completion of bureaucratic tasks and administrative behavior are overly rigid and rule-
based, so much so that pro-poor and pro-growth policies and programs are left unimplemented, 
expenditure allocations remain unspent, and staff vacancies remain unfilled. Government 
officials are caught up in delivering tasks, not services, based on rigid rules. This provides cover 
for incompetence and lack of accountability for failing to deliver services as the rules become an 
easy scapegoat for lack of action. Because of underperforming governments, under-spent 
budgets, and unimplemented programs, public debt as percentage of GDP has gone down from 
60 percent in 1995 to 24.5 percent in 2015. The problem is also manifest in government running 
fiscal surplus over the past few years, as actual expenditures remained much lower than planned 
expenditure (NPC 2015). Given these observations, it is fascinating how Wildavsky’s (1962) 
observations regarding unmet planning targets, under-spent budgets, and unimplemented projects 
                                                 
40 http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/nepal 
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in Nepal still hold true as of April 2015. These problems have gotten worse because of multi-
party instability and Maoist rebellion that Nepal has experienced since 1990s compared to the 
relatively stable, albeit authoritarian, governance system of Nepal under King Mahendra in 
1960s and 70s. 
 The governance system of Nepal suffers from lack of policy experts in the civil service, 
as the majority of civil servants are assigned for positions of generic management while there are 
few well qualified public personnel in fields such as economic planning and statistics, 
engineering, agriculture, and forestry (See Table 21). Only health professionals are relatively 
abundant, even though remote mountainous still lack quality health care. The same problem 
applies to civil servants in general, as about 1/3 of all civil servants are concentrated in 
Kathmandu (See Table 22). 
 
Table 21. Civil Service Jobs in Nepal 
Civil Service Position Categories Number Percent 
General administration 37,044 46.3 
Agriculture 4,925 6.16 
Auditing 327 0.41 
Economic planning and statistics 369 0.46 
Education 1,644 2.05 
Engineering 7,961 9.95 
Forestry 4,829 6.04 
Health 16,418 20.52 
Justice 3,028 3.78 
Parliament 221 0.28 
Constitutional 52 0.06 
Foreign affairs 210 0.26 
Miscellaneous 2,973 1.53 
Total 80,001 100 
Source: Bajracharya and Grace (2014, 13). 
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Table 22. Distribution of Civil Servants Across Government Levels in Nepal 
Government Level N Civil Servants Percent 
Central – Kathmandu 25,781 32.31 
Regional 2,589 3.24 
Zonal 770 0.96 
District 32,825 41.13 
Area 15,996 20.04 
Municipality 60 0.08 
     Sub-total 78,021 97.77 
Temporary 1,782 2.23 
Total 79,803 100 
Source: Bajracharya and Grace (2014, 14). 
 
According to the Fragile States Index (FSI) by the Fund for Peace, the Nepalese state was 
one of the least stable and highly fragile states of South Asia along with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
and Pakistan in 2015. In that sense, Nepal is not unique as the weakest states of the world cluster 
around South Asia based on FSI rankings. The FSI includes 12 indicators: “demographic 
pressures, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), group grievances, human flight and 
brain drain, uneven economic development, poverty and economic decline, state legitimacy, 
public services, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites, and 
external intervention as its 12 primary indicators.”41 Lack of infrastructural reach of the state to 
society (Mann 1984), high ethnolinguistic fragmentation, caste-based hierarchy, and multiplicity 
of sources of public authority (princes, religious leaders, ethnic leaders, landlords, etc.) have 
made it hard to establish coherent and effective governance structures in South Asia (Fukuyama 
2011). 
 A significant problem of Nepal’s political transition from an autocratic kingdom to a 
secular, democratic republic has been instability of the nascent multiparty parliamentary system 
                                                 
41 https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/asias-most-fragile-states-are-in-south-asia/ 
 155 
due to high political mobilization of the masses in protests and rebellion. In a society of high 
ethnolinguistic diversity and socioeconomic inequality such as Nepal, there are more 
disagreements than agreements among vying political parties that politicize almost all spheres of 
life including civil service, businesses, civil society and trade unions. For example, Basnyat and 
colleagues (2017) observe that overt the past 25 years, trade unions in the tourism industry of 
Nepal have become instruments of political parties vying for power and resources, eroding the 
unions’ traditional role of fighting for worker rights and improved workplace conditions. Party 
patronage and factional politics have become acute in Nepal’s districts as well. Rankin and 
colleagues (2016) show how building roads have become a highly contested governance issue in 
Nepal’s districts whereby coalitions of administrative and socioeconomic elites, landlords, 
ethnicity/caste-based organizations, NGOs, and civil society organizations are dominated by 
competing political parties. 
 
8.1.2. Governance System Two Years Prior to the Earthquakes 
Within about two years prior to the 2015 earthquakes, interorganizational networks of Nepal’s 
governance system engaged in conflict and cooperation on several key issues. While Nepal’s 
leaders spent much of their time and energy on adopting a new constitution, governance of 
economic and public affairs of the country suffered a lot. While the dissolution of the First 
Constituent Assembly in 2012 and protests due to disagreements over elections, the army, and 
transitional justice impeded economic investments and productivity, the 2013 November 
elections and Indian and Chinese investments in 2014 brought renewed hope and optimism to 
pass the new constitution and implement economic development projects. However, as of 
January 23, 2015, the Nepali people had lost hope again on passing the new constitution. 
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This section identifies main actors and issues in Nepal’s governance system within about 
two years prior to the 2015 earthquakes. According to data extracted from the Global Data on 
Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) Nepali Congress was the most influential actor in Nepal’s 
governance system in this period (see Chapter 5 for discussion of GDELT data and methods). 
Nepali Congress is the oldest and largest political party in Nepal and won the greatest number of 
seats in the November 19, 2013 election for the second Constituent Assembly tasked with 
adopting a new constitution for the country.42 As the largest winner of Constituent Assembly 
seats, Nepali Congress formed a coalition government with the second largest winner of seats the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified-Marxist-Leninist). Sushil Koirala, the chairman of Nepali 
Congress, led Nepal’s government as Prime Minister from February 11, 2014 to October 12, 
2015. Nepali Congress was the highest-ranking actor based on weighted degree centrality and 
second highest in terms of betweenness and closeness centrality. 
The United States government was the second most influential player according to 
weighted degree centrality and the highest-ranking actor according to betweenness and closeness 
centrality measures. In this period, the U.S. government influenced Nepal’s governance in 
several ways. The U.S. government is one of the top bilateral donors of Nepal assisting in 
various spheres of governance such as agricultural development, education, trade, and 
healthcare, with the U.S. Agency for International Development implementing projects worth 
over USD 205 million during 2009-2014.43 In addition, the U.S. government play a role in 
Nepal’s governance system through its funding for international NGOs, private contractors, 
multilateral donor agencies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United 
Nations, World Trade Organization, Asian Development Bank, and through its security assets in 
                                                 
42 https://epthinktank.eu/2014/11/28/nepals-political-parties-and-the-difficult-road-towards-a-new-constitution/ 
43 http://mof.gov.np/ieccd/newsbook/20140820115245.pdf 
 157 
South Asia.44 The U.S. government has also an observer status in the main regional organization 
called South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).45 
The Supreme Court of Nepal was the third most influential actor based on weighted 
degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality measures in this period. The Supreme Court has 
played an important role in Nepal’s democratic transition not only by interpreting the laws of the 
country and determining its own composition but also by restricting what constitutional 
amendments can be passed (Stith 1996). The Supreme Court not only made important decisions 
during the peace process of Nepal, the Chief Justice stepped in and governed the country for nine 
months and oversaw elections for the second Constituent Assembly when the first one ended in 
crisis without delivering a constitution on May 27, 2012. 
The United Nations is ranked fourth with respect to all three centrality measures, while 
the UN Nepal Office appears in top ten influential actors in terms of weighted degree centrality. 
The United Nations has been one of the longest and most influential international actors in Nepal 
ever since Nepal’s joining the international community in 1955.46 Currently there are nineteen 
resident and twelve non-resident specialized UN agencies operating in Nepal.47 There are seven 
coordination mechanisms that facilitate inter-agency collaboration within the UN umbrella in 
Nepal.48 In addition, the United Nations played a key brokering role in bringing an end to 
Nepal’s 1996-2006 Civil War and the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) oversaw the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the Government of 
                                                 
44 https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5283.htm 
45 https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-role-in-saarc/ 
46 https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/org1469.doc.htm 
47 For a list of all UN agencies operating in Nepal visit http://mofa.gov.np/un-its-specialized-agencies/ 
48 http://www.un.org.np/coordinationmechanism/ 
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Nepal and the Maoist party.49 In 2012, UN agencies employed 2,155 staff (1,859 national and 
296 international) to oversee UN projects in Nepal and mobilized USD 259 million.50 
 
Table 23. List of UN Coordination Mechanisms in Nepal  
Name 
UN Country Team in Nepal 
Humanitarian Coordination and Clusters 
Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium 
UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 
Common Country Assessments (CCA) 
UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) 
Thematic Task Forces 
Source: http://www.un.org.np/coordinationmechanism/ 
 
The Election Commission of Nepal was the fifth most influential actor in this period in 
terms of all three measures of network centrality. The Commission conducts all national, state 
and local elections in Nepal and ran by Chief Election Commissioner along with five Election 
Commissioners appointed by the President of Nepal. The Commissioners are above age 44 and 
have at least bachelor’s degree, good moral character, and no political party affiliation.51 Nepal’s 
elections for the second Constituent Assembly took nineteen months to be conducted – on 
November 19, 2013 – after the first Constituent Assembly expired on May 27, 2012. The 
Commission played a central role in conducting a free and fair election to preserve peace in the 
face of increasing calls for resumption of armed struggle by breakaway Maoist factions.52 
The Nepal Army was the sixth most influential actor in Nepal’s governance system in 
this period with respect to degree and betweenness centrality measures and eighths in terms of 
                                                 
49 https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37279#.Wh8GQraZNAY 
50 http://www.un.org.np/coordinationmechanism/aboutUNCT 
51 https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nepal_2015?lang=en 
52 https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/nepal-2013-final.pdf 
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closeness centrality measures. The Nepal Army, which used to be called the Royal Nepal Army 
before the abolishment of the monarchy in 2008, commands 95,000 troops in six divisions and 
three specialized brigades across Nepal as of 2012. The Nepal Army is under civilian control – 
the President of Nepal is the commander-in-chief. The Nepal Army has sent 75,500 troops to 35 
United Nations peacekeeping missions across the globe since 1958, including the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti since 2004.53 The Nepal Army has close links with the Indian 
Army and India is the largest weapons supplier to the Nepal Army. As of 2012, the US Pacific 
Command coordinated the US military engagement with Nepal and provided USD 50 million 
worth of training and technical assistance grants.54 In addition to protecting Nepal’s porous 
border with India and mountainous border with China, the Nepal Army deployed two thirds of its 
force (62,000 troops) when the government mobilized total of 150,000 security personnel to 
provide security during November 2013 elections for the second Constituent Assembly. It was 
the first deployment of the army since the end of the civil war in 2006.55 
The Nepal Police appears seventh in terms of degree centrality measures, but not in top 
ten according to betweenness and closeness centrality measures. However, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the parent organization of the Nepal Police, appears seventh in terms of the latter 
measures. The Nepal Police is tasked with maintaining internal law and order in Nepal and has 
over 42,000 personnel. The Inspector General is the chief of the Nepal Police and reports to the 
Minister of Home Affairs. In addition, the Ministry also commands over 26,000 officers within a 
separate paramilitary police organization called Nepal Armed Police Force, which does not have 
arrest powers but conduct anti-riot, anti-smuggling, counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist 
                                                 
53 4,665 peacekeepers were actively deployed as of April 2017 http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/na_un.php 
54 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nepal/army.htm 
55 https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/analysis-tensions-mount-nepal-contentious-election-nears 
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operations. The Ministry of Home Affairs is also in charge of disaster management, immigration, 
national identification records management, prison system management, and investigations.56 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was the eight most influential 
organization measured in terms of degree centrality, despite its absence in the top ten lists by 
betweenness and closeness centrality. The TRC, along with the Commission of Investigation on 
Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP), was established by the 2014 Investigation on Enforced 
Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, as required by Article 5.2.5 of 
the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Government of Nepal and the Maoists and 
Article 33 of the 2007 Interim Constitution of Nepal. Both commissions were formed by the 
government on February 10, 2015 to investigate grave violations of human rights such as 
murder, rape, hostage taking, and enforced disappearances during the Nepalese Civil War, 1996-
2006 with the goal of bringing the perpetrators to justice and providing reparation to the families 
of the victims.57 The Nepalese Civil War cost at least 13,000 lives (alternatives estimates are at 
15,000 and 17,000).58 As of July 2014, 1,347 persons were still missing from civil war era.59 
The World Bank was ranked ninth in terms of degree and closeness centrality measures 
and tenth in terms of betweenness centrality in this period. The World Bank is one of the top 
donors and lenders in Nepal. In March 2014, the World Bank had a portfolio of 20 active 
projects in various areas such as energy, education, food security, water management, healthcare 
and transportation. The World Bank’s active portfolio netted USD 1.5 billion in commitment 
                                                 
56 https://www.nepalhousingreconstruction.org/sites/nuh/files/2017-03/PDNA%20Volume%20A%20Final.pdf 
57 http://www.trc.gov.np/about-us and http://www.ciedp.gov.np/index.php  
58 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/NepalConflictReport.aspx 
59 https://www.icrc.org/en/document/missing-persons-nepal-right-know-updated-list-2014 
 161 
with USD 685 million cumulative disbursement. The grant to credit ratio of World Bank’s 
portfolio in Nepal was 45 to 55 percent.60 
Nepal’s Ministry of Commerce ranked eighth in terms of betweenness centrality but did 
not appear in top ten lists in degree and closeness centrality. The Ministry of Commerce is tasked 
with registering trading entities, regulating export and import activities, overseeing 
implementation of investments and infrastructure to facilitate trade, and governing Nepal’s 
relationship with the World Trade Organization and harmonizing its laws with the world trade 
body. The ministry was unified within the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies in early 
2000s, but later the Ministry of Industry was split and recently the Ministry of Supplies was also 
split. The Ministry of Commerce governs three public corporations: Trade & Export Promotion 
Centre (TEPC), Nepal Intermodal Transport Development Board, and Nepal Transit and 
Warehousing Company Ltd.61 The Ministry of Commerce took and active role in undertaking the 
trade and investment deals with India and Nepal in this period, as discussed below. 
The Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) was the ninth top actor in terms of betweenness centrality 
but did not appear in top ten lists of degree and closeness centrality. This is probably because of 
NRB’s brokerage role as the central bank of Nepal that is tasked with managing the foreign 
exchange reserves of Nepal, regulating the foreign exchange policy, governing Nepal’s monetary 
policy, and supervising the banking and financial institutions of the country. The governor, two 
deputy governors, and three directors are appointed by the Council of Ministers for five-year 
terms. The Board of Governors of NRB includes the latter as well as the secretary and the 
Minister of Finance.62 
                                                 
60 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-1398285132254/Nepal-Country-
Snapshot-Spring-Meetings-2014.pdf 
61 http://www.moc.gov.np 
62 https://nrb.org.np/aboutus/bod.php 
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Nepal’s Council of Ministers appeared as the sixth most influential actor in terms of 
closeness centrality measure but did not appear in top ten lists in terms of degree and 
betweenness centrality measures. The Council of Minister’s is Nepal’s cabinet, headed by the 
Prime Minister. The Council of Ministers is housed jointly with the Office of the Prime Minister. 
The Council of Ministers of Nepal is where most high-level executive and policy decisions of the 
Government of Nepal are made. While Nepal’s constitutions have put an upper limit to the 
number of cabinet members, prime ministers have from time to time included more ministers 
without portfolios to affect the decision-making process within the council while also enlarging 
the pool of titles used for patronage. For example, the Prime Minister Deuba’s cabinet includes 
four deputy ministers and twenty line ministers, reaching the legally prescribed 25 limit for 
cabinet membership. However, he also added nine more ministers without portfolio to the 
cabinet. Similarly, in addition to adding 25 state (junior) ministers, the PM added seven more 
state ministers without portfolio.63 
The European Union was the tenth most influential actor in terms of closeness centrality 
but did not appear in top ten in terms of degree and betweenness centrality. In addition to 
development assistance projects financed by individual member states, the European Union has 
played an important role in Nepal’s economic development and political conflict resolution. The 
EU-Nepal are governed by the EC-Nepal Cooperation Agreement of 1996 but also by numerous 
regional and multilateral initiatives, including the EU’s assistance in strengthening the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).64 In 2011-2013, the EU allocated USD 
75 million to support Nepal’s electoral process, school sector reform, public finance capacity 
building, and trade facilitation. In addition, Nepal has benefitted USD 10 million from the EU 
                                                 
63 http://opmcm.gov.np/en/cabinet/ 
64 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/csp-nepal-2007-2013_en.pdf 
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supported Global Climate Change Alliance Facility to improve its food security monitoring and 
analysis systems.65 
In this period, interorganizational cooperation and conflict in Nepal’s governance system 
revolved around five key themes. 
a) Political Instability and Ineffective Governance 
After the expiration and dissolution of the First Constituent Assembly on May 27, 2012, Nepal 
experienced uncertainty and instability as the political elite took 18 months to conduct new 
elections for the Second Constituent Assembly in November 2013. The First Constituent 
Assembly failed to meet four deadlines to adopt a new constitution since 2008 mainly due to 
disagreements between mainstream Nepali Congress and UML on the one hand and Maoists and 
ethnic parties such as Madhesis, Tharus, and other smaller ethnic parties on the other hand on the 
number and names of federal provinces, form of government (parliamentary or presidential) and 
the structure of the judiciary (Adhikari and Gellner 2016). Moreover, issues of integrating former 
Maoist rebels into the Nepal Army and transitional justice had not been resolved yet and thus 
complicated political negotiations. Without a parliament, the government led by the Maoist 
Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai operated without budget for eight months due to 
disagreements among political leaders (Kaphle 2013). In March 2013, the four major parties 
finally agreed through a High-Level Political Mechanism on a new caretaker government led by 
the Supreme Court Justice in March of 2013. Such an interim government is criticized on the 
grounds of violating the separation of powers principle. In April 2013, the new caretaker 
government and the political elite started discussions regarding new elections. While initial plans 
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for elections were set for June, it was deferred to November due to disagreements among 
political party leaders and public protests by breakaway Maoist parties.66 
In this period, as Nepal’s leaders spent most of their efforts in new elections and passing 
a constitution, governing public and economic affairs of the country was left on the backburner. 
Nepalese citizens grew increasingly dissatisfied with poor economic conditions due to political 
instability and the inability of the leaders to pass a constitution during the five years since the 
First Constituent Assembly was vote in in 2008. The leftist parties, especially the Maoists were 
blamed because the votes had given them the largest number of seats in the First Constituent 
Assembly elections in 2008 (Kaphle 2013). 
As governance of public services and economic affairs of the country suffered due to 
dissolved parliament and inability to pass a new constitution, corrupt practices of the civil war 
years continued unabated. When interviewed, many businesses reported receiving letters from 
political parties demanding contributions (extortion and bribery). Some political parties still 
maintained private armed groups as enforcers. Such contributions usually ranged from USD 
1,000 to 5,000 based on the size of the business and those who refused were threatened with 
vandalism and violence.67 Even in major corruption cases that attracted wide media attention, 
political parties were reported to influence in their favor the supposedly independent 
investigations conducted by the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority 
(CIAA).68 
Due to lack of effective governance to address major corruption issues, the Nepalese 
citizens resorted to hunger strikes and protests to attract attention to the problem and to demand 
                                                 
66 http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/carter-ngo-observe-elections-nepal-article-1.1304370 
67 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/world/asia/in-fractured-nepal-plans-for-national-elections-provide-a-series-
of-subplots.html 
68 http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2014-12-18/politicians-try-to-influence-ciaa.html 
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resolution at the risk of losing their lives. For instance, a renowned medical doctor undertook a 
two-week hunger strike protesting the government’s inappropriate sacking of Tribhuvan 
University’s Institute of Medicine dean and appointing a new dean for political patronage. Many 
health professionals around the country joined the doctor and protested publicly in solidarity. As 
a result, there were public discussions regarding politicization of medical industry and colleges 
in Nepal as political party leaders have investments in these institutions. There were media 
reports claiming that “political patronage has plagued just about all professional institutions, with 
meritocracy taking a back seat… [politicization of appointments in] medical colleges and 
hospitals is merely a manifestation of the larger malaise that now plagues all walks of life—the 
bureaucracy, the police, all kinds of professional groups and even the media.”69 Licensing of 
medical facilities and colleges could be approved only through bribery. Many health 
professionals lost confidence in the system.70 The same doctor held another 11-day hunger strike 
a year later in March 2015, as the government had failed to implement reforms in medical 
education system and corrupt political practices in licensing of medical colleges as promised.71 
Experts point out that governance quality in Nepal deteriorated in the post-1990 transition 
period due to politicization of the bureaucracy by major parties, which blocked implementation 
of government policies and legislation when it did not suit them and resorted to corruption and 
abuse of power to pursue their interests. This hampered proper professionalization and 
standardization of conduct in government bureaucracies. Bureaucratic leadership also suffered as 
political expediencies trumped rules while ordinary citizens were inundated with red tape in the 
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absence of real service delivery.72 Thus, many Nepalese citizens highly distrust police, courts, 
and government officials due to corruption as they are implicated in illegal activities such as 
gold-smuggling, substandard medicine imports for profit, bribery for licensing, accreditation, and 
procurement.73 Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer showed that 90 
percent of Nepalese citizens consider political parties corrupt or extremely corrupt, 85 percent 
believe that government officials and civil servants are corrupt or extremely corrupt, and 72 
percent think that corruption has worsened in the past two years. The Chairman of the 
Transparency International-Nepal, Bishnu Bahadur KC, argued that government bureaucracy 
must be insulated from political party influence to alleviate Nepal’s corruption problem.74 
Increased political instability, ineffective governance and corruption in this period 
affected all aspects of public and private affairs in Nepal. In December 2013, the European 
Union Commission banned all Nepalese airlines carrying both passengers and cargo from flying 
into the 28 EU countries due to air safety concerns. (The Commission requested the European 
Aviation Safety Agency to initiate an aviation safety assistance project to Nepal).75 More and 
more Nepalese citizens left home in search of jobs abroad. By 2015, more than ten percent of 
Nepal’s labor force was abroad (in construction and domestic services) and Nepal’s remittances 
made up more than one fourth of Nepal’s GDP. Due to abuse and lack of basic worker safety 
standards hundreds of labor migrants died every year in gulf countries, as constantly reported by 
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73 https://blog.com.np/2014/03/05/an-analysis-of-corruption-in-nepal-is-it-becoming-socially-acceptable/ 
74 http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2014-05-21/political-interference-in-bureaucracy-abetting-corruption-
says-ti-report.html 
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media and human rights organizations.76 Despite open borders and free movement of people 
across Nepal-India borders, exchanging Nepali currency into Indian currency became a 
challenge. In March 2014, there was acute shortage in Nepal for Indian currency so that 
Nepalese citizens wanting to travel to India had to wait in long queues to buy Indian currency. 
The Nepalese currency was not accepted even at banks or exchange stores in India. Because the 
Nepal Oil Corporation owed nearly NPR 9 billion to the Indian Oil Corporation for imports of 
petroleum products and had to make payments in Indian Rupees, this led to further shortage of 
Indian Rupees in Nepal. The government increased the price of petroleum products only to 
reverse its decision after student organizations held public demonstrations against the decision.77 
Due to ineffective governance, illegal activities at the Nepal-India border increased 
considerably. Nepal’s and India’s security forces, including the armies, police, and armed police 
forces, however, continued to collaborate to fight crimes such as smuggling of abusive drugs and 
small arms, robbery, abduction, extortion and homicide.78 In August 2013, India created five new 
posts along its border with Nepal to check criminal entries and curb smuggling of arms.79 Two 
Indian terrorists A. K. Tunda and Y. Bhatkal in India’s most wanted list were arrested in August 
2013 in Nepal and handed over to India.80 Fighting crimes such as smuggling currency and gold, 
trafficking protected species, and terrorism is challenging because of the open nature of the 1,700 
km border between India and Nepal. Criminals usually escape justice by running from one 
country to the other.81 The terrain is also harsh in many parts of the border, making targeted 
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enforcement much more challenging. While the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between 
India and Nepal has allowed their citizens to legally reside, work, and own property in both sides 
of the border, India worries that many who cannot enter India for illegal activities find an easy 
way to enter India through Nepal as Nepal relies on tourism and aid and has made it easy to get 
visa on arrival to enter the country.82 
Making things worse, a panel of scientists issued a report in July 2013 that the 2010 
cholera outbreak in post-earthquake Haiti was likely introduced by UN peacekeepers from 
Nepal. The report led to debates in the international community in assigning responsibility of the 
outbreak to the UN as the Nepalese government also countered the claims. There were many 
lawsuits against the UN by parties representing the victims of cholera in Haiti (Lynch 2013). The 
Nepal Army’s reputation at home and abroad suffered from the allegations as well as from the 
UK government’s arrest of a colonel of the Nepal Army in February 2013. The Nepal Army is 
one of the most powerful institutions in Nepal and yet has a limited role in the country’s national 
politics. The Nepal Army has a history of supplying soldiers to the British Army and being 
currently the seventh largest per capita contributor of troops to the UN peacekeeping missions.83 
Due to lack of effective governance by Nepal’s political leaders, the Supreme Court of 
Nepal grew into an increasingly influential role in Nepal’s governance system. In March 2013, 
the Supreme Court’s Chief Justice formed a new government to be in power until new elections 
are held. The Supreme Court also made several important decisions to affect public affairs in 
Nepal. On June 11, 2013 Nepal’s Supreme Court ruled that the government must make changes 
in the country’s passport so that transgender individuals do not need to describe themselves as 
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either male or female.84 In September 2013, the Supreme Court of Nepal banned individuals with 
criminal conviction to run for seats in the November elections.85 
Despite lack of effective governance in Nepal, projects with foreign development 
partners continued, albeit at a much lower rate. In December 2013, India announced a project to 
set up high-voltage, direct current power transmission lines with Nepal.86 Nepal’s and India’s 
Commerce Ministers met to discuss tariffs and methods to reduce cross-border illegal trade. 
India also donated 10,000 cows to Nepal to help with Nepal’s increasing demand for milk.87 
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) continued its efforts in 
assisting Nepal with reforming its health, education, and disaster risk reduction sectors. In 
August 2013, USAID started the Program for Enhancement of Emergency Response (PEER) to 
improve education on search and rescue and health risk reduction during disasters.88 In January 
2014, there were reports regarding collaborative work among Ministry of Health and Population, 
NSET, WHO, Ministry of Home Affairs, hospitals, and national government’s Health 
Emergency Operation Center to upgrade hospital buildings and run a database of all hospitals 
and clinics and medical personnel so that in case of a major earthquake they can manage public 
health effectively.89 There were also discussions regarding Nepal’s acute need for treating mental 
health problems of victims of the civil war in Nepal. Representatives from the World Health 
Organization (WHO), Nepal’s Ministry of Health, Nepal’s only mental health hospital called 
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Mental Hospital, Tribhuvan University Teaching Hospital and its Institute of Medicine, the 
Center for Victims of Torture’s Nepal office, and the Center for Mental Health and Counseling-
Nepal had discussions related to bringing mental health counseling services to local communities 
using community-based health service provision models in Nepal.90 In cooperation with the 
World Health Organization, and Nepal’s Public Health Concern Trust, a local NGO Nyaya 
Health, which runs a local hospital in Nepal’s Far West Region, started using the internet and 
patient stories to crowd-fund urgent medical surgeries.91 
 
b) 2nd Constituent Assembly Elections 
In addition to dismal economic conditions, corruption, political instability due to dissolved 
parliament and failure to adopt a constitution, Maoist combatant integration into the Nepal 
Army, transitional justice issues, and splits within Maoist and Madhesi parties were the main 
issues that preceded the November 2013 elections to the Second Constituent Assembly. 
As the Maoists had spurred nationalism and anti-India sentiments during their leadership 
in government, they needed to mend relations with India in order improve their odds in the new 
Constituent Assembly elections. The Maoists abandoned anti-India sloganeering in February 
2013. In April 2013, the UCPN-Maoist chief Dahal visited India and called for trilateral 
economic and political cooperation between China, India, and Nepal.92 At home, however, the 
Maoists suffered factional splits due to the party’s compromise on reducing to 1/10th the number 
of ex-rebels to be integrated in the Nepal Army. The hardline, breakaway faction of the Maoists 
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(itself split into two parties) conducted strikes and promised to boycott  the elections.93 At the 
end of September 2013, the head of the breakaway Maoist party in collaboration with the other 
33 small parties demanded the Supreme Court Chief Justice and the head of the interim 
government resign from the Supreme Court chief position and criticized the move by the four 
main parties to deploy the Nepal Army during elections.94 The anti-election protesters vandalized 
voter registration equipment, torched cars of candidates, set fire to copies of the Election Code of 
Conduct mostly in rural areas but also in Kathmandu in October 2013, and promised to organize 
a 10-day nationwide transportation strike in the days leading up to the November 19th election.95 
As Maoist guerilla fighters integrated into the Nepal Army, there were cases of hunger 
strikes and demands to bring Maoist fighters to justice by the relatives of victims who died in the 
hands of Maoist rebels. There were also hunger strikes by relatives of those who disappeared or 
were killed by the government security forces during the conflict. While the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Act was signed by Nepal’s President into law, in practice the 
commission has not been formed, as the parties have objected to investigation of war time cases. 
Nepal’s Human Rights Commission argued that investigations will be conducted, and justice will 
be attained.96 Victims’ representatives also filed cases with the Supreme Court and took cases to 
the United Nations and other international venues.97 Victims’ relatives held months of hunger 
strikes even when their doctors had to place nutrient tubes under their clavicle. They complained 
that the concepts of transitional justice and truth and reconciliation were misrepresented in Nepal 
and impunity continued in the name of peace process.98 Finally in April 2014, the Constituent 
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Assembly finalized and passed a bill that created two commissions to investigate war crimes 
committed by both sides while also specifying the criteria for amnesty. National Network of 
Families of Disappeared Persons, Nepal’s Supreme Court, human rights groups and activists, 
hunger strikes, the UN have played an important role in advocating for transitional justice.99 
Nepalese citizens and politicians alike complained, however, that money has become the 
most important part of elections as parties were rewarding financial contributors by giving seats 
won through proportional representation (PR) system.100 In that sense, the PR system has 
evolved into selling party lists, whereas the original intent was to increase diversity among 
lawmakers. Some wealthy individuals openly supported political parties. For instance, in October 
2013, Nepal’s only billionaire Binod Chaudhary declared his support to one of the top four 
parties CPN-UML.101 
In November 2013, Nepal finally held elections for the second Constituent Assembly 
after the first one did not deliver a constitution and ran out of time in May 2012. The results of 
the election put a spotlight on the disappointed public who had mandated political parties 
dominated by the Maoist party and many other ethnic parties against the establishment parties of 
Nepali Congress and UML. Because of disagreements over the structure of government and 
division of power among the parties, the leaders had neglected their job of governing the country 
as many public and private sector projects were left unimplemented due to political instability 
and uncertainty. The November 2013 election results demonstrate that the people were fearful of 
fragmentation of Nepal led by the leftists and ethnic parties and voted to support the centrist right 
Nepali Congress and the rightist, religious and pro-monarchy party RPP-Nepal. The center leftist 
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party that has championed liberal capitalism also gained votes becoming the second largest party 
in CA-II as opposed CA-I where the Maoists won the greatest number of seats. The Maoist party 
and the Madhesi parties had splintered into factions as the hardliners broke away from the main 
parties due to compromises with the established parties. Their loss of considerable number of 
seats in this election reflect the fact that many Nepalese citizens came to believe that ethnicity 
and identity-based federalism would lead to further instability, if not the demise of the Nepalese 
state, and that the Maoists and Madhesi led revolution for a New Nepal suffered a retreat. Some 
observers also argued that the interim government led by the Supreme Court Chief Justice, the 
Nepal Army, and the President of Nepal used administrative resources and collaboration with 
India to consolidate power in the hands of Nepal’s mainstream party Nepali Congress.102 
In the Madhesi areas of Terai, Nepali Congress emerged as the largest winning party. In 
addition to non-Madhesi populations of Terai, even Madhesis have voted for the Nepali 
Congress, instead of ethnic Madhesi parties. The reasons are simple. Many ordinary Madhesis 
were dissatisfied with increased levels of political violence and banditry that was prevalent in the 
regions during the past five years. People complained about worsened economic conditions. Both 
Biratnagar and Birgunj, major Nepalese industrial hubs in the Terai, suffered from lackluster 
industrial output. The tobacco factory in Janakpur, another major population center in Terai, 
went out of business as many lost their jobs (the factory was the largest employer in the area and 
drove much of the economic activity in the region). Madhesis looked to the Nepali Congress and 
UML for good jobs, cars, well paved roads, and better irrigation projects. Their disappointment 
with ethnicized politics was felt strongly as they voted based on their urgent economic issues 
                                                 
102 http://www.frontline.in/world-affairs/revolution-in-retreat/article5443844.ece 
 174 
instead of their wishes for ethnopolitical autonomy. Because Madhesi leaders promised much but 
did not realize their promises, people chose to vote for development and stability.103 
 
c) Formation of New Government 
With surprising outcome of the elections, Nepalese leaders formed a new government to usher in 
some hope that economic conditions will improve, and a new constitution will be passed. While 
a few disagreements made it harder to form a government and pass a new budget, Nepalese 
leaders were able to rise above their disagreements and start afresh to improve governance in 
Nepal. 
The first disagreement started when both President Yadav and Chief Justice Regmi, who 
was the Interim Prime Minister and head of the Election Commission, claimed the right to call 
the first meeting of the second Constituent Assembly. The dispute had to be settled in the 
Supreme Court due to ambiguities in the Interim Constitution of 2017, which did not foresee a 
second Constitutional Assembly. The first meeting of the CA-II was finally held on January 22, 
2014 with the Chief Justice calling the meeting and the President issuing a statement that called 
for forming a new government. At the first meeting, the members of CA-II reached an agreement 
to adopt a new constitution within a year, i.e., by January 22, 2015.104 
It took another eighteen days for the leaders to form a government. On February 10, 
2014, the Nepali Congress leader Sushil Koirala finally emerged as the new Prime Minister in 
alliance with the second largest party UML. Experts pointed out that Prime Minister Koirala has 
the backing of smaller parties and independent members of the Constituent Assembly to make 
him a more likely leader who can bring the country’s leaders together to adopt a new 
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constitution. Mr. Koirala is reportedly known to have skills in negotiations and political alliance 
building because of his family ties with previous leaders of the country and his lifelong 
experience in politics (Sushil Koirala is the fourth Koirala to hold the position of Prime Minister 
in Nepal).105 To get the votes for the position, Sushil Koirala reached a six-point agreement with 
UML. The agreement included power-sharing in the cabinet, drafting a new constitution within a 
year of taking office, holding elections for presidency, vice-presidency, and parliament 
speakership, and not overturning the laws made during CA-I that, among others, declared Nepal 
a secular, federal republic.106 
Other experts disagreed pointing out that while Koirala led the Nepali Congress for 23 
years, he never held a government position and thus does not have experience in public 
administration. Mr. Koirala also served a prison term in the past for being involved in the 1973 
hijacking of an airplane that was carrying the King’s gold to India and seizing the money to use 
for revolutionary activities of the Nepali Congress against the monarchy. However, many still 
believe that the unmarried man in his late 70s is soft spoken and clean from corruption.107 
While Koirala had agreed to give the positions of Minister for Home Affairs and the 
Deputy Prime Minister to the UML party leaders in a verbal “gentleman’s agreement,” which is 
a common practice among Nepal’s politicians, he reneged on his promise after he was sworn in 
as Prime Minister. This led to serious political tensions in forming the cabinet as the UML 
boycotted the inauguration ceremony and sat out the first two weeks of government.108 Koirala 
considered joining forces with UCPN-Maoist and the royalist Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (Nepal) 
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leaders in forming a new government but had pushback from within his own party. Koirala 
finally gave in as his power was being questioned by Sher Bahadur Deuba, who lost his party’s 
nomination for Prime Minister to Koirala only with a small margin. The Council of Ministers 
was finally formed on February 24, two weeks after his election as the Prime Minister.109 
In July 2014, the Government of Nepal introduced a complete budget, first in the past 
three years that were mired in instability, outlining major spending programs. The Finance 
Minister R. S. Mahat stated that the USD 6.4 billion budget will be spent on enhancing energy 
supplies, transportation infrastructure and agricultural development. The budget is twice the 
regular budget amounts because of unspent expenditures piling up over the past three years after 
the dissolution of the First Constituent Assembly. The government unveiled a road project that 
would connect Kathmandu to India through Terai. The government also set up low interest loans 
to help villagers set up small farms instead of traveling abroad for work. The introduction of the 
budget was delayed as lawmakers demanded that each constituency’s development budget be 
increased to NPR 50 million from one million. They compromised on an initial NPR 10 million 
allocation and the budget was introduced.110 
 
d) Changes in External Environment 
The victory of the conservative, nationalist Hindu Bharatiya Janati Party (BJP) in Indian general 
elections of April-May 2014 and its leader Narendra Modi’s tenure as Prime Minister of India 
affected the dynamics of governance in Nepal. As soon as Modi won the elections, he initiated a 
policy of Neighborhood First to prioritize India’s relations with its neighbors to counter the 
increasing influence of China in what India considers its sphere of influence in South Asia. Modi 
                                                 
109 https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/nepal-tries-again-to-write-a-constitution/ 
110 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-14/nepal-unveils-first-full-budget-in-three-years/5593454 
 177 
invited all the leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
countries to his inauguration ceremony. Under Modi’s leadership, India elevated the status of its 
relations with neighbors to political levels from merely routine bureaucratic affairs, giving high 
priority in buttressing India’s role in the economies and governance of neighboring countries.  
China responded in kind by increasing its own investments and commitments in South Asian 
countries. Chinese investments had grown significantly especially in Sri Lanka, Bhutan, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan but also in Nepal in recent years. 
In May and June, after Modi’s election as Prime Minister, the Nepalese and Indian media 
start discussing the increasing Chinese influence on Nepal and India’s worries about it at an 
increasing rate.111 Previously, in March 2013, after Nepal Army had completed the integration of 
1,352 former Maoist fighters and political parties cleared the way for resumption of purchase of 
military supplies from India that came to a halt in 2005. In July 2013, Indian Minister for 
External Affairs had announced that India would be providing military supplies through loans 
and subsidies to Nepal.112 In response to India’s efforts, the Chief of Nepal Army and a general 
from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army met to reiterate China’s commitment to provide 
military aid to Nepal worth USD 7.7 million, assist with training, and set up two mobile hospitals 
for the Nepal Army in response to Nepal’s support to One China policy and curbing of anti-
Chinese activities of Tibetan refugees in nepal.113 There appeared growing signs and evidence of 
growing influence of China on Nepal on India’s radar.114 
In August 2014, Modi visited Nepal to improve bilateral relations and promised a USD 1 
billion worth of investments. A week before him, his FM visited Nepal to prepare ground for his 
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visit. Modi’s visit was the first Indian PM visit to Nepal in 17 years. It improved direct political 
ties instead of just relying on bureaucratic ties. Modi’s first visit was to Bhutan, second to Nepal 
and third to Sri Lanka, while also improving ties with Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 
Modi started a Neighborhood First Policy to counter increasing Chinese influence in the region 
through China’s One Road, One Belt project. Modi promised to invest in Nepal’s hydropower 
and infrastructure sectors and complete projects in a timely manner.115 
In response, China announced its own plans for infrastructure development in Nepal. In 
August 2014, the Chines government announced that by 2020 China will complete a railway 
extension from Tibet to Indo-Nepalese border through Kathmandu. In 2006, China had linked 
Tibet’s capital city Lhasa to its railroad network.116  Recently, the railroads were extended from 
Lhasa to Tibet’s border with Nepal – the town of Xigaze, which is situated only 253 km away 
from China’s border with Nepal and India.117 China prepared a blueprint for the railroad 
extension project in early January 2015 and both Chinese and Nepalese officials signed an 
agreement on implementing it.118  
Following up on Modi’s promises, Indian and Nepali officials signed the Indo-Nepal 
Power Trade Agreement in September 2014, paving the way to further hydropower and energy 
development.  In September 2014, the Investment Board of Nepal signed a hydropower deal 
worth USD 1.4 billion with the Indian energy infrastructure company called GMR. The deal was 
expected to be the first of four such large energy projects. The project includes building a 900-
megawatt dam and a tunnel system with the goal of providing electricity to Nepal as well as 
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exporting it to India. The deal includes a form of contract called “build, own, operate and 
transfer”. GMR will give 12 percent of the electricity output to Nepal for free for 25 years. After 
25 years, the ownership will be transferred to Nepal. Nepal will also benefit 27 percent of the 
profits that will originate from exporting electricity to India. The hydropower station is expected 
to be built by 2021. All four projects will benefit Nepal through taxes, royalties, energy, 
dividends, and ownership in the amount of USD 17 billion – which is almost equal to Nepal’s 
annual GDP.119 Nepal will own 27 percent of the profits through its public corporation the Nepal 
Electricity Authority120 In addition to hydropower deals, the Export-Import Bank of India 
extended a USD 1 billion line of credit to Nepal in December for hydro and infrastructure 
projects.121 Further, Nepalese and Indian border officials and surveyors from convened to resolve 
the remaining 7 percent of Indo-Nepal border that was not clearly demarcated yet.122 Election of 
Modi appeared to improve Nepal’s fortunes considerably, ushering in more hope to the country. 
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) also became part of 
increasing regional rivalry between India and China. As India tries to accelerate regional 
economic integration through common infrastructure and trade projects, rather hostile relations 
with Pakistan slows the progress made through the regional body. In addition, Pakistan and other 
members of the SAARC are pushing the idea of China transitioning from an observer status into 
full membership, which India stands to oppose. In March 2014, Nepal’s former Foreign 
Secretary Arjun Bahadur Thapa was selected as the Secretary General of the SAARC.123 In 
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November 2014 Nepal held the 18th SAARC summit in Kathmandu. Modi visited Nepal again 
for the SAARC summit. Modi’s main goal was to increase connectivity among SAARC member 
states. Some proposals include improving road, train, flight, and telecom connectivity in the 
region.124 Modi also urged Nepal’s leaders to pass the constitution as soon as practical but with 
national consensus instead of pushing through with 2/3 majority of the CA. The NC-UML 
coalition was attempting to pass it through 2/3 majority instead of consensus.125 
 
e) Another Attempt, Another Failure 
With renewed hope and optimism, the Constituent Assembly and the new government led by 
coalition of Nepali Congress and UML made another attempt at adopting a new constitution for 
the country. However, the attempt ended in yet another failure because of disagreements among 
Nepal’s political leaders. While the mainstream parties of Nepali Congress and UML interpreted 
their victory in the November 2013 elections as the popular verdict for unity and against 
ethnicity or identity-based federalism, the Maoists and ethnic parties such as Madhesis who 
preferred greater number of federal provinces based on ethnic groups insisted on adopting a 
constitution that is not passed through a minimum requirement of 2/3 majority but through near-
unanimous political consensus in the Constituent Assembly. While the mainstream political 
leaders had been able to sway many Maoist and Madhesi leaders into the mainstream, many 
hardline Maoists and Madhesis were not on the same page. At this point, at least one thing was 
obvious: as soon as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in November 2006 
concluding the civil war with the brokerage of the UN, many mainstream political leaders argued 
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that they gave away too much and needed to fight back against those promises. According one 
expert, many mainstream leaders believed that they did not even need a new constitution.126 
With electoral victory of the BJP party in India and ascension of Modi to the position of 
Prime Minister of India, not only had the contours of Indian influence over Nepal had changed, 
but also the royalist, right-wing Hindu leaders of RPP under the leadership of Kamal Thapa also 
had strengthened beyond increasing their Constituent Assembly seats in the November 2013 
elections. One of the UML party leaders Pradip Gyawali argued that many Nepalese leaders 
routinely consulted with the Indian intelligence (RAW) officials to improve their positions in 
negotiations.127 Moreover, NC and UML leaders met with the Indian ambassador at the Indian 
embassy weeks before the January 22, 2015 attempt to pass the constitution without the Maoist 
and RPP’s support. The latter did not attend the meeting.128 The Indian ambassador in Nepal at 
the time was Ranjit Ray, a long-term Nepal specialist who had good relations with Nepal’s 
political leaders and civil servants and had helped draft the twelve-point agreement that ended 
the civil war, has so far managed to maintain good relations with Kathmandu’s politicians and 
civil servants.129  
In the meantime, in November 2014, a Madhesi pro-independence movement led by CK 
Raut emerged and demanded improving political, economic and social conditions for the 
Madhesis in Terai. Protests were suppressed by the Nepal Armed Police whereby a protester was 
gunned down by the paramilitary unit and the leader of the movement CK Raut was arrested and 
charged with “crimes against the state”, punishable by 20 years in prison.130 In December 2014, 
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Kamal Thapa, the leader of the conservative Hindu movement, demanded a referendum on re-
making Nepal a Hindu state and a constitutional monarchy.131 
On January 22, 2014, Nepal’s leaders failed to meet the fifth deadline to pass a new 
constitution. After the NC-UML coalition government was established with the leadership of 
Prime Minister Sushil Koirala in February of 2013, the leaders had agreed to pass the new 
constitutions by January 22, 2014. While the NC-UML coalition attempted to push through the 
new constitution with a 2/3 majority vote, the Maoists and ethnic parties held protests against 
such a move and demanded political consensus. The same problems that prevented passing the 
constitution in May 2012 stood in the way of succeeding this time as well. These problems were: 
(1) the names, numbers and borders of proposed federal provinces; (2) whether or not to name 
the provinces along ethnic or identity lines; (2) forms of government (prime ministerial or 
presidential); (3) type of electoral system first-past-the-post, proportional or a mixed system; and 
(4) disagreements about the structure of the judiciary and the constitutional court.  
As the Maoist leader Prachanda demanded that their views be taken into consideration, an 
alliance of 30 parties including the Madhesi that he leads had already started street protests and 
strikes. The protestors argued that if the constitution was pushed through with a 2/3 majority 
vote, then country will slide into another conflict.132 Because of the hurried nature of the 
coalition government’s effort to push through the new constitution without consultation with 
smaller parties, the breakaway Maoist parties have called for dissolution of the CA so that an all-
party mechanism be started to adopt a new constitution and revive the “People’s Liberation 
Army” to continue the “unfinished” war.133 The attempt to pass the constitution ended in a brawl 
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in the parliament as politicians threw shoes, microphones, and chairs to one another. As 1,000 
police units were deployed to restore order in the parliament, the conflict spilled over to the 
streets as many gathered on all sides to protest in support of their party.134  
The network visualization in Appendix F depicts the problems of cooperation and 
conflict in this period in Nepal. It demonstrates the obsession of Nepal’s leaders with election 
and working out a constitution, as well as the increased role of the Supreme Court in the process, 
and the importance of the international community – the United Nations, the World Bank and 
India in Nepal’s governance system. Networks statistics in Appendix F shows that the network 
had a modest density of 0.024 with a relatively higher average clustering coefficient of 0.773, 
exhibiting a small world phenomenon. The connectivity of the network is modest with average 
degree centrality of 7.698 and average path length of 2.69. This suggests that while there were 
many problems that actors in Nepal had to work on through cooperation and conflict, they did 
have connected lines of communication that is structurally conducive for resolving their 
differences. 
 
8.1.3. Governance System Three Months Prior to the Earthquakes 
This section of the chapter identifies the main actors and issues in Nepal’s governance system 
within three months prior to the 2015 earthquakes. Using measures of edge-weighted degree, 
betweenness and closeness centrality, top ten actors are identified along with their estimated 
scores. According to weighted degree centrality measures, three new organizations were 
detected. Asian Development Bank has increasingly become one of the largest multilateral 
donors in Nepal, implementing projects in spheres of governance and economy. The Chinese-led 
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Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) also joined the top ten influential actors, as China 
has become of the top donors and investors in Nepal. In addition, the Constituent Assembly’s 
Questionnaire Committee, formed by the speaker in late January, becomes a major actor 
regarding the disputed points in the constitution.135 The Committee members prepared 
questionnaires and proposals on disputed issues in order to put them up for a vote in the 
Constituent Assembly. However, the UCPN-Maoist and RPP-N parties disagreed for voting on 
disputed issues, insisting on political consensus.136 
With respect to betweenness centrality scores, Nepal’s Ministry of Health and 
Population, the Indian Ministry of Health, and the Appellate Courts of Nepal joined the top ten 
influential actors. The first two played important role in addressing the brief, small-scale 
epidemic of swine flu, which occurred in February in India, and in March in Nepal, as will be 
discussed below. The Appellate Courts, in addition to the Supreme Court, became influential as a 
corruption scandal in the medical industry of Nepal exposed a doctor who allegedly had faked 
his medical degree and embezzled funds from a hospital.137 
In terms of closeness centrality measure, Amnesty International and Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) – the ruling nationalist Hindu party of India joined the top ten actors. Amnesty 
International experts have played an influential role in the transitional justice debates of Nepal.138 
The VP of the BJP party Renu Devi visited Nepal in February and stirred a controversy between 
the two countries when she commented that Nepal should never choose an ethnicity-based 
federalism and that Nepal should enshrine the Hindu religion as the state religion while cracking 
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down on activities of Christian missionaries in Nepal. Many Nepalese leaders reacted to Devi’s 
comments by accusing her of interfering with Nepal’s internal affairs.139 
After failing to meet the promised January 22, 2015 deadline to adopt the new 
constitution, Nepal faces some political instability and uncertainty. In the subsequent three 
months, prior to the devastating earthquakes, Nepal’s leaders make additional efforts to reach an 
agreement. However, it appears the views of the mainstream NC-UML coalition members have 
hardened as they continued to insist on pass the constitution without the Maoists and other 
smaller party with mere 2/3 majority instead of a more unanimous consensus. At the same time, 
Maoists and their multi-party alliance organized street protests and threatened the parties with 
violent confrontation unless their constitutional demands were met.140 Frequent nationwide 
strikes and shutdown of streets for protests severely disrupted daily economic life in Nepal.141 
With constitution making taking center-stage, ineffective governance and corruption continued 
in Nepal. All the while, the rightist, Hindu nationalists appeared to be strengthening further, 
making their demands much louder to remake the Nepalese state and Hindu state. In addition, 
transitional justice continued to be a hurdle in the way of constitution making, as, in addition to 
protesting relatives of victims, the UN, Amnesty International, and the UK also got involved in 
pressing the political parties and the government in resolving the transitional justice issues. 
In February 2015, the Supreme Court of Nepal delivered a ruling making the amnesty 
provision of the 2014 Commission on Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and 
Reconciliation Act unconstitutional. As more than 200 relatives of victims filed a petition, a 
three-judge Supreme Court bench issued an order to remove the discretionary powers of amnesty 
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given to the commissions and made it a requirement that the consent of the victims or their 
relatives must be sought for any amnesty or reconciliation to occur.142 Over 13,000 were killed 
and 1,347 still missing as a result of the decade long civil war. While the Maoists kidnapped 
tortured and killed people who they suspected of being informants or uncooperative “class 
enemies” and committed mass atrocities like bombing buses, government security forces also 
engaged in secret arrests, torture, and killings. 143 Maoists organized street protests against the 
Supreme Court decision.144  
Complicating the issue of transition justice, a colonel from the Nepal Army who 
commanded a unit in South Sudan as part of UN’s peace keeping mission was arrested in 
London in January 2013 during his travel and his trial for torturing two alleged Maoist 
sympathizers was ongoing in early 2015.145 Experts argue that the involvement of the UK 
government in Nepal’s transitional justice issues is related to the British government’s military 
aid to the Royal Nepal Army and a potential British involvement in routine and systematic 
torture of Maoists even after India and the US stopped aid as the King Gyanendra usurped power 
in 2005.146 The problem of transition justice had increasingly become a hurdle in the way of 
constitutional negotiations among NC, UML, and the Maoists.147 The United Nations and the 
Amnesty International encouraged Nepal’s leaders to conduct proper transitional justice 
procedures in Nepal in order to advance the peace and democracy building processes. 
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In the meantime, rampant corruption problems continue unabated in Nepal.148 The latest 
corruption scheme in this period was revealed by the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists who reported that eight Nepalese citizens had deposited USD 54 million of 
potentially laundered illegal money in the Swiss branches of the HSBC bank.149 In February 
2015, the head of India’s Aam Admi Party (AAP) visited Nepal and gave a speech in 
Kathmandu, urging Nepalese politicians to find a minimum common understanding on disputed 
issues regarding passing a new constitution. The AAP is known for being a single issue, anti-
corruption political party in India. The AAP leader encouraged the leaders of Nepal to start a 
process to rid corrupt officials from positions of power, as they have done in India.150 
In March 2015, the Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister declares that some rightist 
(Hindu monarchist and Madhesi independence) and leftist (hardline Maoist) groups are 
threatening peace and stability by increasing their activities and the government is increasing 
surveillance of their activities.151 Nepalese national and religious sentiments grow as the public 
become sensitive about the comments of external government officials. The UK ambassador was 
pressured to resign as his comments in December regarding freedom of religious conversion in 
Nepal was interpreted as political interference in domestic affairs of Nepal.152 The position of the 
royalist, conservative Hindu movement strengthens as the deposed king of Nepal makes a 
statement that he is willing to cooperate with the ruling coalition to revive the constitutional 
monarchy in return for the former king’s support to pass a new constitution.153 While there were 
discussions of unification among royalist, Hindu parties RPP and RPP-Nepal, which had been 
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split up previously, there was no unity within RPP itself, as the latter was at the verge of further 
splits.154 
 Against the strengthening of the religious and royalist groups, leftist and ethnic groups 
were getting further weakened. The Maoists have continued to weaken further because of more 
splits in the parties and criminal allegations against the main Maoist leader Dahal regarding war 
crimes and financial embezzlement. Similarly, Madhesi activists have also weakened as they 
have splintered into multiple political groupings, Madhesis voting for non-Madhesi parties in 
November 2013 elections, and there has been increasing backlash against them regarding the 
threats to Nepal’s territorial integrity if Madhesi demands for provincial demarcation were to be 
met. 
 All the while, India, China and other development partners continue to seek new projects 
while trying to implement the existing ones. The Chinese government increased its aid to Nepal 
fivefold under their agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation. The grants will be used 
on large infrastructure development projects aimed at improving trade and tourism.155 China 
announces that it has started feasibility study regarding connecting Lhasa to Kathmandu via a 
tunnel through Mount Everest by 2020 at the request of Nepal’s government.156 Nepal and China 
also sign a USD 1.6 billion hydropower project agreement.157 While India tries to preserve 
Nepal’s dependence to India, Chinese is trying to increase Nepal’s dependence to China, and 
Nepal is attempting increase its independence from both. Nepal and Bangladesh set up power 
trading companies with India’s initiative that started at SAARC’s November 2013 meeting. The 
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objective is to create an integrated electricity market in the region that would boost electricity 
production and trade among India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.158 
While the development partners and experts have been ringing the alarm bell about a 
mega-earthquake in central Nepal that is overdue, political leaders of Nepal have been too busy 
fighting positions of power and resources in their fight in drafting a new constitution. Exemplary 
but small projects were in the works to retrofit schools and hospitals in some municipalities in 
anticipation of the massive earthquake.159 There was a brief period of anxiety in March regarding 
a public health emergency as 552 patients were identified with swine flu and 24 of them died in 
Nepal.160 The epidemic took place in neighboring India a month earlier when thousands of 
people caught the swine flu and over a hundred died within a few days.161 
Thus, within three months prior to the earthquakes, the governance system of Nepal was 
gridlocked again because of its leaders’ inability to agree on a new constitution and the issues 
surrounding power sharing in government and transitional justice. While NC-UML coalition did 
their best to co-opt the Maoists and the Madhesis into continuing the status quo with respect to 
delineating the borders of federal provinces and their numbers, the UML party leaders were 
growing impatient to adopt a new constitution so that they would form a new government under 
a UML leader based on their agreement with Sushil Koirala.162 Against this backdrop, there were 
initial signs of a strategy being discussed among Nepal’s top leaders to consider deferring certain 
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constitutional matters into the future so that a new constitution could be passed based on what 
can be agreed upon currently.163 
The visualization in Appendix G depicts co-occurrence of entities in discussions of issues 
within Nepal’s governance system during the three months prior to the earthquakes. As it can be 
seen, Nepal’s Supreme Court, the Nepali Congress, the US, UN, and the World Bank are among 
the most influential actors. The activity among Health Ministry agencies shows the issue of 
swine flu that occurred in late winter/early spring in Nepal. Similarly, the Medical Association of 
Nepal and the Supreme Court were involved in adjudicating disputes regarding allegations of 
corruption in the medical industry of Nepal. Network statistics in Appendix G show that while 
network density increased, average clustering coefficient decreased. This reflects the difference 
in time period covered as well as the lower number of actors that occur in the network within 
three months prior to the 2015 earthquakes. 
 
8.2. Organizational Capacity After the Earthquakes  
8.2.1. Governance System Within Three Months After the Earthquakes 
In this period, interorganizational cooperation and conflict in Nepal’s governance system can be 
described in three key themes. 
a) Immediate Impact of the Earthquakes 
The earthquakes struck Nepal as its political leaders hit another low, failing to meet a deadline of 
January 22, 2015 to adopt a new constitution, which was needed for regaining stability for the 
country. Some experts had started to wonder if Nepal’s days were numbered and whether it 
would slide back into armed conflict and chaos.164 The high level of damage from the 
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earthquakes in Nepal was blamed on Nepal’s governance system, which had been overly 
centralized and concentrated in Kathmandu. Because of lack of physical infrastructure 
development, socioeconomic development, and local governance capacity building outside of 
Kathmandu, earthquake damages were much greater and earthquake response activities were 
much lower and ineffective in rural areas (Koirala and Macdonald 2015).165 
Maoist leaders Dahal and Bhattarai used the sluggish response of the government and 
poor leadership of PM Koirala to discredit the NC-UML coalition government that had been 
governing the country since February 2014. The Koirala government was also weak due to the 
PM’s health issues (lung cancer) and multiple resignations of cabinet ministers for various 
reasons.166 As UML leader Oli was anxious to become the next PM, it became possible to 
discredit Koirala and advance to the PM position in cooperation with the Maoists. Alternatively, 
the Maoist and Madhesi leaders demanded to form a new “national government” in which 
Maoists and Madhesis are also included. The sudden opportunity for funds and to rebuild the 
devastated regions of Nepal created a strong momentum for cooperation and competition for 
building political capital. The opposition leader Maoist Bhattarai, for example, proposed to head 
the National Reconstruction Authority in return for cooperation.167 This basically led to the 
scramble for reconstruction funds and influence over reconstruction activity and competition for 
taking credit for delivered public goods and services by Nepal’s political parties.168 
Experts and analysts have argued that the earthquakes were the largest trigger for the 
momentum to political deal-making that led to agreement among Nepal’s leaders to pass the new 
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constitution. While the earthquakes pressured the political parties to come to the table and act, 
they also empowered the mainstream political parties to make minor concessions to the Maoists 
and Madhesi to pass the new constitution. These minor concessions could always be retracted in 
the future, as it often has happened. Therefore, many argued that the new constitution did not 
represent the wishes of the Nepalese people in all segments of society, as larger parties basically 
ignored the preferences of the smaller parties. 169 As the Maoist-Madhesi opposition alliance had 
weakened in their demand for federalism, their preference for a larger influence in the 
reconstruction process also dwindled the salience of their demands for federalism (this Madhesi 
group of leaders, however, were not considered as true representatives of the Madhesi 
community as they were perceived being co-opted by the mainstream parties).170 
As the earthquakes exposed the weakness of Nepal’s governance, political party leaders 
had to act to show leadership and action in passing the new constitution quickly. This process 
was dubbed among experts and commentators as a “super-fast-track” process to pass the 
constitution, which was deemed hasty and illiberal.171 The agreement on the new constitution, 
paradoxically, allowed the continuity in the system in which government lasts a year and a half 
on average as political parties come in and out of government offices, a patron-client relationship 
system that sustains the political machine of Nepal’s parties. Therefore, the threat of the UML 
and the Maoists in forming a new government with or without a new constitution was credible 
against the Koirala government as it had already been in power for a year and a half. However, 
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the Koirala and the Nepali Congress wanted to take credit for passing the new constitution so 
that it would later have better chances in rebuilding as well as local elections.172 
The earthquakes also strengthened the civil society and nonprofits vis-à-vis the 
government and political parties. Not only did youth groups, citizens associations, local 
nonprofits, diaspora associations, and Nepalese chapters of international nongovernmental 
agencies engaged in grassroots activities to help earthquake victims and thus received more 
visibility then inactive and ineffective government institutions, many of these groups were 
getting local and international donations over hundreds of thousands of dollars, which worried 
the government and political parties a lot.173 Civil society groups, especially young professionals 
and the youth organized various initiatives using social media and other tools to step and help the 
victims of the earthquakes in a show of increased sense of collective responsibility in Nepal.174 
However, in Nepal, private organizations as well as civil society groups are also 
subsumed within the system of patron-client relationships with political parties at the top. This 
civil society activism in the aftermath of the earthquakes was much more about caring for the 
victims and rebuilding the country than fights about federalism and long-term rights of the 
marginalized communities. The civil society groups and the “super-fast-track” process for 
adopting a new constitution thus did not allow time or attention for the marginalized 
communities to object to the process in which essentially many of the newly gained rights of 
these groups were reversed in the new draft of the constitution. Even though the second 
Constituent Assembly was committed to the progress achieved during the first Constituent 
Assembly, the new draft of the constitution undid much  of the progress achieved in areas such 
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as freedom of expression and press, women’s legal, reproductive, property, and citizenship 
rights, distribution of parliamentary constituency boundaries, tenant rights not to get forcefully 
evicted by landlords, and political and socioeconomic empowerment of marginalized ethnic and 
caste groups. Some of the achievements of the Interim Constitution were directly removed from 
the new draft, while others were masterfully diluted using clever word plays in Nepali language. 
Not only did the earthquakes distract the marginalized groups as they became less able and 
willing to object to the changes in the constitutional rights, the government also used the 
earthquakes and resulting crisis to pass a legislation that gave the Nepal Armed Police (APF) 
vast new powers to arrest and discretion to open fire in cases of looting, riots and disorder.175 
The earthquakes also showed that Maoist-Madhesi parties developed stronger ties as 
opposition during the NC-UML government and constitutional disagreement. However, they 
were mostly pragmatist and mainstream parts of the Maoists and Madhesi parties. Being part of 
the reconstruction government became much more important for politicians. Reconstruction 
meant building political capital. That is why the leaders moved swiftly to pass the new 
constitution. What these leaders would later find is that they did not have control over large 
segments of breakaway Maoist and Madhesi factions that considered the mainstream Maoist and 
Madhesi leaders were bought off by the establishment.176 
The earthquakes also revealed simmering problems with Nepal-international community 
relations. When Nepal’s government leaders felt they did not exercise much control over 
activities of international organizations and nonprofits, they attempted several measures to 
restore their influence. For example, on June 22, 2015, less than two months after the 
earthquakes, the government of Nepal declared the emergency phase was over. This led to re-
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imposition of customs check and taxes on aid materials imported from abroad leading to long 
queues and delays. As a response, the United Nations officials used a formal diplomatic method 
called “demarche” to directly inform the government of their concerns for earthquake victims 
who need shelter, food and basic medical help. 
The international norm for emergency relief phase is three months in which all imported 
shipments enter the country freely and without imposition of import duties and excise taxes. 
Nepal’s Finance Ministry official Madhu Marasini, who heads the Office of Coordination of 
International Economic Cooperation, stated that the office informed development partners 
categorically that all rescue and relief goods must be deposited in central warehouses of the 
government and distributed in coordination with government to avoid import taxes. The 
government of Nepal criticized international agencies and donor countries in not being 
transparent about their activities and how they are spending millions of dollars during their 
search and rescue operations. Nepal had been especially sensitive about its national sovereignty 
and also pressured by India and China not to allow foreign military powers near their borders 
even for search and rescue operations.177 
Nepal’s government leaders used local media outlets to mount serious challenges against 
the United Nations and development partners. For instance, Nepal’s domestic media widely 
reported that the food the WFP was distributing amounted to spoiled rice. The UN responded by 
criticizing domestic media for inaccurate reporting by arguing that a few hundred spoiled bags of 
rice should not be used to discredit the whole UN umbrella agencies. Some experts argued that 
the government as attempting to discredit the international agencies in an effort to deflect 
criticism on its ineffective disaster response. As Nepal’s government used new rules and 
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regulations to regain control over activities of international agencies, the latter complained that 
layers of bureaucratic red tape would allow government to engage in nontransparent and corrupt 
practices with relief funds and supplies (such as profiteering from supplies and directing funds to 
party supporters and cronies). Experts pointed out that the main problem with mainstream NC-
UML coalition led government and development partners emanated from pre-earthquake 
disagreements on donor funds and support going to promotion of human rights, democracy and 
ethnic inclusion, especially by the UN and Nordic country agencies.178 
There were especially sharp disagreements with Nepal’s establishment and the mandates 
of the UN Mission in Nepal and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights with 
respect to the peace process and transitional justice issues. Many in the Kathmandu 
establishment blamed development partners for stoking divisive ethnic anxiety and disunity in 
Nepal through their inclusion agenda.179 This dispute expanded into non-governmental agencies 
in the aftermath of the earthquakes, as on June 14, 2015, eight of the eleven national executive 
members of Amnesty International in Nepal resigned, protesting the organization’s favorable 
view of a Madhesi intellectual KC Raut who had led riots to improve Madhesi political rights by 
demanding a separate province for the Madhesi but was arrested on  treason charges by 
government.180 
 Many experts also pointed that development partners were complicit with Nepal’s 
political elite in the ineffectiveness of aid projects worth millions of dollars in the country. At the 
management and operational levels, development agencies and Nepal’s government were almost 
fused with respect to development policy, budget and program implementation. Development 
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partners are as Kathmandu-centric as Nepal’s government and do not have much impact outside 
of the valley.181 Many funds allocation for development projects disappeared in a nontransparent 
manner through “all-party mechanism” in Nepal’s districts whereby a coalition of unelected 
elites from major political parties allocated development funds among themselves. For example, 
hundreds of millions of dollars spent under the Local Government and Community Development 
Program that was supposed to build local infrastructure and governance and millions of dollars 
under the Nepal Peace Trust Fund that was supposed to help with conflict victims’ needs for 
reparation did not result in any tangible outcomes that can be observed.182 
Therefore, many internationals argued against the Nepal’s government proposed 
approach of reconstruction called one-window policy both at the center and the districts by 
arguing that it would lead to misuse of resources at both levels – political party-based 
appropriations at the center – National Reconstruction Authority – and “all-party mechanism” 
based corruption at the local level. In response, some experts and government officials in Nepal 
argued that many foreign agencies have expanded their operations by using earthquake 
emergency as pretext in a non-transparent manner in the past and that all donations must be 
channeled through government’s one-window approach to response and recovery in order to 
avoid problems of aid-dependency and crowding out local efforts by foreign experts and 
consultants who seem to value their expert evaluations more than local knowledge and practices 
(interviewee #; Ghimire and Robertson 2015;183 Wolbers et al. 2016).184 
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The dispute worsened as Nepal’s own institutions had disagreements. While the National 
Planning Commission (NPC) argued for reconstruction through regular inter-ministerial 
coordination in order to avoid billion-dollar duplication of existing bureaucratic arrangements, 
the Finance Ministry argued for centralized, one-stop shop style National Reconstruction 
Authority arguing that existing ministries have not even been able to spend their regular 
expenditure allocations.185 This likely speaks to factional divisions within political parties in 
Nepal, as both institutions were under the leadership of the Nepali Congress party. 
 
b) Announcement of Nepal’s Constitutional Deal 
By Saturday, June 6, 2015, merely 25 days after the May 12 earthquake and 42 days after the 
April 25 earthquake, it was apparent that the four largest political parties of Nepal had reached 
an agreement on the new constitution. These parties included two mainstream political parties 
Nepali Congress and UML, which had been running the government in coalition since February 
2015, and two main opposition parties – the UCPN-Maoist and the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-
Loktantrik (MJF-L). These four parties met with representatives of smaller parties from the 
Constituent Assembly at PM Koirala’s residence the same evening to convince the fringe parties 
in getting on board with the new constitutional deal. One of the NC leaders Ramesh Lekhak 
stated that the smaller parties responded positively to the new constitutional deal. 186 
On Tuesday, June 8, the Government of Nepal made a formal announcement that Nepal’s 
political leaders just reached a 16-point agreement to adopt a new constitution using a “super-
fast-track” approach. The Minister of Information Minendra Rijal stated that the devastating 
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earthquakes were powerful motivating forces for collaboration and the resulting agreement was a 
major breakthrough in the political system.187 
Box 1 below presents an unofficial translation of the 16-point deal signed by the four 
political party leaders in the night of Monday, June 7, 2015. 
 
Box 1. Sixteen-point Agreement of June 7, 2015 
 
1. The Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal will have eight provinces based on five 
criteria of identity and four criteria of capability. 
2. Two-thirds majority of provincial assemblies will name the provinces. 
3. The Nepal government will form a federal commission to recommend on demarcation 
of federal provinces. The commission will have tenure of six months. The Legislature-
Parliament will take a final decision on the demarcation with a two-thirds majority 
after the recommendation of the commission. 
 
Parliament and Electoral System 
4. There will be a bicameral parliament comprising federal legislature parliament and the 
upper house. Provincial parliaments will be unicameral. 
5. Mixed electoral system will be adopted for parliamentary election. There will be 275 
members in Parliament. There will be 165 constituencies based on geography and 
population. A total of 165 lower house members will be elected through first-past-the-
post (FPTP) system. The rest—110–will be elected through the proportional 
representation system. 
6. The upper house will have 45 members-40 of the members will be elected equally from 
each federal province. The remaining five will be nominated by President on the 
recommendation of the Council of Ministers. 
 
Form of Government 
7. To run the state affairs, a federal democratic republic multiparty parliamentary system 
of governance will be adopted. The leader of the party having a clear majority or 
having support of other parties in Parliament will become the executive prime minister. 
8. There will be a constitutional President in Nepal. An electoral college of the federal 
legislature parliament and provincial assemblies will elect the President. 
 
(The UCPN (Maoist) has its differences on the parliamentary system of governance and the 
constitutional president. Despite this, the party agrees to taking forward the constitution 
writing process.) 
 
                                                 
187 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/nepal-political-rivals-agree-national-charter-150609044704806.html 
 200 
9. After the promulgation of the new constitution, the election of the President, Vice 
President, Prime Minister, Speaker and Deputy Speaker will be held by the 
transformed Legislature-Parliament as per the Interim Constitution-2007. 
10. Until the next election of the House of Representatives, the transformed Legislature-
Parliament will hold the election of the Prime Minister, vote of confidence, no 
confidence motion and Cabinet formation as per the Interim Constitution-2007. The 
impeachment of the President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Speaker, Deputy 
Speaker will be in accordance with the Interim Constitution-2007. 
 
Judicial System 
11. An independent, impartial and efficient judicial system will be formed as per the 
concept of independent judiciary. 
12. The Supreme Court will be the court of record. It will be authorized to make final 
interpretation of the constitution. 
13. A Constitutional Court will be formed to settle disputes on the jurisdictions between 
the provinces and the Centre, between provinces, between provinces and local bodies, 
and election-related disputes of the House of Representatives, National Assembly and 
provincial assemblies. The Constitutional Court shall have the final decision on these 
issues. The court will be chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and will 
comprise two senior-most justices, and two legal experts who are qualified for the post 
of Supreme Court Justice. The tenure of the Constitutional Court will be 10 years from 
the promulgation of the new constitution. 
14. The provision on the formation of the Judicial Council will be as determined by the 
Interim Constitution-2007. 
15. The constitution writing process will be taken forward based on the spirit of this 
fundamental agreement on federalism, forms of government, electoral system, and 
judicial system. 
 
Local Body Election 
16. The election of local bodies will be held as soon as possible to strengthen the 
representation and participation of the people. 
 
Signatories: 
Sushil Koirala, Prime Minister and President, Nepali Congress 
KP Sharma Oli, Chairman, CPN-UML 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Chairman, UCPN-Maoist 
Bijay Kumar Gachhadar, Chairman, Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Loktantrik 
 
Source: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/16-
point_Agreement.htm 
 
After the failure of the January 22 deadline, there were some signs of political 
discussions among the leaders that the issues of number, boundaries and names of federal 
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provinces could be deferred into the future in order to adopt a constitution. The April-May 
earthquakes catalyzed this process and contributed to the parties reaching an agreement on the 
number of federal provinces – eight – and leaving the work on boundaries to a yet another 
federal commission that would come up with recommendations on how to draw the boundaries 
of the eight provinces within six months of promulgation of the new constitution. The names of 
the provinces would be determined by the provincial legislatures using a 2/3 voting rule. The 
Maoists were hard pressed to concede on the form of government, as they have had a 
longstanding demand to turn Nepal into a presidential system whereby the president of the 
country is directly elected by the people. To signify the importance of the issue and, perhaps, to 
show that they had made concessions, they included a note in the agreement that they came to 
the table and signed the agreement despite their differing views on the form of government.188 In 
addition, political parties, especially UML, Maoists and the Madhesi MJF-L agreed to form a 
national government after adopting the new constitution, as PM Koirala had promised to step 
down once the constitution is passed.189 As soon as the 16-point agreement was signed, the CA 
passed a resolution and mandated the Constitution Drafting Committee to prepare a draft of the 
new constitution within two weeks.190  
Just like the dominant segments of the Nepalese society, the international community 
positively reacted to the new development. On June 9, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations welcomed the 16-point agreement as significant milestone for Nepal’s political 
development. Reaffirming the continuing support of the United Nations to Nepal’s peace process 
and post-earthquake reconstruction, the Secretary-General encouraged the leaders of Nepal to 
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implement the 16-point agreement and continue to resolve the remaining issues while drafting 
the constitution with citizen input.191 
However, the Madhesi ethnic parties (apart from the MJF-L), conservative Hindu parties, 
and other smaller ethnic parties denounced the 16-point agreement as regressive, arguing that the 
new basic document would allow continuation of the marginalized communities’ suffering. The 
Maoist party attempted to get the dissenting parties on board, as they had been protesting 
together when the NC-UML attempted to pass the new constitution with 2/3 vote of the 
Constituent Assembly in January 2015. The Maoist leader Dahal stated on June 13 that he was 
confident in bringing the dissenting parties on board and revealed that they agreed to allow the 
next president to be from the Nepali Congress party, perhaps unintentionally giving out details 
that make the constitutional deal making process to look like a fight for public office.192 Five 
days later, on June 18, Deputy PM and the Home Minister Bamdev Gautam announced that the 
UML would form a new government once the new constitution is adopted with KP Sharma Oli 
as the prime minister.193 
Many experts also criticized the deal as regressive because many of the newly gained 
rights of the Interim Constitution of 2007 were rolled back, likening the process to the national 
movements of 1950 and 1990, in which cases resulting changed turned out to be too limited and 
a lot more like the status quo than what was expected to be achieved.194 
In the following days, several smaller parties representing marginalized ethnic 
communities and pro-federalism forces merged to more effectively launch their opposition of the 
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constitutional agreement. The Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Nepal (MJF-N), the Federal Socialist 
Party Nepal (FSPN), and the Khas Samabeshi Party merged to form the new Sanghiya 
Samajbadi Forum-Nepal (SSFN) party, under the leadership of MJF-N Chairman Upendra 
Yadav. They had a total of 15 seats in the 601-member Constituent Assembly and vowed to 
invite other smaller parties and independent lawmakers to join them.195 
Another blow of opposition came from one of the Supreme Court justices as it ruled on 
June 19 that the CA cannot pass a constitution without determining the number, names, and 
boundaries of federal provinces.196 The Supreme Court also opposed the attempts of the CA 
trying to establish a committee that would constantly monitor the apex court and also make it 
easier to remove judges. Joining the dispute, some Madhesi leaders argued that they would 
protest and walk out of the CA if a constitution was delivered without federal provinces in it. 
They opposed the idea of establishing provinces and their boundaries by a federal commission on 
a later date.197 Some criticized the move by arguing that the petitioner, lawyers, the judge were 
all Madhesi and therefore produced a ruling against the 16-point deal. They also criticized 
president, who is of Madhesi origin, to be taking the side of the Madhesi in the constitutional 
dispute.198 
In the meantime, Nepal’s government continued its activities to pursue donations for 
reconstruction. On June 25, the government hosted an international donors conference whereby 
foreign donors pledged aid to Nepal’s reconstruction. India pledged USD 1 billion, ADB 600 
million, World Bank 500 million, China 480 million, Japan 260 million, USAID 130 million, 
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and EU 112 million.199 Many domestic and international companies that were trying to get trade 
or production licenses in Nepal also contributed funds to the Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief 
Fund.200 Nepal’s government allocated about USD 715 million for reconstruction in its FY2015-
16 budget of about USD 8 billion, which was 32.6 percent greater than the FY2014-15 budget 
despite the fact that the government projected to collect only 93 percent of the revenue compared 
to the preceding fiscal year due to the earthquakes. The government also planned to provide 
50,000 young people with jobs during the reconstruction process.201 UML leaders complained 
that the government prepared the FY2015-16 budget without consulting with UML even though 
the two parties formed the coalition government.202 Home Minister Gautam (UML) announced 
that his party UML was mobilizing 50,000 party cadres to undertake rehabilitation and 
reconstruction activities for three days, while also encouraging donors to donate funds through 
government’s single-door policy to reconstruction.203 
 
c) New Constitution Draft and Public Feedback 
Three weeks following the 16-point agreement, on June 30, 2015, the Government of Nepal 
presented a draft constitution with 297 articles in the Constituent Assembly despite opposition by 
smaller political parties and the Supreme Court.204 In order to speed up the process of public 
consultations, on July 2, the CA passed a resolution to bypass the CA Regulation 93(3), which 
requires the CA to debate the constitution among its members before it can be published in Nepal 
Gazette for public feedback, so that the draft can be published in Nepal Gazette the morning of 
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July 3. The resolution passed despite protests by members of smaller political parties such as 
Federalist Socialist Forum Nepal, Terai Madhesi Loktantrik Party, Sadbhawana Party, Terai 
Madhes Sadbhawana Party, and RPP Nepal.205 
On July 7, the Chief Justice of Nepal’s Supreme Court stepped down and a new Chief 
Justice was sworn in the following day. Experts argued that the new Chief Justice has reputation 
for integrity and impartiality, as political party leaders were disgruntled by the recent Supreme 
Court decision that ordered the CA to produce a constitution that already defines the names and 
boundaries of federal provinces of Nepal. Experts argued that the Supreme Court should not 
intervene in politics and attempted to restrict the power of the institution in the new draft of the 
constitution.206 Moreover, the under the leadership of the previous Chief Justice, the Supreme 
Court produced dubious rulings, one which bailed out a jailed doctor who was arrested for 
embezzling funds from a hospital using a fake medical diploma.207 
Some experts argued that the new draft constitution lessened the power of the CIAA by 
eliminating the responsibility to conduct investigations on “improper conduct” of public 
officials. Both the 1990 Constitution and the 2007 Interim Constitutions had these 
responsibilities assigned to the agencies. This change will likely reduce the power of the agency, 
as it has recently investigated some political party leaders related to large-scale hydropower 
projects.208 Experts further argued that Maoists have become part of the mainstream political 
parties just like UML did in 1990s. While the grievances of the Nepalese are still there – which 
the Maoists used to successfully launch their political careers center stage, the fact that the new 
constitution sounds like a pre-2006 status quo is a bad omen for the ordinary Nepalese who still 
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suffer from Nepal’s inequality. No wonder why the international actors, even the ones that had 
animosity against communists in general – agreed with the Maoist demands for social and 
political reform in Nepal.209 
On July 16, the UML leader Nepal argued that they need to pass the constitution as soon 
as possible and conduct local elections. This attests to the fact that UML wanted to form a new 
government as soon as possible and take control of the reconstruction process and conduct the 
local elections in its watch while people are happy with reconstruction aid. The UML leader 
Nepal also said that the volunteering program that their party ran to help rebuild in villages was a 
successful program as it won people’s good grace.210 
On July 17, the Maoist leader Dahal went on a seven-day visit to India, meeting the 
foreign minister and the prime minister of India.211 The meetings were likely intended to 
reconcile issues related to the newly drafted constitution. Commenting on the newly drafted 
constitution, India’s Prime Minister Modi welcomed the progress but stated that he hoped 
outstanding issues would be resolved soon before the document is put up for vote so that all 
sections of the Nepalese society support the new constitution, which is important for building 
stable, inclusive, and prosperous Nepal.212 Both India and China had concerns regarding Nepal’s 
new constitution, especially with respect to ethnicity based federal provinces, which would send 
the wrong signal to Tibet as well as Nepali speaking populations of India’s West Bengal state. 
Especially with Modi’s rise in India and increasing Chinese influence in South Asia, the 
geopolitical competition had intensified. While India, in cooperation with the US strategy of 
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“democratic encirclement” of China, is attempting to further integrate South Asian nations into 
its orbit of economic and political influence, China has been investing in the region following its 
Silk Road infrastructure plan and geopolitical strategy of “pearl of strings” in South Asia.213 
Two days, July 20-21, were announced to be public holiday so that citizens could debate 
the constitution and attend public consultation meetings. All members of the Constituent 
Assembly and government officials were deployed to conduct public consultation meetings.214 In 
the same two days protests erupted in the Terai region of Nepal where Madhesi and Tharu ethnic 
communities did not support the new draft arguing that their rights are underrepresented in the 
new document. The newly formed Sanghiya Samajwadi Forum-Nepal (SSF-Nepal) took the lead 
in protests and mobilized Madhesi people to boycott the constitution writing process. In alliance 
with other parties such as the Samyukta Loktantrik Madhesi Morcha, SSF-Nepal called for 
alliance with more Madhesh-based fringe political parties to join forces in protesting the new 
document.215 
In the Madhesi city of Gaur, Rautahat, the cadres of Madhes-based parties threw chairs to 
a senior UML leader Madhav Kumar Nepal (who was a prime minister during the first 
Constituent Assembly) in protest to the constitution and the consultation process. Sadbhawana 
Party (SP) supporters also joined the protests throwing rocks to the former prime minister 
alleging that the Chairman of their party Anil Kumar Jha was not allowed to enter the 
consultation meeting. The police used tear gas to disperse the crowds. Other SP leaders also 
swore to not allow anti-Madhesh constitution and announced a general protest shutdown of the 
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Terai region.216 The Federal Socialist Forum Nepal, Terai-Madhes Loktantrik Party, Sadbhawana 
Party and Tarai-Madhes Sadbhawana Party also called for general shutdown protests across the 
Terai region claiming that police used excessive force against those holding peaceful 
demonstrations in during the public hearings on the draft constitution.217 
Hundreds of supporters of breakaway Maoist parties also protested and got arrested as 
they torched dozens of cars on the streets. They argued that the new constitution betrays the 
ideals of the revolution they fought to undo ethnic discrimination in Nepal. While the protests 
disrupted life and business in Kathmandu, many residents also complained about protesters’ 
disruptive activities, especially in the aftermath of the earthquakes when a lot of work needs to 
be done to rebuild the country.218 The conservative Hindu parties joined the dispute after a 
couple of days when a BJP MP from neighboring Indian state of Uttra Pradesh visited Nepal to 
deliver a speech in a Hindu event to demand that Nepal declared a Hindu State in the constitution 
and that religious conversion was prohibited by law.219 
On July 21, the Chief of Staff of the Nepal Army submitted a letter to the Constituent 
Assembly arguing that the Chief of Staff of the Army must be included in the National Security 
Council, which authorizes and mobilizes the army. The Chief of Staff also argued that the Public 
Service Commission need not get involved in recruitment of soldiers as the army already 
engages in competitive recruitment and that the CIAA need not investigate abuse among the 
military officials as the army already does that in accordance with the Nepal Army Act.220 The 
following day, a senior Nepali Congress leader and a former prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba 
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publicly stated that the Army Chief of Staff must have a place in the National Security Council, 
which is headed by the Prime Minister of Nepal. Deuba argued that as in the 1990 Constitution, 
in the new constitution it is important for the Nepal Army to be represented in the National 
Security Council that includes Ministers of Defense, Home, Finance, and Foreign Affairs.221 
Another contentious issue with the draft constitution that many Madhes based 
communities as well as pro-inclusion advocates in Nepal opposed was the restriction of 
citizenship for children through their mothers. The issues also galvanized many human rights 
agencies and pro-gender equality supporters to push for allowing citizenship through either 
mother or father of the child.222 
 
8.2.2. Governance System Within Two Years After the Earthquakes 
On July 27th, leaders of Nepali Congress, UML, and CPN-Maoist stated that during public 
hearings Nepali people did not like the word secularism in Nepal’s constitution. The CPN-
Maoist leader Dahal noted that the term sounds alien, and therefore they would consider 
replacing it with another word to respect feedback they received from the people on the draft 
constitution.223 This acknowledgment was in response to a street protest campaign of Hindu 
groups that erupted across Nepal to claim that Nepal must be enshrined as Hindu state in the 
constitution.224 The debate regarding the role of Hinduism in Nepal’s constitution was marred by 
a tragedy as one man was arrested who had reportedly sacrificed the life of his young son to 
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Hindu deities.225 Some argued that formerly discredited political leaders attempted to incite 
religious sentiments to find their way back into politics.226 In addition to Madhesi and Hindu 
protests, many activists of inclusive state for Nepal noted their disagreement with dilution of 
many fundamental rights for food, health, education, free press, special quotas for marginalized 
ethnic groups, and women’s rights in the constitution.227 228 229 
On July 30th, landslides in mountainous villages west of the earthquake epicenter Gorkha 
District killed at least 29 villagers. The monsoon season typically causes landslides in the 
mountainous areas and floods in the plains of Nepal. In the aftermath of the April and May 
earthquakes, monsoons were expected to cause more landslides and floods than usual.230 
On August 6th, a University of Cambridge professor Jeane-Philippe Avouac and his 
colleagues published the findings of their research on Nature Geoscience and Science Magazine 
that indicated that western Nepal and northern India could be rocked by another powerful 
earthquake due to a partial release of the built-up energy at the Main Himalayan Thrust in the 
April/May earthquakes.231 232 In an interview with the BBC, Professor Avouac noted that it is 
important to raise awareness without scaring people to train children with earthquake drills.233 
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On August 13th, Nepali government leaders reached an agreement and appointed Govind 
Raj Pokhrel as CEO of the National Reconstruction Authority. Pokhrel was the vice president of 
the National Planning Commission and oversaw the production of the Post-Disaster Needs 
Assessment report prepared for the June 25th Donor Conference.234 UML leader KP Oli and 
Nepali Congress leader and Prime Minister Sushil Koirala were each endorsing different 
candidates and therefore appointment of the CEO got delayed since the government ordinance 
was introduced on June 21st to create the National Reconstruction Authority. CPN-Maoist and 
MJF-Democratic party leaders objected to the ordinance introduced by the NC-UML 
government on the grounds that it should be established through a parliamentary legislation.235 
While the NRA was established in time for the donor conference, it had to be ratified by the 
Constituent Assembly by August 31st. The speaker of the CA reconvened the body after its 
summer recess only on September 1, effectively rendering the NRA legally non-existent. It took 
the political parties another three months to debate and agree on the legislation, which was 
finally passed on December 20th and signed into law by Nepal’s president on December 25th. The 
legislation established the NRA with Sushil Gyawali as its CEO. The body was to be government 
by the Prime Minister as the chairman of the governing committee and the leader of the main 
parliamentary opposition as the vice-chairman of the committee.236 
By the end of August, Nepal’s government re-opened Mount Everest for tourism. Many 
tourism agencies started a campaign to encourage tourists to visit Nepal pointing out the country 
needs tourism revenue to rebuild.237 
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On August 8th, major political party leaders agreed on the boundaries of Nepal’s federal 
provinces. Even though the earlier deal had foreseen eight federal provinces, Nepal’s leaders 
came up with six federal provinces. Mid-Western and Far-Western areas erupted in protests as 
Karnali districts refused to be part of two provinces and demanded a province for the group.238 In 
the following three days, local administration officials in protest-affected districts imposed 
curfews during daytime with police and armed police force personnel enforcing it. Three people 
died in clashes with law enforcement.239 In contrast, Madhesi areas of the Terai was relatively 
calm, as many Madhesi leaders were waiting to see the main four leaders to make revisions to 
the six-province model.240 However, starting August 17th, Madhesi parties declared indefinite 
shutdown protests in the Terai.241 
Some argued that Karnalils got a province of their own because dominant leaders such as 
Sher Bahadur Deuba (NC), Bhim Rawal (UML) and Lekhraj Bhatta (UCPN-Maoist) supported 
this move and these districts were under the influence of the mainstream leaders of Nepal. In 
contrast, Tharu and Madhesi communities did not get a province because the ruling elite of 
Nepal would lose their dominant positions if they accorded these groups provinces.242 
By August 24th, protests against the demarcation of Nepal into six provinces intensified 
in Far-West districts of Nepal. Fifty people were injured, and seven police officers and a young 
boy were killed in Tikapur district in what the Home Minister of Nepal stated a premeditated 
attack by Maoist extremists. The Nepal Army was mobilized under the leadership of the Chief 
District Officer of affected districts.243 
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On September 13th the Constituent Assembly started the process of voting to adopt the 
new constitution clause by clause with 2/3 majority. On September 16th, the Constituent 
Assembly finalized its voting and adopted the new constitution. On September 18th, the Speaker 
of the Constituent Assembly signed the constitution. On September 20th, the President of Nepal 
signed and promulgated the new constitution of Nepal. 
In the evening of September 16th, the Ambassador of India in Nepal Ranjit Rae requested 
Prime Minister Sushil Koirala and President Ram Baran Yadav to postpone the promulgation of 
the constitution. On September 18th, Indian Prime Minister Modi’s special envoy Foreign 
Secretary S. Jaishankar arrived in Kathmandu and demanded the postponement of the 
constitution.244 
On September 24th, Kathmandu Post published that Nepal-bound cargoes were halted at 
the Indian side of the border citing order from New Delhi.245 October 11, K.P. Oli was voted as 
the new Prime Minister in Nepal’s parliament.246 October 28, Bidya Devi Bhandari was voted as 
the new president (first woman to be Nepal’s president).247 
 In interviews with experts in Nepal, discussions of organizational capacity occurred 55 
times, rendering the concept second most discussed in the interviews. Figure 32 below shows a 
visualization of the semantic network of organizational capacity as revealed by expert 
interviews. The majority of the mentions of the concept occurred in the context of the need for 
increased information collection, exchange, and use of governance actors in Nepal. An integrated 
information database can be used not only to collect and monitor post-earthquake reconstruction 
but also to make government officials accountable by registering their salaries and property 
                                                 
244 https://scroll.in/article/757547/has-modis-neighbourhood-first-model-forgotten-about-nepal 
245 https://scroll.in/article/757879/india-is-unhappy-with-nepal-but-insists-it-has-not-shut-the-border 
246 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/world/asia/nepal-elects-kp-sharma-oli-as-new-prime-minister.html 
247 http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2015-10-28/bhandari-elected-first-woman-prez.html 
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ownership by making it transparent to the public and easily detectable when corruption occurs 
(Interviewee #2). 
 The majority of experts discussed how the earthquakes contributed to the building of 
necessary informational capacity to improve Nepal’s governance system. Several government 
agencies such as the Central Bureau of Statistics, the National Information Technology Center 
and the Nepal Armed Police Force improved their data centers by launching new, disaster-safe 
database systems financed by donors like the World Bank, Chinese government, and the Korea 
International Cooperation Agency (Interviewee #6, #8, and #19). Some of the improved 
informational infrastructure and tools are already being used for other governance projects to 
improve public participation in municipal development projects and reducing disaster risk in 
districts that were not affected by the earthquakes but might be affected by future earthquakes 
(Interviewee #19). In the judiciary sector, the realization that all files could be lost and the 
importance of improving access to courts for residents in remote areas who need to appeal for 
reconstruction subsidies has pushed the system to digitize its files and launch e-courts 
(Interviewee #34). 
 Experts also pointed out the importance of organizational capacity for political parties to 
undertake policy reforms in Nepal’s governance. In this contexts, experts noted that political 
parties that had greater organizational capacity with respect to managing public information 
(propaganda) as well as internal information among its cadre and branches such as UML and 
CPN-Maoist were able to take advantage of the post-earthquake environment and improved their 
influence as opposed to Nepali Congress, which had lower organizational capacity with respect 
to information dissemination and control among its party members (Interviewee # 4 and #31). 
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Figure 32. Semantic Network of Organizational Capacity in Expert Interviews  
 
Note: Atlas.ti software was used to create the visualization with the author’s interview data. 
 
 The concept of organizational capacity co-occurred with other concepts such as resource 
capacity, social trust, social learning, leadership, and initial conditions, indicating that changes in 
organizational capacity interact with changes in resource capacity and social trust to affect 
governance reforms and institutional capacity building in Nepal. Table 24 below shows the 
number and standardized measure of co-occurrence of organizational capacity with its 
neighboring concepts.  
 
Table 24. Co-Occurrence of Organizational Capacity in Expert Interviews  
 216 
 
Note: The table was produced using the author’s interview data with Atlas.ti software. 
 
8.3. Summary 
This chapter analyzed how the changes in the levels of organization capacity within Nepal’s 
governance system – increased level of interorganizational connectivity among the actors of 
Nepal’s governance system and their enhanced capacity for information collection, exchange, 
and use following the 2015 earthquakes – have contributed to governance reforms and improved 
governance capacity in Nepal. Because disaster response and post-disaster reconstruction 
requires large-scale efforts in collecting, exchanging, processing and using information to make 
policy and governance decisions, Nepal’s post-disaster information capacity enhanced 
significantly. Such informational capacity has had spillover effects as governance actors started 
using the same tools and techniques to address other policy and governance problems. As a 
critical component of organizational capacity, informational capacity has enhanced significantly 
in Nepal’s governance system as a result of massive earthquakes and large-scale effort to 
respond and rebuild afterwards. The chapter also showed that actors that had greater pre-disaster 
organizational capacity had greater opportunity to further increase their capacity in the post-
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disaster governance system of Nepal due to increased levels of resources and changes in the 
governance system that solidified their rights and privileges. 
 In this chapter, the complementary nature of the expert interview data and the GDELT 
data has come into play as interorganizational network data shows increased levels of 
connections among governance actors and the expert interview data shedding light on increased 
capacity to collect, analyze and share information in post-disaster Nepal. While the GDELT v.1 
data has some limitations with respect to coverage of subnational governance actors, future 
research should look at the newly released v.2 of the dataset to see if interorganizational 
networks in Nepal’s governance system would have any subnational components as it related to 
post-earthquake organizational capacity and constitutional reforms in Nepal. 
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9.0 CONCLUSION 
9.1. Summary of Findings 
Research presented in this dissertation demonstrates that large-scale natural disasters can have 
critical impact on governance systems of low-income, fragile states. Using a complex adaptive 
systems perspective and the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal, the dissertation documented how post-
earthquake constitutional reform and changes in adaptive capacity of Nepal’s governance system 
can be traced back to changes in the disaster response network, resource capacity, social trust, 
and organizational capacity.  
Using field observations, expert interviews, and knowledge graph data from media 
contextualization database Global Data on Events, Locations and Tone (GDELT), Chapter 5 
showed that the disaster response network following the massive 2015 earthquakes in Nepal was 
dominated by international multilateral and bilateral governmental institutions as measured by 
centrality scores. Perceived loss of control in the disaster response network to Indian and UN 
actors led government officials and political party leaders in Nepal to attempt to regain control of 
the disaster governance network. Within a month of the earthquakes, the government of Nepal 
ended the emergency phase of the response and re-imposed import duties to all the incoming 
goods at the customs, while also trying to control operations of foreign organizations in Nepal. 
Moreover, the government required that financial donations go through the Prime Minister’s 
Disaster Relief Fund or Nepal’s central bank. Political party leaders attempted to reignite 
nationalism, anti-India sentiment, and self-sufficiency narratives to regain control of the 
situation. 
Chapter 6 analyzed the impact of the 2015 earthquakes on resource capacity of Nepal’s 
governance system using mixed-methods and multiple sources of evidence. In so doing, it 
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described the pre-disaster level of resource capacity in Nepal and analyzed disaster donations 
data that documents mobilization of resources by Nepali actors as well as their international 
partners in the UN system and multilateral development organizations. The chapter also used 
financial statistics provided in government and nongovernmental organization reports as well as 
expert interview data to show how the fiscal, economic, and human resource capacity of Nepal 
compares before and after the earthquakes. Incentives to command these resources and the 
increased resource capacity has increased the capacity of Nepal’s governance system and 
facilitated the adoption of the new constitution and implementation of administrative reforms to 
implement the federal constitution that mandates the creation of central, provincial, and local 
bodies of authority. Increased level of resource capacity has contributed to adaptation of the 
system in the post-disaster environment and allowed the Nepali actors to gain more autonomy 
with respect to internal policy decisions as well as in managing their diplomatic ties. 
Chapter 7 provided an analysis of how the 2015 earthquakes affected governance reforms 
and institutional capacity building in Nepal through changes in social trust. Social trust is critical 
for any governance system to function effectively because in the absence of social trust the 
necessary level of interaction and cooperation among the units of the system cannot be sustained 
in decentralized governance systems that rely on both vertical and horizontal connections. Social 
trust, in combination with resource capacity and organizational capacity, is an important micro- 
and meso-level mechanism that contributes to macro-level changes in the laws and structures 
that shape governance systems. In post-earthquake Nepal, sudden increases in social trust created 
a window of opportunity for drastic measures such as the passage of the new constitution in the 
face of resistance by powerful external actors like India that has historically challenged Nepal 
with border blockades from time to time when all other levers of influence did not materialize. 
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The chapter traced pre-post changes in social trust in Nepal using published reports and articles 
as well as primary expert interview data and secondary citizen feedback surveys of relief and 
recovery activities in earthquake affected districts of Nepal. 
Chapter 8 demonstrated that increased levels of organization capacity within Nepal’s 
governance system – increased level of interorganizational connectivity among the actors of 
Nepal’s governance system and their enhanced capacity for information collection, exchange, 
and use following the 2015 earthquakes have contributed to governance reforms and enhanced 
governance capacity in Nepal. Because disaster response and post-disaster reconstruction 
requires large-scale efforts in collecting, exchanging, processing and using information to make 
policy and governance decisions, Nepal’s post-disaster information capacity enhanced 
significantly. Such informational capacity has had spillover effects as governance actors started 
using the same tools and techniques to address other policy and governance problems. As a 
critical component of organizational capacity, informational capacity has enhanced significantly 
in Nepal’s governance system as a result of massive earthquakes and large-scale effort to 
respond and rebuild afterwards. The chapter also shows that actors that had greater pre-disaster 
organizational capacity had greater opportunity to further increase their capacity in the post-
disaster governance system of Nepal due to increased levels of resources and changes in the 
governance system that solidified their rights and privileges. 
 
9.2. Implications for Theory 
The dissertation contributes to scholarship in social and policy sciences by marrying the disaster 
policy and management theories with networked governance and institutional change literatures 
in developing country context. In disaster politics literature, following Pelling and Dill (2010), 
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Daubers (2013), and Roberts (2013), this dissertation has maintained that large-scale natural 
disaster must be studied as critical junctures because the window of opportunity created by such 
extreme events in the spheres of resources, social trust, and organizational capacity can allow 
governance actors to enact fundamental changes to the rules and structures of governance 
systems. While the dissertation has provided analysis of disaster response and early recovery, its 
goal was going beyond the disaster policy and management to observe changes in the broader 
political system. In that sense the dissertation goes beyond Birkland’s (1998) model of 
organizational learning by studying systemwide learning outside of the boundaries of disaster 
policy and management. 
 In international development and political economy literature, scholars have often 
focused on conflicts and post-conflict rebuilding to understand governance systems in 
developing countries. This dissertation has argued that catastrophic natural disasters and large-
scale efforts to respond and rebuild can have fundamental consequences for governance systems. 
Many scholars do study resource capacity, social trust, and organizational capacity as they relate 
to changes in governance institutions. As natural disasters increase due to changes in the global 
environment, more basic research will be needed to better understand the processes through 
which disasters and conflicts co-occur and engender contentious politics and social movements 
that can have consequences for macro-level political and economic outcomes.  
 
9.3. Implications for Policy and Management 
Catastrophic natural disasters and their consequential impact on governance systems are not new 
to Nepal. The Great Bihar earthquake of 1934, the 1954 floods, and the 1988 earthquake in 
Nepal were followed by tumultuous political processes and enhanced governance capacity in 
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dealing with such crises. The latter event was followed by an official economic blockade by 
India that lasted for two years to weaken the regime of King Birendra when the enacted 
economic and diplomatic policies of the king did not satisfy the government of Indira Gandhi 
(Koirala 1990). However, a comprehensive search of the English language literature in the 
United State and Nepal did not result in any research that systematically examined the 
relationship with catastrophic natural disasters and changes in the policies and governance 
institutions of Nepal. This dissertation aimed at filling this gap in knowledge. 
 Just as pre-disaster prevention and preparedness efforts are key to reducing disaster 
impact, understanding how natural disasters affect resource capacity, social trust, and 
organizational capacity prior to the disaster is critical for political and economic actors in 
Nepal’s governance system so that they can better manage policy and management problems. 
For example, Nepal’s governance leaders could have predicted a strong reaction by the Indian 
government and foreseen the border blockade. Such an expectation could have allowed the 
Nepali actors to increase their supplies of food, medicine, fuel, and other essential in case 
movement of goods are obstructed at the border.  
 In disaster policy and management arena, there has been significant social learning across 
all types of actors in Nepal. Families and businesses have reconstructed their buildings in 
accordance with earthquake safety guidelines providing in Nepal’s Building Code. Construction 
companies have become much stricter in their building practices and local government offices 
more diligent in enforcing zoning and building laws. School children have learned more about 
how to cope with earthquake induced economic and emotional suffering. Organizations have 
acquired new resources, knowledge, trust, and information systems to better understand and 
reduce risk from large scale organizations. While such improvement is relative to the prior 
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conditions, there is still much more work that needs to be done. I hope that as Nepali leaders and 
citizens continue to debate reforming public institutions that address problems of risk reduction 
and disaster response, they allocate appropriate time, attention, and human and technological 
resources to make Nepal a more robust and resilient country against natural hazards. 
 
9.4. Limitations and Future Research 
I hope future research contributes to further advancement of knowledge in our understanding of 
models of post-disaster governance reform. While this dissertation has looked at short and 
medium-term effects of the 2015 earthquakes on Nepal’s governance system, with the passage of 
time I hope to collect more data and examine longer term effects of the earthquake on Nepal’s 
resource capacity, social trust, and organizational capacity. 
Moreover, comparative research design is essential to advance our knowledge on general 
principles of post-governance reform. In my future work, I hope to use a comparative method to 
understand why post-2010 Haitian governance system was not able to strengthen its governance 
system as much as Nepal has been able to do. An equally fruitful way to improve scientific 
insights to include more cases from the same country’s history. I hope to collaborate with Nepali 
historians to better understand the effects of past disasters such as the 1934 and 1988 earthquakes 
and the 1954 floods on Nepal’s governance system. Within and between case comparisons 
provide more generalizable insights as to the extent to which Nepal’s governance system 
successfully adapted to the post-disaster environment by conducting organizational reform in 
multi-risk environment that not only included aftershocks, monsoons, winters, and droughts but 
also social unrest and high risk of political instability. 
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While GDELT data is useful in understanding interorganizational structure of Nepal’s 
governance system from a larger context, it has limitations with respect to understanding the role 
of smaller and local level organizations. To the extent this was an issue with respect to arriving at 
micro- and meso-level logics of action and mechanisms of change, expert interviews as well as 
other supplementary data sources described in the methods chapter were used to fill the gap. 
Because of the complementary nature of all datasets used in this mixed-methods dissertation, a 
rich understanding of the context as well as the preferences and actions of governance actors due 
to surveys, news articles, field research and expert interviews complement the 
interorganizational network analysis that used the GDELT data. Expert interviews validated the 
GDELT analysis findings by providing more detailed and nuanced evidence on how the 2015 
earthquakes have increased resource capacity, social trust, and organizational capacity in Nepal. 
Future research should explore using the version 2 of the GDELT Global Knowledge Graph 
database as it would include Nepali language news and social media data in addition to the 
English language content. Nepali language content would undoubtedly cover more subnational 
level governance actors in Nepal. 
In future research, scholars are encouraged to compare the GDELT graph data with 
human coded network data from news articles, financial statements of donation exchanges 
among organizations, and extraction of networks from web hyperlinks. More formal methods of 
comparison such as Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) and Exponential Random Graphs 
(ERGs) would allow one to check if macro and micro level network structures across different 
measures of the network provide similar results (e.g., Lai and Hsu 2018). 
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APPENDIX A.  LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED IN EXPERT INTERVIEWS
Organization Sector 
Armed Police Force Government 
Attorney General’s Office Government 
Auditing Firm Private sector 
Bilateral Development Contractor Bilateral development agency/contractor 
British College Academia 
Community for Self-Reliance Center Nonprofit sector 
Construction firm Private sector 
Construction firm Private sector 
Democracy Resource Center Nonprofit sector 
Department of Standards and Metrology Government 
Evidence for Policy Design Academia 
Florida International University Academia 
Institute of Crisis Management Studies Academia 
Kathmandu Engineering College Academia 
Kathmandu Living Labs Nonprofit sector 
Kathmandu School of Law Academia 
Kathmandu University Academia 
Ministry of Agriculture, Land Management and Cooperatives Government 
Ministry of Finance Government 
National Information Technology Center Government 
National Planning Commission Government 
National Reconstruction Authority Government 
National Society for Earthquake Technology Nonprofit sector 
Nepal Academy of Science and Technology Academia 
Nepal Government Office of Architecture Government 
Nepal Police Government 
Nepal Red Cross Society Nonprofit sector 
Nepal Seismological Center Government 
Nepali Congress Political party 
Rotary Club of Mount Everest Nonprofit sector 
Search and Rescue Consultant Private sector 
South Asia Institute of Advanced Studies Think tank 
Tourism firm Private sector 
Transparency International Nepal Nonprofit sector 
Tribhuvan University Academia 
UN Development Program Nepal Multilateral development agency 
US Agency for International Development Bilateral development agency/contractor 
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APPENDIX B.  LIST OF QUESTIONS USED IN SEMI-STRUCTURED EXPERT 
INTERVIEWS 
1. What is your role within your organization? 
2. What is the role of your organization within the governance system of Nepal?248 
3. In what ways and to what extent have the 2015 earthquakes affected your organization? 
a. How have the earthquakes and relief and reconstruction processes affected the 
capacity of your organization? 
b. How did the earthquakes affect the clients and stakeholders of your organization? 
c. What are the social and economic characteristics of your clients and stakeholders? 
4. How did the earthquakes affect your partner organizations and your relationships with 
them? 
5. How would you compare the impact of previous earthquakes and the 2015 earthquakes? 
Has Nepal’s governance capacity improved since then? Or has it lessened? 
6. If another earthquake happens in Nepal, would the Nepalese governance institutions 
respond better or worse? 
7. How did the earthquakes affect the constitutional process in Nepal? Has the effect been 
positive or negative? Why? 
8. How did the earthquakes affect Nepal’s relations with its neighbors? Has the effect been 
positive or negative?  Why? 
9. How did the earthquakes affect civil society organizations in Nepal? Has the effect been 
positive or negative?  Why? 
10. How did the earthquakes affect Nepal’s relations with international organizations such as 
the UN and World Bank? 
11. What is the primary service area for your organization; urban or rural? 
12. How have the earthquakes affected your community/neighborhood? 
13. What training and skills are needed by your organization to carry out its work with clients 
and stakeholders? 
                                                 
248 For interviewees, governance system was defined as a system of rule in which not only political/state actors but 
also non-state actors such as NGOs, private firms, citizen groups, and international development partners play 
crucial roles in policy making and implementation (Ansell and Gash 2008). 
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14. What methods does your organization use to communicate internally and externally?249 
APPENDIX C. LIST OF VARIABLES OF THE CITIZEN FEEDBACK SURVEYS 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Description 
District District 
vdc_muni VDC or Municipality 
ward  Ward  
Age Age 
Gender Gender 
caste_ethnicity Caste ethnicity 
other_caste If other, what is your caste? 
Occu Occupation 
other_occu If other occupation 
health_problem Do you have any health problem 
1  1 Are your main problems being addressed? 
1a  1a What is your biggest problem? 
1a other If other, what is your biggest problem? 
1b  1b What is your second biggest problem? 
1b other If other, what is your second biggest problem? 
1c What is your third biggest problem? 
1c other If other, what is your third biggest problem? 
2 Are you satisfied with what the government is doing for you after the earthquakes? 
2a What is the first reason you not satisfied with government? 
2a other If other top reasons 
2b other What is the second reason you are not satisfied with government? 
2b other If other second reason 
3 Do you have the information you need to get relief and support?  
3a What is the top thing that you need information about? 
3a other If other top need information 
3b What is the second most important thing that you need information about? 
3b other If other, second need for information 
4 Are you satisfied with what NGOs are doing for you after the earthquake?  
4a What is the first reason you not satisfied with NGO support? 
4a other If other, top reason for dissatisfaction with NGOs 
4b What is the second reason you are not satisfied with NGOs? 
4b other If other, second reason for dissatisfaction with NGO 
5 Are you Prepared for winter? 
5a What is the main reason you feel you are not prepared? 
5a other If other why not prepared? 
6 Do you have problems related to children in your household or family in the post-
earthquake period?  
6a What is the main problem for the children? 
6a other If other What is the main problem for the children? 
6b What is the second top problem for the children? 
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6b other If other What is the second top problem for the children? 
7 Overall is the post-earthquake relief effort making progress?  
8 Do you feel there has been an increase in the environment of tension or risk of 
violence or harassment since the earthquake? 
8a Who has this increased risk come from? 
8a other If others Who has this increased risk come from? 
9 Do you feel that the children in your family are in a safe place while attending 
school?  
10 Do you need to rebuild repair or retrofit your home because of damage caused by 
earthquakes? 
10a Where do you plan to get the resources or funds to rebuild/repair /retrofit your home? 
10a other If other, where do you plan to do? 
10b What factors do you base your rebuild/repair/ retrofitting decisions on? 
10b other If other, what factors do you baser decisions on? 
11 Do you feel your community has recovered from the earthquake?  
11a What is the main thing your community to recover? 
11a other If other, what is the main thing your community to recover? 
11b What is the second main thing your community recover? 
11b other If other, what is the second main thing your community recover? 
 
Source: https://data.humdata.org/showcase/nepal-earthquake-citizen-perception-survey  
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APPENDIX D. DISTRIBUTION OF STATISTICS FOR DISASTER RESPONSE NETWORK
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: These measures and charts were created using Gephi 0.9.2 software
  
 230 
APPENDIX E. LIST OF LABELS AND DESCRIPTIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
DISASTER REPONSE NETWORK 
Label Description 
AAI Alpine Ascents International 
AC Adventist Church 
AD Adventist Development 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
AE Australian Embassy 
AG Advisory Group 
AHF American Himalayan Foundation 
AI Amnesty International 
AIIB Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank 
AJJDC American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 
AJWS American Jewish World Service 
ALCF Alex Lowe Charitable Foundation 
AM Affairs Ministry 
ANA Afghan National Army 
ASEAN Asian Association For Regional Cooperation 
AST Assistance Survey Team 
AU African Union 
AWNN Animal Welfare Network Of Nepal 
BA British Army 
BAG British Army Gurkhas 
BDS Blue Diamond Society 
BE British Embassy 
BIS Bureau Of Indian Standards 
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party 
BLIA Buddha Light International Association 
CAAN Civil Aviation Authority Of Nepal 
CAF Canadian Armed Forces 
CC1 Catholic Church 
CC2 Culture Centre 
CCV Communication Centre Vehicles 
CDART Canada Disaster Assistance Response Team 
CDC Constitution Drafting Committee 
CE Chinese Embassy 
CFA Commission For Asia 
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CIS China International Search 
CMC Crisis Management Committee 
CO Cultural Organization 
COC Coordination Centre 
COI Commission Of Inquiry 
COM Council Of Ministers 
CONI Confederation Of Nepalese Industries 
CP Cheshire Police 
CPON Communist Party Of Nepal 
CPONM Communist Party Of Nepal Maoist 
CRG Contingency Response Group 
CRS Catholic Relief Services 
CTMA China Tibet Mountaineering Association 
CWO Commonwealth Office 
DA Development Agenda 
DABS Dar Al Ber Society 
DART Disaster Assistance Response Team 
DB Development Bank 
DC Development Canada 
DDMA Delhi Disaster Management Authority 
DDRC District Disaster Relief Committee 
DEC Disaster Emergency Committee 
DM Defense Ministry 
DOD Department Of Defense 
DOFA Department Of Foreign Affairs 
DOH Department Of Hydrology 
DOHS Department Of Homeland Security 
DRCC Disaster Relief Coordination Centre 
DRF Disaster Relief Fund 
DRT Disaster Response Team 
DTF Donor Trust Fund 
DWB Doctors Without Borders 
EBC Everest Base Camp 
EC European Commission 
EGU European Geosciences Union 
EMSC European Mediterranean Seismological Center 
EP European Parliament 
ETC Emergency Telecommunications Cluster 
EU European Union 
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FA Foreign Affairs 
FFM French Foreign Ministry 
FM Foreign Ministry 
FO Foreign Office 
FONCO Federation Of Nepalese Chambers Of Commerce 
GH Global Health 
GP Green Party 
GPF Global Peace Foundation 
GW Gurkha Welfare 
HDI Human Development Index 
HFHI Habitat For Humanity International 
HM Home Ministry 
HRA Himalayan Rescue Association 
HRC Human Rights Council 
HRW Human Rights Watch 
HSI Humane Society International 
IA Indian Army 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IAEE Indian Army Everest Expedition 
IAF Indian Air Force 
IC International Cooperation 
ICFIM International Centre For Integrated Mountain Development 
ICFTR International Committee For The Red Cross 
ICONR International Conference On Nepal Reconstruction 
ID International Development 
IDF Israel Defense Forces 
IE1 Indian Embassy 
IE2 Irish Embassy 
IE3 Israel Embassy 
IEA Indian External Affairs 
IF Intrepid Foundation 
IFM Israel Foreign Ministry 
IFOTR International Federation Of The Red Cross 
IHAM India Home Affairs Ministry 
IHC International Humanitarian City 
IIOMS India Institute Of Medical Sciences 
IMC International Medical Corps 
IMD India Meteorological Department 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
 233 
IMG International Mountain Guides 
IN Indian Navy 
INCMC India National Crisis Management Committee 
INDMA India National Disaster Management Authority 
INDRF India National Disaster Response Force 
INSA India National Security Advisor 
IOC Indian Oil Corporation 
IOFM International Organization For Migration 
IPOCC Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change 
IR Indian Railways 
IRAMT India Rapid Action Medical Team 
IRC International Red Cross 
IRT International Relief Teams 
IS1 Immigration Services 
IS2 International Search 
ISST Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team 
IUHM India Union Home Ministry 
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency 
JM Justice Ministry 
JUSN Jubilee United States Network 
KC Korean Church 
KCC Khumbu Climbing Center 
KMC Kathmandu Medical College 
KMD Kolkata Meteorological Department 
LACFD Los Angeles County Fire Department 
LI Lexington Institute 
LNP Langtang National Park 
LWR Lutheran World Relief 
MAG Marine Aircraft Group 
MC1 Marine Corps 
MC2 Mercy Corps 
MDG Millennium Development Goals 
ME1 Malaysian Embassy 
ME2 Marine Expeditionary 
MEBC Mount Everest Base Camp 
MF MetLife Foundation 
MFA Ministry Of Foreign Affairs 
MOC Ministry Of Culture 
MOD Ministry Of Defence 
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MOE Ministry Of Education 
MOEA Ministry Of External Affairs 
MOFA Ministry Of Federal Affairs 
MOH Ministry Of Health 
MOHA Ministry Of Home Affairs 
MOS Ministry Of Science 
MOT Ministry Of Tourism 
MOUD Ministry Of Urban Development 
MRCS Malaysian Red Crescent Society 
MSF Medecins Sans Frontieres 
NA Nepal Army 
NAP Nepal Armed Police 
NC Nepali Congress 
NCR National Capital Region 
NE Nepal Embassy 
NEOC National Emergency Operation Center 
NERF Nepal Earthquake Relief Fund 
NG National Guard 
NGRI National Geophysical Research Institute 
NHM Nepal Home Ministry 
NMA Nepal Mountaineering Association 
NMOH Nepal Ministry Of Health 
NP Nepal Police 
NPC National Planning Commission 
NRA National Reconstruction Authority 
NRB Nepal Rastra Bank 
NRCS Nepal Red Cross Society 
NRF National Reconstruction Fund 
NS National Societies 
NSC1 National Seismological Centre 
NSC2 National Security Council 
NSFET National Society For Earthquake Technology 
NTA Nepal Telecommunications Authority 
NZD New Zealand Defence 
NZHC New Zealand High Commission 
OBI Operation Blessing International 
OI Oxfam International 
OSU Oregon State University 
PA1 Pakistan Army 
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PA2 Promotion Authority 
PA3 Public Affairs 
PAF Pakistan Air Force 
PAFH Pakistan Army Field Hospital 
PI Plan International 
PIUK Plan International United Kingdom 
PL Propulsion Laboratory 
PP Pacific Partnership 
PRF PM Relief Fund 
RA Relief Agency 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RBAF Royal Brunei Armed Forces 
RC Response Centre 
RCM1 Red Cross Movement 
RCM2 Red Crescent Movement 
RCSOC Red Cross Society Of China 
RF1 Relief Fund 
RF2 Russian Federation 
RMAF Royal Malaysian Air Force 
RMI Rainier Mountaineering Inc 
RPP Rastriya Prajatantra Party 
RSUH Royal Stoke University Hospital 
RT Relief Trust 
RTAF Royal Thai Armed Forces 
SA Salvation Army 
SAF1 Singapore Air Force 
SAF2 Singapore Armed Forces 
SC1 Supreme Court 
SC2 Security Council 
SCD Singapore Civil Defence 
SDG Sustainable Development Goals 
SF Seva Foundation 
SH Scripps Health 
SP Singapore Police 
SPCC Sagarmatha Pollution Control Committee 
SPR Services Public Relations 
SVA Student Volunteer Army 
TD Technology Directorate 
TF Task Force 
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TI1 Teams International 
TI2 Textron Inc 
TIA Tribhuvan International Airport 
TICOF Third International Conference On Financing For Development 
TPP Trans Pacific Partnership 
TR Team Rubicon 
TRC Tourism Recovery Committee 
TUTH Tribhuvan University Teaching Hospital 
U USAID 
UA US Army 
UAF US Air Force 
UC1 US Congress 
UC2 University Of California 
UCERF UN Central Emergency Response Fund 
UCF UN Children Fund 
UDFID UK Department For International Development 
UDP UN Development Program 
UE US Embassy 
UFAAO UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
UHAS UN Humanitarian Air Service 
UHDI UN Human Development Index 
UHRC UN Human Rights Council 
UKIS United Kingdom International Search 
UN United Nations 
UOA University Of Adelaide 
UOC University Of Cambridge 
UOFTC UN Office For The Coordination Of Humanitarian Affairs 
UOL University Of Leicester 
UOS University Of Sheffield 
UPF UN Population Fund 
US United States 
USC1 UN Security Council 
USC2 US Supreme Court 
USD US State Department 
UU Utrecht University 
UWFP UN World Food Program 
UWHO UN World Health Organization 
VT Virginia Task 
WB World Bank 
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WGA Wise Giving Alliance 
WHA World Health Assembly 
WU Western Union 
WVI World Vision International 
ZGI Zayed Giving Initiative 
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APPENDIX F.  GDELT NETWORK STATISTICS AND VISUALIZATIONS FOR NEPAL’S 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM TWO YEARS PRIOR TO THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES 
Top 10 actors by weighted degree centrality 
Rank Actor 
Weighted Degree 
Centrality Score 
1 Nepali Congress 9.7943 
2 United States 9.2960 
3 Supreme Court 5.8629 
4 United Nations 4.9181 
5 Election Commission 3.6472 
6 Nepal Army 3.1355 
7 Nepal Police 2.7793 
8 Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2.2324 
9 World Bank 2.0385 
10 UN Nepal Office 1.9314 
 
Top 10 actors by betweenness centrality 
Rank Actor 
Betweenness 
Centrality Score 
1 United States 0.3128 
2 Nepali Congress 0.2961 
3 Supreme Court 0.1683 
4 United Nations 0.1303 
5 Election Commission 0.0569 
6 Nepal Army 0.0422 
7 Ministry of Home Affairs 0.0408 
8 Ministry of Commerce 0.0378 
9 Nepal Rastra Bank 0.0324 
10 World Bank 0.0290 
 
Top 10 actors by closeness centrality 
Rank Actor 
Closeness 
Centrality Score 
1 United States 0.6004 
2 Nepali Congress 0.5947 
3 Supreme Court 0.5641 
4 United Nations 0.5400 
5 Election Commission 0.5080 
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6 Council of Ministers 0.4976 
7 Ministry of Home Affairs 0.4961 
8 Nepal Army 0.4938 
9 World Bank 0.4915 
10 European Union 0.4877 
Nepal’s Governance Network, Apr 1, 2013-Jan 24, 2015 
 
Note: Node and label sizes are based on betweenness centrality with spline value of 0.8. Colors denote communities 
detected by a modularity algorithm. Visualization was made using Fruchterman-Reingold layout method in GEPHI 
0.9.2 Data source is GDELT Knowledge Graph. 
  
Network Statistics (N=485; E=1,386) 
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Variable Name Value 
Average Degree 7.698 
Weighted Average Degree 0.398 
Network Density 0.024 
Modularity 0.546 
Average Clustering Coefficient 0.773 
Average Path Length 2.69 
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APPENDIX G.  GDELT NETWORK STATISTICS AND VISUALIZATIONS FOR NEPAL’S 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES 
Top 10 actors by weighted degree centrality 
Rank Actor 
Weighted Degree 
Centrality Score 
1 United States 5.7632 
2 World Bank 3.8289 
3 Supreme Court 3.6974 
4 United Nations 3.6579 
5 Nepali Congress 3.5263 
6 Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1.9737 
7 Asian Development Bank 1.9605 
8 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 1.5658 
9 Nepal Army 1.4737 
10 CA Questionnaire Committee 1.3421 
 
 
Top 10 actors by betweenness centrality 
Rank Actor 
Betweenness 
Centrality Score 
1 Supreme Court 0.4081 
2 United States 0.3389 
3 Nepali Congress 0.2983 
4 Nepal Army 0.2144 
5 Nepal Police 0.1634 
6 US Embassy 0.1544 
7 United Nations 0.1460 
8 Health Ministry 0.1366 
9 Appellate Court 0.1226 
10 [Indian] Union Health Ministry 0.1184 
 
 
Top 10 actors by closeness centrality 
Rank Actor 
Closeness 
Centrality Score 
1 Supreme Court 0.4211 
2 United States 0.4085 
3 Nepali Congress 0.3951 
4 United Nations 0.3902 
5 Nepal Army 0.3569 
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6 European Union 0.3478 
7 Amnesty International 0.3453 
8 Truth and Reconciliation Commission 0.3404 
9 Nepal Police 0.3299 
10 Bharatiya Janata Party 0.3299 
 
 
Nepal’s Governance Network, Jan 24-Apr 24, 2015 
 
Note: Node and label sizes are based on betweenness centrality with spline value of 0.8. Colors denote communities 
detected by a modularity algorithm. Visualization was made using Fruchterman-Reingold layout method in GEPHI 
0.9.2 Data source is GDELT Knowledge Graph. 
 
Network Statistics (N=191; E=347) 
Variable Name Value 
Average Degree 4.66 
Weighted Average Degree 0.757 
Network Density 0.049 
Modularity 0.701 
Average Clustering Coefficient 0.681 
Average Path Length 3.921 
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APPENDIX H.  GDELT NETWORK STATISTICS AND VISUALIZATIONS FOR NEPAL’S 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM THREE MONTHS AFTER THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES 
Top 10 actors by weighted degree centrality 
Rank Actor 
Weighted Degree 
Centrality Score 
1 United States 8.1364 
2 United Nations 7.6688 
3 World Bank 4.0357 
4 European Union 3.0390 
5 Asian Development Bank 2.3312 
6 Supreme Court 1.8442 
7 Nepal Army 1.6201 
8 Nepali Congress 1.5584 
9 World Health Organization 1.4286 
10 Nepal Police 1.3052 
 
 
Top 10 actors by betweenness centrality 
Rank Actor 
Betweenness 
Centrality Score 
1 United States 0.4352 
2 United Nations 0.3276 
3 World Bank 0.0856 
4 Supreme Court 0.0767 
5 Nepali Congress 0.0672 
6 Nepal Army 0.0432 
7 Home Ministry 0.0428 
8 National Planning Commission 0.0367 
9 Nepal Police 0.0319 
10 European Union 0.0309 
 
 
Top 10 actors by closeness centrality 
Rank Actor 
Closeness 
Centrality Score 
1 United States 0.6064 
2 United Nations 0.5833 
3 World Bank 0.4871 
4 Supreme Court 0.4835 
5 European Union 0.4694 
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6 Home Ministry 0.4687 
7 Nepal Army 0.4646 
8 National Planning Commission 0.4593 
9 Nepali Congress 0.4561 
10 World Health Organization 0.4510 
 
Nepal’s Governance Network, Apr 25-Jul 25, 2015 
 
Note: Node and label sizes are based on betweenness centrality with spline value of 0.8. Colors denote communities 
detected by a modularity algorithm. Visualization was made using Fruchterman-Reingold layout method in GEPHI 
0.9.2 Data source is GDELT Knowledge Graph. 
 
Network Statistics (N=323; E=1,063) 
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Variable Name Value 
Average Degree 6.582 
Weighted Average Degree 0.272 
Network Density 0.02 
Modularity 0.501 
Average Clustering Coefficient 0.732 
Average Path Length 2.857 
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APPENDIX I.  GDELT NETWORK STATISTICS AND VISUALIZATIONS FOR NEPAL’S 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM TWO YEARS AFTER THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES 
Top 10 actors by weighted degree centrality 
Rank Actor 
Weighted Degree 
Centrality Score 
1 Nepali Congress 9.3666 
2 United States 8.5916 
3 United Nations 6.4148 
4 World Bank 2.9260 
5 Nepal Police 2.2315 
6 Nepal Oil Corporation 2.1254 
7 Supreme Court 2.1061 
8 Rastriya Prajatantra Party 1.7974 
9 European Union 1.5563 
10 Nepal Army 1.4952 
 
 
Top 10 actors by betweenness centrality 
 
Rank Actor 
Betweenness 
Centrality Score 
1 United States 0.3725 
2 Nepali Congress 0.3660 
3 United Nations 0.1476 
4 Nepal Oil Corporation 0.0755 
5 Supreme Court 0.0619 
6 Indian Ministry of External Affairs 0.0483 
7 World Bank 0.0346 
8 Nepal Police 0.0260 
9 Tribhuvan University 0.0186 
10 Fed. of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce 0.0183 
 
 
Top 10 actors by closeness centrality 
 
Rank Actor 
Closeness 
Centrality Score 
1 United States 0.5896 
 247 
2 Nepali Congress 0.5740 
3 United Nations 0.5328 
4 Nepal Oil Corporation 0.4788 
5 Supreme Court 0.4779 
6 Indian Ministry of External Affairs 0.4685 
7 European Union 0.4602 
8 Nepal Army 0.4586 
9 Communist Party of Nepal 0.4561 
10 Home Ministry 0.4530 
 
 
Nepal’s Governance Network, Jul 26, 2015-Jan 30, 2016 
 
Note: Node and label sizes are based on betweenness centrality with spline value of 0.8. Colors denote communities 
detected by a modularity algorithm. Visualization was made using Fruchterman-Reingold layout method in GEPHI 
0.9.2 Data source is GDELT Knowledge Graph. 
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